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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis explores the health, safety and well-being experiences of seafarers in relation 
to the organisation of work and employment at sea. Work at sea entails many features – 
such as long working hours, scheduling uncertainty and social isolation – which have 
been shown in other industries to be associated with a deterioration in workers’ health, 
safety and well-being. Moreover, the structure of the seafaring industry has changed 
beyond recognition in recent decades with the vast majority of today’s seafarers 
employed by third-party agencies on a temporary basis, and in shore-based industries 
the organisation of employment in this manner has also been associated with poorer 
occupational health, safety and well-being outcomes.  
This study used a mixed-methods approach, including both semi-structured interviews 
with seafarers onboard four ships and the secondary analysis of three shipping 
companies’ safety data. 
Seafarers’ health, safety and well-being experiences were related to the structure and 
organisation of their work and employment and fluctuated in relation to specific time 
periods within a tour of duty. In particular, the most substantial adverse well-being 
outcomes were apparent at both an early and late stage of a tour of duty, whilst safety 
outcomes were seen to significantly improve during the last week of a tour of duty for 
seafarers onboard offshore vessels. 
Further qualitative analysis revealed some strong associations between poor 
occupational health, safety and well-being experiences and the ways in which 
employment is organised at sea, and indicated a failure to address such associations in 
the arrangements in place to manage the health, safety and well-being of seafarers 
during their periods of employment. In particular, it indicated that there were substantial 
mismatches between the experiences of seafarers and the requirements of them 
determined by their shore-side management, and found that the reporting mechanisms 
that might demonstrate this were inadequate. 
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INTRODUCTION  
The aim of this study is to explore the health, safety and well-being experiences of 
seafarers in relation to the organisation of work and employment at sea. Seafaring is a 
hugely important industry, with more than 90 per cent of global trade carried by sea (IMO 
2012). The industry is not new, “from the Phoenicians, through the Egyptians, the 
Greeks and the Carthaginians, the Chinese, the Vikings, the Omanis, the Spaniards, the 
Portuguese, the Italians, the British, the French, the Dutch, the Polynesians and Celts, 
the history of the world is a history of exploration, conquest and trade by sea” (IMO 2012, 
p.6). Moreover, the industry employs an estimated 1,647,500 seafarers (BIMCO 2015). 
Research shows the seafaring industry to be particularly dangerous. Between 2003 and 
2012 seafarers onboard British flagged vessels were twenty-one times more likely to 
suffer a fatal accident at work than all other workers in Great Britain (Roberts et al. 
2014). Furthermore, rates of non-fatal injuries in the seafaring industry are of concern. In 
comparison to shore-based workers, seafarers were found to have a 70% increased risk 
of personal injury (Hansen et al. 2002).  
Seafarers are at increased risk of suicide compared to other occupations and work at 
sea entails a number of features which are known to adversely impact on well-being 
outcomes. Seafarers are one of the most physically and socially isolated demographic 
working groups worldwide (Oldenburg et al. 2010) and working at sea is characterised by 
long periods of separation from life at home and family members. Environmental 
stressors have also been identified as features which negatively affect seafarers’ 
well-being. During both their working time and their rest time seafarers are exposed to 
environmental factors such as vibration, noise and the motion of the ship (Oldenburg et 
al. 2010).  
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While some elements of working at sea which are likely to cause adverse health, safety 
and well-being outcomes have remained immutable – such as harsh weather conditions 
and social isolation – seafaring has been transformed greatly since the 1970’s. In former 
times shipping companies were predominantly family run and their ships were 
associated with a specific port. The nationality of the shipping company tended to be 
reflected in the flag under which their ships sailed. Crews were much larger and were 
predominantly composed of national workers. These crews tended to remain with one 
company for the entirety of their seagoing career. Seafarers often joined the vessel in its 
home port and sailed onboard for a prolonged period of time before ‘paying off’ the ship 
on its return to the home port. 
In today’s seafaring industry the relationship between the flag of a vessel and the 
location of ship ownership is far less predictable (Sampson 2013). Ship operators have 
flagged out their vessels to Flags of Convenience1 and it is no longer commonplace for 
vessels to be registered locally. 
Moreover, whilst historically seafarers have tended to be from the traditional maritime 
nations such as the United Kingdom, in recent decades ship-owners have sourced crew 
from emerging economies, with China and the Philippines estimated as the top two 
labour supplying countries in 2015 (BIMCO 2015). This new supply of labour is 
predominantly recruited through employment agencies in their home country, rather than 
directly by the shipping companies onboard whose ships they work (Walters and Bailey 
2013). Thus, the national link between the ship owner, flag of the ship and the ship’s 
crew no longer exists.   
                                            
1 The International Transport Workers Federation (2012) defines a flag of convenience (FOC) ship as a 
ship “that flies the flag of a country other than the country of ownership.” 
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Increasingly, today’s seafarers tend to be employed on a temporary basis – although 
among the minority of seafarers from more economically developed countries permanent 
employment is still conceivable – and are likely to be placed onboard different ships or 
even onboard ships operated by different shipping companies. As a consequence, 
seafarers’ periods of work may occur on a regular basis (for permanently employed 
seafarers) or on an ad hoc basis for those seafarers who experience temporary 
employment. The durations of these prolonged periods of intense labour at sea vary 
greatly – from one week to nine months or more – and are dependent on numerous 
factors, such as the seafarer’s nationality and which crewing agency recruited the 
individual. Consequently, it is not uncommon to find two seafarers onboard the same 
ship, working in the same rank, to have tours of duty of completely different durations.  
During tours of duty seafarers work long hours each day they are onboard. For example, 
in one study the average weekly working hours of participants was between 67 and 70 
hours and the majority of participants reported working every day of the week (Jensen et 
al. 2006). More often than not these working hours are arranged in shift patterns – owing 
to the fact that the shipping industry is a 24 hour 365 days a year industry and ships 
navigate and load cargo regardless of the time of the day or the day of the year. Many 
seafarers work split shifts and it is not unusual for seafarers to work patterns of 4 hours 
on/8 hours off or 6 hours on/6 hours off. It is thus unsurprising that literature (see for 
example Smith et al. 2006) suggests fatigue to be prevalent among the seafaring labour 
force. 
In addition, literature pertaining to injuries in the offshore oil and gas installation industry 
identified relationships between injury severity and the number of consecutive days an 
individual had been on the offshore installation (Parkes and Swash 1999). Research 
specific to the seafaring industry similarly indicates a relationship between the frequency 
of seafarers’ injuries and the number of elapsed days onboard (Hansen et al. 2002; 
Jensen et al. 2004). 
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With this background in mind, this study seeks to consider the following research 
question: What are the health, safety and well-being experiences of seafarers in relation 
to the organisation of work and employment at sea? In addressing this question the 
thesis focuses on an important aspect of the organisation of work at sea – seafarers’ 
work patterns – and in particular seafarers’ experiences throughout a tour of duty. The 
principal aim is to deepen understandings of the impact of the organisation of work and 
employment at sea on the health, safety and well-being of seafarers and contribute to an 
area of academic research which is both important and under-studied. In order to 
address the research question the thesis utilises both qualitative and quantitative 
research methods – which entail the interviewing of seafarers and the analysis of three 
shipping companies’ safety records. The thesis discusses the findings of the study, 
before finally drawing conclusions and reflecting on how some of the issues identified 
might be addressed. 
The thesis is arranged into seven main chapters. Chapters one and two present a review 
of the literature. Chapter one focusses on literature regarding the nature of the seafaring 
industry and the seafaring labour market, highlighting the widespread prevalence of 
precarious employment. It does so as, to properly understand how the organisation of 
work and employment at sea impacts on the health, safety and well-being of seafarers, it 
is necessary to look at the ways in which the seafaring industry is structured – which in 
turn enables a consideration of the extent and nature of control possible among those 
who work at sea. 
The latter half of the chapter considers the appropriate literature regarding the 
challenges associated with regulating occupational health and safety, and in particular 
the challenges specific to the seafaring industry. In doing so, it indicates issues – such as 
the working of seafarers outside the boundaries of national states – which inevitably 
have some bearing on the protection of those who work at sea. Thus, it helps to set the 
scene for chapter two, which presents a review of literature regarding occupational risks 
– specifically the risks faced by those who work at sea.  
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The first half of chapter two focusses on occupational accidents and injuries, as well as 
occupational-related illnesses and well-being at work. This chapter seeks to explore the 
current state of health, safety and well-being at sea, as well as making an important 
divide between three distinct aspects of occupational health and safety: occupational 
injuries, occupational ill-health and occupational well-being. In doing so an indication of 
what is, and is not, known about seafarers’ occupational health, safety and well-being 
outcomes is given.  
With the first half of the chapter showing the scale of the problem, the latter half of the 
chapter focusses on the contribution of the organisation of work and employment to 
occupational health, safety and well-being. In particular, the second half of the chapter 
considers literature regarding occupational accidents in relation to temporal factors – 
such as successive shifts and working hours – and indicates some associations between 
the frequency of occupational injuries and features of work patterns. In doing so, it 
explicitly draws out relationships between occupational accidents and the ways in which 
work and employment are organised in a number of shore-based industries. The chapter 
also considers literature regarding occupational health and safety in relation to features 
of seafarers’ tours of duty and presents an overview of the factors specific to both the 
early and late stages of a tour of duty. Drawing on several key studies, it considers 
patterns of fatigue throughout an entire tour of duty and the adverse impact that 
prolonged travel and jet lag has on seafarers when they arrive at a vessel. Lastly, it 
draws on a study by Bailey et al. (2007) and presents an overview of seafarers’ 
perceptions of risk at both the start and end of a tour of duty. Again, in doing so it 
indicates how features of the organisation of work and employment may be associated 
with health, safety and well-being outcomes. 
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Chapter three details the research methods utilised in this study. The chapter considers 
the key techniques used in other relevant studies and critically assesses the use of 
mixed methods research. It goes on to provide an outline of the data collection methods 
implemented in this study. The qualitative component of this study – the semi-structured 
interviewing of seafarers – is outlined and details regarding the manner in which this 
aspect of the research was conducted are provided. Finally, the chapter presents an 
overview of the ethical considerations which were taken into account in the study. 
Chapters four, five and six present an analysis of the data collected. Chapter four is the 
first of two chapters which present the qualitative findings of this study, obtained from the 
semi-structured interviewing of seafarers. The chapter provides the reader with a flavour 
of life as a seafarer and considers the complexities of life at sea throughout a usual tour 
of duty. In doing so chapter four provides an understanding of seafarers’ experiences of 
some of the features of the organisation of employment and work at sea – such as the 
use of precarious employment and tour of duty duration – and how they impact upon 
their health, safety and well-being outcomes. The findings in chapter four also help to 
situate and contextualise the findings presented in chapters five and six. 
Chapter five primarily presents the findings from the quantitative component of this 
study. The findings in this chapter are based on the secondary analysis of three shipping 
companies’ safety and human resources data. The chapter considers and compares the 
frequency of occupational injuries among seafarers with various work patterns. In 
considering the relationship between seafarers’ injuries and time into tour of duty using 
shipping company data, chapter five explores what these data can tell us about how 
work patterns – an important and integral feature of the organisation of work and 
employment – impact on the safety outcomes of those who work at sea. In later 
chapters, consideration of these findings in the light of the experiences of the seafarers 
who participated in the qualitative study allows an exploration of the extent to which 
these company data capture the extent and relevant contexts of work-related harm 
associated with working at sea.    
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Chapter six – the second of the two qualitative findings chapters – highlights findings 
regarding the experiences of seafarers pertaining to the early and late stages of a tour of 
duty. The early and late stages of a tour of duty emerged from the interviews as 
particularly important time periods during which some of the most substantial impacts of 
features of the organisation of work and employment at sea on seafarers’ health, safety 
and well-being outcomes were most apparent. A significant strength of this study is that 
the use of seafarers’ own definitions – as identified during interviews – of the time 
periods within a tour of duty which were perceived to be important were used. By 
focussing on these particular periods of time within a tour of duty, chapter six identifies a 
number of issues related to features of the organisation of work and employment at sea 
– such as scheduling uncertainty and location uncertainty – reported by the seafarers in 
this study. It also indicates gaps in the expectations of seafarers and the contractual 
obligations of those who employ them.  
Chapter seven synthesises the key findings that emerged from the analysis presented in 
chapters four, five and six. It discusses findings which indicate a mismatch between 
seafarers’ experiences and the requirements determined by shore-side, as well as the 
inadequacy of mechanisms to record this mismatch.  
The final chapter highlights the key findings from this study. In this chapter reflections on 
the research and possible approaches to addressing the problems identified are given. 
These include improvements in the recording of injury data by shipping companies – 
among others. 
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CHAPTER ONE: THE SEAFARING INDUSTY 
 
1.0 Introduction 
In this chapter, there are two points of departure. First, the nature of the seafaring 
industry and the organisation of life onboard ships are explored. The literature gives a 
flavour of how the relationship between ships’ owners and those who work onboard 
ships has changed. In doing so, literature regarding how and where labour is sourced in 
the seafaring industry and the employment terms and conditions of those who work at 
sea is considered. In exploring the nature of the seafaring industry, the consequences of 
flagging out vessels to flags of convenience – and the associated removal of the national 
link between the ship owner, flag of the ship and the ship’s crew – are seen and thus it is 
acknowledged through such literature that the seafaring industry has transformed 
beyond recognition. This has, in turn, impacted on the organisation of work and 
employment at sea, yet little is known about how these changes relate to the 
occupational health, safety and well-being experiences of the seafaring labour force. 
Second, in order to fully understand seafarers’ health, safety and well-being, it is critical 
to recognise the ways in which efforts are made to safeguard seafarers. Much of 
seafarers’ work takes place outside national boundaries and consequently the regulation 
of what can be considered as a global industry is complicated. As such, in the latter half 
of the chapter research regarding the complexity of regulating a global industry is 
considered and recent attempts to ensure the adequate protection of seafarers, such as 
the Maritime Labour Convention (2006), are explored.  
In presenting a broad and comprehensive review of literature relating to how the 
seafaring industry is structured, how seafarers are employed, and how those who work 
at sea are safeguarded this chapter provides an understanding of the extent – and also 
nature – of control possible in the seafaring industry. The chapter therefore raises 
questions of power both amongst colleagues onboard a vessel, and in the seafaring 
labour market more generally.  
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1.1 The nature of the seafaring industry 
In 1970, annual world seaborne international trade was estimated as 2.6 billion tons of 
cargo (UNCTAD 2016). In comparison, in 2015 annual world seaborne international 
trade was estimated as 10 billion tons of cargo (UNCTAD 2016). Thus, worldwide 
seaborne trade has increased exponentially during the last four decades and 
undoubtedly the seafaring industry has transformed greatly in this period. Historically, 
maritime industries were concentrated in more economically developed countries, such 
as Norway and the UK. Ships were owned, built, operated and crewed by nationals of 
the same country, and the ship flew the flag of that country.  
Today, the situation is very different. In 2016, the top five owners of the world fleet were 
Greece, Japan, China, Germany and Singapore (UNCTAD 2016). Between them they 
owned almost 50% of the world fleet (UNCTAD 2016). Yet, the five largest fleets in terms 
of flags of registration were Panama, Liberia, Marshall Islands, Hong Kong (China) and 
Singapore (UNCTAD 2016). These five countries flagged 57% of the world’s fleet 
(UNCTAD 2016). Thus, the link between where ships are owned and where they are 
flagged no longer exists. This is because ship owners are free to flag their vessels to any 
flag, a situation which has led to the prolific rise of flags of convenience and in 2016 
70.2% of the world’s merchant fleet was registered in a country which was different to the 
country in which the ship was owned (UNCTAD 2016).  
Recent studies have revealed that registering a ship under a FOC provides a number of 
benefits for ship-owners. In terms of cost it is cheaper for ship-owners to register their 
vessels with these countries as registration fees and other costs such as tonnage tax 
rates are lower (Lillie 2004). Moreover, Lillie (2004) also revealed that such countries 
offer relatively weak regulatory frameworks which enable ship-owners to adhere to lower 
regulatory requirements. It is these regulatory requirements – and the problems of 
regulating a global industry – which will be presented in the latter half of this chapter. 
Before this, the employment terms and conditions experienced by today’s seafarers and 
the composition of ships’ crews will be explored. 
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1.1.1 Seafarers’ employment 
Working onboard ships are an estimated 1,647,500 seafarers (BIMCO 2015). In 2016, 
China, the Philippines and Indonesia were listed as the top three labour supplying 
countries (UNCTAD 2016) and table 1 below shows the estimated global seafarer supply 
of officers and ratings by broad geographical areas. 
Area Officers Ratings 
OECD Countries 23% 14% 
Eastern Europe 17% 14% 
Africa and Latin America 8% 9% 
Far East 39% 55% 
Indian Sub-Continent 13% 8% 
Table 1 Estimated global seafarer supply by broad geographical area (adapted from BIMCO 2015 
[online]). 
Whilst ship-owners have long been able to employ foreign labour – British ship owners, 
for example, utilised foreign seafarers as early as the mid Nineteenth Century (Coles 
2002) – in recent decades ship-owners have cast their nets further to source seafarers to 
staff their fleets. Consequently, there has been an erosion of local seafaring labour and 
the number of seafarers from traditional maritime nations has reduced substantially. 
Moreover, UNCTAD (2016) revealed that the labour market for seafarers is increasingly 
separate from the country of vessel ownership. In one study Sampson (2013) explained 
that ship-owners enter into agreements with third-party crew agents – who are 
predominantly located in less economically developed nations – to supply locally 
sourced labour and thus the recruitment underpinning the global seafarer labour market 
has changed beyond recognition.  
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The sourcing of seafarers through local third-party crew agents has impacted upon the 
organisation of employment within the seafaring industry and the current types of 
employment prevalent within the industry can best be described as precarious 
employment. In one study the International Labour Organisation (2001) used data 
obtained from a survey of 4525 seafarers and revealed that the majority of seafarers 
were employed on contracts of a single tour of duty. Bloor and Sampson (2009, p.713) 
went on to explain that “contractual arrangements for outsourced labour vary between 
ship operators and between ship sectors (ferry, cruise, bulk carriers, container ships, oil 
tankers, gas carriers, etc.) but typically only senior officers will be employed on 
permanent contracts if permanent contracts are in place at all: junior officers (frequently) 
and crew (almost invariably) will be employed on short-term contracts of a year or less, 
but will remain ‘on the books’ of the crewing agency”. 
Research regarding precarious employment in shore-based industries has shown 
precarious employment methods to be associated with negative occupational health and 
safety outcomes. In a review of 93 studies which considered the effects that precarious 
employment has on health and safety outcomes Quinlan et al. (2001) found in 76 studies 
precarious employment was associated with a deterioration of workers’ health and safety 
in terms of rates of injuries, risk of disease, exposure to hazards or the knowledge of 
workers’ occupational health and safety and regulatory responsibilities.  
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In endeavouring to explain the link between precarious employment and inferior health 
and safety outcomes Quinlan et al. (2001, p.345) identified three broad sets of risk 
factors: “economic and reward factors, disorganisation and increased likelihood of 
regulatory failure.” Economic and reward factors encompassed issues such as 
“competition for work/underbidding of tenders and task work/payment by results” and 
disorganisation included risk factors such an “exacerbation of complexity/ambiguity in 
rules and procedures and hidden changes to work practices and underqualification, 
inadequate training and inexperience” (Quinlan et al. 2001, p.345). The risk factor 
termed ‘increased likelihood of regulatory failure’ included the “weakening of 
conventional surveillance and reporting systems and multi-employer worksites, 
situations with complex webs of legal responsibility and difficult-to-locate/monitor 
workplaces/workers for which conventional regulatory regimes are not designed and 
which require substantially more logistical resources” (Quinlan et al. 2001, p.345). 
In another study Lewchuk et al. (2003) considered the impact that precarious 
employment had on the health and well-being of workers and in doing so conducted a 
survey of more than 400 workers who were engaged in precarious employment in 
Canada which examined employment strain – a concept which was developed by 
Lewchuk et al. (2003) to capture those characteristics which are unique to precarious 
employment. There are seven components of employment strain: “employment 
uncertainty (control over access to work), earnings uncertainty (control over future 
earnings), household precarious-ness (control/demand providing basic needs), 
scheduling uncertainty (control over work schedule and hours), location uncertainty 
(control over work location), task uncertainty (control over use of skills and job 
assignment) and employment uncertainty workload (demand required to manage 
employment uncertainty)” (Lewchuk et al. 2003, p.29). 
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In designing the employment strain model Lewchuk et al. (2003) utilised some of the key 
concepts of Karasek’s (1979) Job Demand Control model. The key idea behind the Job 
Demand Control model is that a worker’s control can act as a buffer on the impact of job 
demands on strain. Thus, high job demands when accompanied by low decision latitude 
result in job strain. In the simplest sense individuals experience lower levels of well-being 
when they perceive lower levels of job control. Johnson and Hall (1998) also expanded 
Karasek’s model (1979) by adding a factor which they termed ‘support’. The Job 
Demand Control Support model predicts that low social support combined with high 
demand and low control results in job strain. 
Building on these models the employment strain model of Lewchuk et al. (2003) 
hypothesised that levels of employment strain may not necessarily correlate with job 
strain. That is, employment strain captures a dimension of the organisation of work which 
is independent from a worker’s experience with any one workplace (Lewchuk et al. 
2003). In a questionnaire study, which explored workers’ employment strain Lewchuk et 
al. (2008) revealed that scheduling uncertainty was associated with negative health 
outcomes. Lewchuk et al’s. (2003) findings pose some interesting questions for the 
seafaring labour force, the majority of which is employed precariously on contracts of a 
single tour of duty, on an ad hoc basis.  
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Despite the negative health, safety and well-being outcomes associated with precarious 
employment, for some seafarers’ permanent employment is simply not an option. For 
example, in the Philippines the ‘Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Overseas 
Employment of Filipino Seafarers Onboard Ocean Going Ships states: “The employment 
contract between the employer and the seafarer shall commence upon actual departure 
of the seafarer from the Philippine airport or seaport in the point of hire and with a POEA 
approved contract. It shall be effective until the seafarer’s date of arrival at the point of 
hire upon termination of his employment pursuant to Section 18 of this Contract. The 
period of employment shall be for a period mutually agreed upon by the seafarer and the 
employer but not to exceed 12 months. Any extension of the contract shall be subject to 
mutual consent of both parties” (POEA 2013). Consequently, Filipino seafarers are 
prohibited from engaging in permanent employment. 
This is not the case globally, however, as not all seafarers experience precarious 
employment – some seafarers are permanently employed directly by shipping 
companies. In a study regarding the employment methods utilised in the seafaring 
industry Ellis et al. (2012) used questionnaire data and revealed that the type of 
employment experienced by seafarers was significantly related to the seafarers’ 
nationality. It showed that 75% of all respondents reported that they were employed on 
temporary contracts, however, when considering the British questionnaire respondents 
in isolation, 21% were employed on short-term contracts (Ellis et al. 2012). Other factors 
such as rank and ship type were also found, to a lesser extent, to influence the type of 
employment experienced by the respondents (Ellis et al. 2012).  
Seafarers who are employed on permanent contracts experience fixed periods of time at 
sea and fixed periods of time at home, on a cyclical basis and recent studies have 
revealed that the ratio of leave to time at sea is dependent on both rank and nationality.  
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Those seafarers who are employed on short-term contracts – which are commonly 
referred to as voyage contracts – are employed onboard a ship for a pre-determined 
period before returning home and seeking a new voyage contract, a process which 
occurs on an ad hoc basis. Consequently, the length of time such seafarers spend at 
home following employment onboard a ship is almost entirely dependent upon the 
availability of subsequent voyage contracts. 
Recent studies have also revealed that the length of time a seafarer is deployed for 
varies and this was seen to be related to the ship type on which they were sailing, their 
rank, their nationality and which crewing agency recruited them. In one study Oldenburg 
et al. (2009) found that the average tour of duty for European seafarers was between 
three and six months, whereas for non-European seafarers the average was between six 
and nine months.  
Seafarers from less economically developed countries were found to be willing to accept 
longer tours than their colleagues from more economically developed countries as for 
many seafarers from poorer nations any job onboard a ship is better than the alternative, 
which is wide-spread unemployment. Moreover, there are substantial differences 
between the average salary earned ashore and the salary earned at sea – particularly for 
those individuals from less economically developed countries. For example, Lillie (2004) 
reported the average monthly wage for an industrial worker ashore in the Philippines to 
be $140. In comparison, the median monthly wage for a Filipino able seaman was found 
to be $1025 (Lillie 2004). 
Seafarers’ willingness to endure unfavourable terms of employment is also a cause for 
concern with regards to occupational health and safety, as Sampson (2013, p.92) 
explains: “crew members are not only willing to sacrifice a great deal in pursuit of high 
dollar salaries, with which there is no comparison for local shore-based jobs, they are 
also frequently recruited from very impoverished backgrounds where living standards, 
and consequently expectations, are low.”  
16 
 
The ways in which seafarers are employed also impact on the ship types on which they 
sail and to understand this issue it is necessary to consider seafarers’ professional 
qualifications. First, individuals sailing as deck and engine officers are required to hold a 
Certificate of Competency and the exact requirements and procedures for obtaining this 
vary from country to country. The minimum requirements, however, are outlined in the 
International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for 
Seafarers (1978) – a convention which will be discussed in greater detail in section 1.2.1 
– and a Certificate of Competency states the capacity in which the seafarer who has 
been awarded it can sail.  
These Certificates of Competency can be unlimited in terms of the geographical area in 
which the ship sails or the ship’s tonnage – or they may have limitations based on 
geographical area or gross tonnage. It is imperative to recognise, however, that a 
Certificate of Competency does not contain any restrictions in terms of ship type. 
Similarly, ratings must obtain basic certification in areas such as firefighting and first aid 
and this basic certification is universal across all sectors of the seafaring industry. Thus, 
seafarers are able to be employed onboard any ship type2. Within the industry there are 
numerous vessel types and an aggregation of ship types – conducted by Equasis (2014 
[online]) – gave the following twelve main types: general cargo ships, specialised cargo 
ships, container ships, ro-ro ships, bulk carriers, oil and chemical tankers, gas tankers, 
other tankers, passenger ships, offshore vessels, and service ships. A lack of restriction 
permits seafarers to be employed onboard any of these ship types.  
 
                                            
2 An exception to this is officers who are involved in cargo operations onboard tankers (oil/chemical and 
gas) who require additional certification. 
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Consequently, the seafaring labour force can be considered to offer what Leong (2012) 
terms functional flexibility – that is seafarers can transfer their services to other sectors of 
the seafaring industry. This is of benefit to those who control the seafaring labour force 
as, in the event of a labour shortage in a sector, seafaring labour can be sought from 
another sector. Thus, shipping companies can choose not to employ seafarers when 
their labour is not required safe in the knowledge that labour can be sourced in other 
sectors should a shortage of seafaring labour occur in times of increased demand.  
This approach by shipping companies to the seafaring labour force has some salience in 
relation to labour process theory which argues that the workforce is objectified in terms 
of its use values (ILPC 2008). 
By treating seafarers in a flexible manner, the costs of the employers are reduced, and 
such flexibility is, arguably, a consequence of shipping companies’ lack of commitment 
to seafarers. Consequently, this flexibility – and instability – is a concern for seafarers in 
terms of employment uncertainty and these are features of the organisation of 
employment at sea which are likely to impact on their occupational health, safety and 
well-being.  
1.1.2 Organisation of life onboard 
Onboard ships, seafarers are deemed as either officers or ratings and ratings are those 
seafarers who are employed in roles which require lower levels of professional seafaring 
qualifications (Glen 2008). Individuals occupying trainee officer positions are commonly 
referred to as Cadets. In 2016, around 51% of seafaring positions were for officers and 
the remaining 49% of positions were for ratings (UNCTAD 2016). 
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Onboard each ship a seafarer occupies a specific position and within the seafaring 
industry an unusually strong hierarchical structure exists with officers and ratings having 
separate spaces to socialise and even eat. Figure 1 below illustrates the general rank 
structure onboard a ship, however, it should be noted that onboard some ships there are 
slight variances in this structure.  
These individuals share the space onboard which can be divided into five general 
sections: the bridge, the engine room, the accommodation block, the weather decks and 
the cargo holds. When a seafarer is not on duty they can normally be found in the 
accommodation block, the area that includes the cabins and mess rooms. Seafarers 
onboard modern ships tend to have single-person en-suite single cabins. However, there 
are no spaces onboard a ship that are truly private; even a seafarer’s cabin can be 
entered at any time by the Captain and all cabins are subjected to regular inspections in 
accordance with the Maritime Labour Convention (2006) – a convention which will be 
discussed in section 1.2.1. As Sampson (2013, p. 122) states: “for many seafarers the 
ship is not regarded as a home or a community but is merely an institutional work space 
where they have to survive until the end of each contract”. 
The work undertaken by seafarers varies depending on their position onboard. The 
Captain, for example, is in overall command of the ship and is required to ensure the 
safe operation and navigation of the vessel. The primary role of the deck officers (Chief 
Officers, Second Officers and Third Officers) is to navigate the vessel and ensure the 
planned voyage is carried out. These individuals spend the majority of their working time 
on the bridge and generally in each twenty-four hour period they undertake two periods 
of watchkeeping (Sampson 2013). Deck ratings (Able Seamen and Ordinary Seamen) 
are supervised by a Bosun and assist the deck officers by maintaining a lookout during 
the hours of darkness and acting as a helmsman when required. In port the duties of 
deck officers and ratings include loading and discharging cargo and maintaining a 
security watch. 
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The engineering officers (Chief Engineers, Second Engineers, Third Engineers and 
Fourth Engineers) and the engine ratings (Fitters and Wipers) undertake the routine 
maintenance and monitoring of equipment in the engine room. Finally, the Chief Cook 
and Messman are generally found in the galley and take care of many of the domestic 
requirements, such as cooking and cleaning onboard. 
The exact nature of the work undertaken by seafarers also varies between different ship 
types. For example, whilst in port onboard tankers deck officers operate pumps to 
discharge cargo whereas onboard passenger vessels deck officers ensure passengers 
safely disembark.  
Irrespective of the work they undertake the work space of seafarers is not only to work in, 
seafarers must also live in this space – and socialise with those who share this space for 
prolonged periods of time. Onboard a ship the number of seafarers can vary and the 
minimum number of seafarers each vessel requires is decided by the vessel’s flag state 
in accordance with safe manning regulations (ILO, 2006). The flag state’s responsibility 
to determine the minimum number of seafarers again indicates why it is in the ship 
owners’ interests to use certain flags. In an article published by the Nautical Institute the 
author explains that a flag state assesses a manning proposal made by a shipping 
company and “subjectively makes a decision as to whether the company’s proposal can 
be agreed” (Bowring 2006, p.11). It goes on to explain “if one administration always 
holds out for higher crew numbers then owners under that flag will find that they are 
uncompetitive and will consider changing flag. Some companies put more people 
onboard but others feel that to remain competitive, they are only able to sail with a 
complement similar to that of their competitors” (Bowring 2006, p.11). 
In a study which analysed crewing levels – but did not differentiate between vessels’ flag 
states – Winchester et al. (2006) revealed that the mean number of seafarers onboard 
tankers varied from 11.7 to 25.0. Findings regarding crew size onboard dry cargo 
vessels were found to be similar (mean between 10.0 and 25.7 seafarers). 
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Figure 1 Onboard occupational hierarchy
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These individuals may be of any nationality and in a study, Wu and Winchester (2005) 
revealed that multi-national crewing – whereby onboard one ship seafarers of three or 
more nationalities work alongside one another – is now widespread. They go on to state 
that multi-national crewing has undoubtedly been helped by transnational links between 
ship-owners, manning agencies and national labour markets (as discussed in section 
1.1.1 above). Multi-national crewing, however, has implications for language and 
communication between individuals onboard, as whilst English is the universal language 
used at sea, for many seafarers it is not their native language. In one study regarding 
multilingual crews Sampson and Zhao (2003) revealed that seafarers perceived 
communication between multi-national crews as a substantial potential problem – owing 
to the fact that miscommunication or poor communication could contribute to both 
work-related and social problems. Some of the seafarers interviewed as part of the study 
by Sampson and Zhao (2003) cited experiences whereby misunderstandings arose 
because individuals were unable to convey how to carry out a particular task or which 
tools were needed for a job. 
Despite concerns for both inadequate communication and cultural barriers amongst 
multi-national crews, in some studies seafarers have been found to express a preference 
for working as part of a multi-national crew. Sampson and Zhao (2003) revealed that 
seafarers perceived the potential for conflict to be reduced when working with other 
nationalities. This perception was seen to relate to the notion that social distance and in 
turn tolerance and respect, was greater in teams of mixed nationals. In a questionnaire 
study regarding seafarers’ stressors, however, 39.5% of respondents had a positive 
attitude towards multicultural crews, 5.5% a negative one and 55.0% were neutral 
(Oldenburg et al. 2009). Importantly, there were substantial differences in attitudes 
between European and non-European seafarers, with only 25.2% of non-Europeans 
perceiving multicultural crews as positive and more than 70% stating they were neutral to 
such crews (Oldenburg et al. 2009). 
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Irrespective of the seafarers’ nationality – and indeed the nation to which the ship is 
flagged – the rest hours of all those who work at sea are determined by the Maritime 
Labour Convention (2006). The Maritime Labour Convention (2006), which will be 
discussed further in section 1.2.1, requires all seafarers to have a minimum of 10 hours 
rest per day and all seafarers must have 77 hours rest per week. Importantly, “hours of 
rest may be divided into no more than two periods, one of which shall be at least six 
hours in length, and the interval between consecutive periods of rest shall not exceed 14 
hours.” (ILO 2006, p.31). It is worth noting that the seafaring industry is unusual in that 
the minimum number of rest hours is specified, rather than the maximum hours of work. 
The hours which seafarers work are dependent on the working routine of the ship – 
which in turn depends on a number of factors such as the ship type, the number of 
seafarers onboard and the frequency of port visits. Table 2 on the following page is a 
version of the ILO specimen shipboard working arrangements table, which is required by 
the Seafarers’ Hours of Work and the Manning of Ships Convention (commonly referred 
to as ILO 180). Whilst the table does not give the exact hours all seafarers work, it does 
give a flavour of the working routine at sea.  
Moreover, a number of studies have revealed the rest hours of seafarers to be 
under-recorded, with seafarers recording their rest hours to comply with requirements 
rather than the actual hours of rest they experienced. In one study regarding global 
governance in the seafaring industry, Bloor (2003) stated that it was widely known that 
seafarers’ hours of work and rest were being routinely falsified. This situation poses a 
number of important questions with regards to how those who work at sea are 
safeguarded – an issue which this chapter now turns to. 
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Table 2 Shipboard working arrangements (adapted from ILO 1996 [online])
Position/rank Scheduled daily work hours at sea Scheduled daily work hours in port Total daily rest hours 
  
Watchkeeping 
Non-watchkeeping 
duties Watchkeeping (from - to) 
Non-watchkeeping duties 
(from - to) At sea In port 
(from-to) (from-to) (from-to)         
Chief Officer 04.00 - 08.00 16.00 - 20.00 08.00 - 10.00   06.00 - 18.00 14 12 
Second Officer 00.00 - 04.00 12.00 - 16.00 10.00 - 12.00 00.00-06.00 / 12.00-18.00   14 12 
Third Officer 08.00 - 12.00 20.00 - 24.00 13.00 - 15.00 06.00-12.00 / 18.00-24.00   14 12 
Bosun     06-12, 13 – 17   06.00 - 18.00 14 12 
AB (Watchkeeper) 04.00 - 08.00 16.00 - 20.00 08.00 - 10.00 00.00-06.00 / 12.00-18.00   14 12 
AB (Watchkeeper) 00.00 - 04.00 12.00 - 16.00 10.00 - 12.00 06.00-12.00 / 18.00-24.00   14 12 
AB (Watchkeeper) 08.00 - 12.00 20.00 - 24.00 13.00 - 15.00 00.00-06.00 / 12.00-18.00   14 12 
AB (Day man)     06-12, 13-17 06.00-12.00 / 18.00-24.00   14 12 
OS     06-12, 13-17   06.00-12.00 / 13.00-17.00 14 14 
Chief Engineer   08-12, 13-17   08-12, 13-17 16 16 
Second Engineer   08-12, 13-17  08-12, 13-17 16 16 
Third Engineer   08-12, 13-17  08-12, 13-17 16 16 
Motorman   08-12, 13-17  08-12, 13-17 16 16 
Cook     06-13, 15-18   06.00-13.00 / 15.00-18.00 10 10 
Mess man     06-13, 15-18   06.00-13.00 / 15.00-18.00 10 10 
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1.2 Safeguarding seafarers 
The second half of this chapter explores the various ways in which seafarers are 
safeguarded. In doing so it provides an outline of the regulatory environment within 
which the mechanisms to protect seafarers’ health, safety and well-being are 
situated. 
The section begins by detailing the key regulatory instruments of global governance 
which shape the regulation of occupational health and safety in the seafaring 
industry. These include legislation regarding labour standards, the environment, 
safety and training. In particular, those instruments which are of the most relevance to 
the health and safety of seafarers are presented. 
It then moves on to consider the role of flag state and port state control. The flag state 
is the “country of registry of a sea going vessel” (OECD 2003 [online]) and it has the 
authority to enforce regulations on ships flying their flag. The International Maritime 
Organisation (2017 [online]) defines port state control as the “inspection of foreign 
ships in national ports to verify that the condition of the ship and its equipment comply 
with the requirements of international regulations and that the ship is manned and 
operated in compliance with these rules.” Port state control in particular, plays an 
important role in the safeguarding of seafarers’ health, safety and well-being. 
Finally, the section concludes by describing the private regulation of health and safety 
at sea and the major players currently engaged in this. These players include 
classification societies, protection and indemnity (P & I) clubs, as well as trade 
unions. Furthermore, Walters and Bailey (2013, p.123) state that “in shore-based 
industry, business relations within supply chains are increasingly regarded as 
potentially useful leverage in improving worker conditions” and thus the roles of 
supply chain players such as oil majors are considered. Each of these private 
regulators are important, particularly given the limitations of state regulation in the 
face of a global industry. 
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1.2.1 Instruments of global governance in the seafaring industry 
At a global level health and safety regulations in the seafaring industry include both 
International Maritime Organisation (IMO) and International Labour Organisation 
(ILO) Conventions. The IMO is a United Nations specialised agency and is the 
principal maritime treaty making body. The ILO is also a United Nations specialised 
agency but is concerned specifically with labour standards (Walters and Bailey 2013). 
One key IMO convention concerning seafarers’ safety is the International Convention 
for the Safety of Life at Sea (1974) (SOLAS). The convention is the primary legislation 
for transportation at sea and in 1994 the IMO added a chapter titled the ‘Management 
for the safe operation of ships’ to SOLAS. This chapter is universally known as the 
ISM Code and the code shifted the focus of managing seafarers’ health and safety 
from maritime administrations to shipping companies. The code requires a safety 
management system to be implemented by ship operators worldwide and the 
legislation represents a shift from the previous prescriptive regulatory approach 
(Bailey 2006). Thus, the ISM Code brought the seafaring industry more in line with 
shore-based industries which have adopted similar regulatory approaches.  
One important requirement of the ISM Code is the recording and investigating of 
accidents by shipping companies. Literature regarding the reporting of incidents in the 
seafaring industry, however, suggests the occupational incidents which are reported 
in the seafaring industry may just be the tip of the iceberg. In one study Psarros et al. 
(2010) analysed accident data for Norwegian flagged vessels which was obtained 
from the Norwegian Maritime Directorate and Lloyd’s Register Fair Play and 
suggested that around 30% of incidents experienced were reported.  
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A number of reasons as to why seafarers may not report incidents have been 
identified. In his study on the impact of the ISM Code on the management of health 
and safety, Bhattacharya (2012) revealed that seafarers feared reporting an incident 
as they felt that doing so would subject them to disciplinary action – be this directly or 
indirectly – as they would be assumed by managers to be responsible for the incident. 
Thus, whilst seafarers readily acknowledge the under-reporting of incidents they 
justified that they did so in order to avoid shore-side managers demanding an 
explanation from them (Bhattacharya 2012). In addition, some seafarers were seen to 
not only be concerned about reprisals to themselves individually but also wanted to 
avoid reporting an incident which might bring a colleague’s professional reputation 
into disrepute, which in turn would lead to them becoming labelled as someone who 
betrays their colleagues (Bhattacharya 2012). Such worries are likely to be 
significantly exacerbated by the fact that many seafarers are precariously employed – 
an issue discussed in section 1.1.1 – and consequently prioritise obtaining future 
employment over the reporting of an injury. 
Whilst SOLAS is perhaps the IMO’s best known legislation, other treaties which are 
directly related to the safety of ships include the International Convention on Load 
Lines 1996, which primarily concerns the depth a vessel can be loaded to and the 
International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGS) 1973, which 
can be compared to the Highway Code. 
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Another important IMO convention is the International Convention on Standards of 
Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW) 78. In section 1.1.1 it 
was seen that STCW outlines the minimum requirements seafarers need to sail in 
certain positions within a ship’s onboard occupational hierarchy. In doing so it aims to 
ensure that ships are operated in a common manner and maintain standards among 
the labour force – factors which are known to have implications for occupational 
health and safety in the industry. The maintaining of seafarers’ standards is especially 
important given that research has consistently shown human behaviour to be a 
significant cause of incidents at sea. In one study the MCA (2010 [online]) stated that 
human behaviour was the source of “virtually all” losses at sea. In a study which 
reviewed literature on the human element of safety in the shipping industry 
Hetherington et al. (2006) revealed there are a number of human factors which 
influence safety at sea including: situational awareness, team work, communication 
and decision making. Hetherington et al. (2006) concluded that there are individual 
and organisational behaviours which are common to accidents in the seafaring 
industry. These individual and organisational behaviours may, in turn, be related to 
how work at sea is organised, and consequently the argument of the role of human 
error in accident causation supports the main objective of this study which is to 
explore the impact of the organisation of work and employment at sea on the 
occupational health, safety and well-being of seafarers. 
Given the role of human error in accident causation it is unsurprising that attempts 
have been made to regulate the human element of the seafaring industry. One such 
attempt is the labour standards for those who work are sea, which are consolidated 
under the International Maritime Labour Convention (MLC) 2006. The MLC (2006) 
falls under the four titles: Minimum requirements for seafarers to work on a ship; 
Conditions of employment; Accommodation, recreational facilities and food and 
catering; and Health protection, medical care, and welfare and social security 
protection.  
In section 4 of the MLC (2006) it is stipulated that member states are responsible for 
the management of health and safety onboard ships that are flagged to their state – 
however, the use of flag states to enforce regulations in the seafaring industry is not 
without problems, as will now be seen. 
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1.2.2 Flag state and port state control 
Irrespective of the amount of regulation governing the seafaring industry, such 
regulation is only of use if it is adequately implemented and enforced. The flag state is 
supposed to be the principal regulatory body in the seafaring industry through its own 
system of certification and inspection (Walters and Bailey 2013). Critics, however, 
have argued that Flags of Convenience lack both the infrastructure and the will to 
ensure compliance. It was seen in section 1.1 that the flagging of vessels to the 
newer maritime states (FOC’s) is widespread and consequently the use of flag states 
across the global seafaring industry in implementing and enforcing regulations is 
generally considered as inadequate. As a result, some states decided to protect their 
own territorial waters and coastlines and consequently this helped to develop a 
further key regulatory body: port state control. 
Port state control utilises port state inspectors who board ships and conduct 
inspections to ensure compliance with international conventions such as STCW and 
SOLAS. There are a range of options available to port state inspectors should they 
identify any deficiencies, which include prohibiting the vessel from entering their 
national ports in future or detaining the ship until the necessary rectifications have 
been made. 
Memorandums of Understanding (MOU’s) have been formed by states within regional 
groups and are an internationally agreed approached to the inspection of foreign 
flagged vessels. The IMO (2017) states there are currently nine regional MOU’s: 
Paris, Tokyo, Abuja, Caribbean, Black Sea, Mediterranean, Indian Ocean, Riyadh 
and Acuerdo de Vina del Mar (Latin America). The purpose of the MOU’s is to ensure 
“that as many ships as possible are inspected but at the same time prevent ships 
being delayed by unnecessary inspections.” (IMO 2017 [online]). The Paris MOU 
publishes lists which classify the flag states of vessels in terms of risk. The white list is 
classified as quality flags, the black list is for flags which are classified as between 
medium risk and high risk inclusive, whilst the grey list is for flags classified between 
quality and medium risk (ParisMOU 2017). In 2015, of 73 flag states, 43 were on the 
white list, 19 were on the grey list and 11 were on the black list (ParisMOU 2017). 
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The enforcement of international regulations in the seafaring industry through the use 
of port state control, however, is not without limitations. In a study which involved 
shadowing port state ship inspectors in Russia, India and the UK, Bloor (2003) 
revealed substantial inconsistencies in inspection practice between ports and 
countries, as well as between inspectors. The 2014 annual report published by Paris 
MOU indicated that port state control has not succeeded in fully eliminating all 
substandard ships – a point made by Bloor (2003) over a decade earlier. In the 2003 
annual report Paris MOU itself stated: “Port State control results for 2002 indicate that 
efforts need to be enhanced to obtain a substantial reduction in the number of 
substandard ships visiting the region” (Paris MOU 2003 [online]). 
Nevertheless, in a study regarding the effectiveness of port state control inspections 
in Sweden Cariou et al. (2008) revealed that following an inspection, deficiencies 
were reduced by 63% at the subsequent inspection. Thus, whilst port state control 
has not eliminated all substandard ships – as evidenced by the fact that 63 vessels 
were banned in Paris MOU ports between 2012 and 2014 (ParisMOU 2014) – the 
finding indicates it has played a role in improving the standards of some vessels. The 
continued presence of substandard ships, however, indicates limitations in the 
safeguarding of seafarers and these limitations support the need for a deeper 
understanding of the factors which negatively impact on seafarers’ health, safety and 
well-being outcomes. 
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1.2.3 Private regulation 
In this final sub-section literature regarding the private regulation of health and safety 
in the seafaring industry is considered. Some forms of private regulation predate state 
regulation – one of which is the regulating of the condition of sea-going vessels 
through the use of classification societies. Classification societies are closely tied to 
risk assessment and insurance and they conduct routine surveys to ensure vessels 
are maintained to a specified standard. By certifying a ship as meeting their standards 
classification societies enable insurance companies to allocate ships a risk rating, 
which in turn enables ship owners to obtain insurance for the ship’s hull and 
machinery. If ships are to be insured they must remain in class, and to do so 
minimum standards must be met. In one study Payer (1998) revealed that 
classification societies made a substantial contribution to harmonising an adequate 
standard of structural requirements for vessels. Moreover, Walters and Bailey (2013) 
explain that the standard setting and certification activities of classification societies 
play a role in protecting the health and safety of those who work at sea. 
Closely aligned with classification societies are Protection and Indemnity Clubs which 
insure many of the liabilities relevant to the seafaring industry. INTERTANKO (2006) 
– which is a worldwide association of tanker owners – explain that liabilities generally 
include: the death and personal injury of seafarers, passengers and third parties; 
liabilities in respect of persons saved at sea and stowaways; liabilities arising from 
collisions, groundings, pollution, damage to fixed and floating objects, wreck removal, 
towage operations; and liability to cargo. P & I Clubs operate on a non-profit basis 
and between the thirteen P & I Clubs 95% of the global sea-going tonnage liabilities 
are insured (Seward 2002). Whilst the insurance of liabilities is the primary area of 
work of P & I Clubs, a further area of work entails co-operation in matters of common 
interest, for example, representing common interests in discussions at the IMO 
(Seward 2002). DeSombre (2006) suggests that the standard of ship admission to P 
& I Clubs is generally acknowledged as being rigorous and thus provides a further 
form of private independent regulatory control in the seafaring industry. 
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Commercial hirers of ships are also recognised as a form of independent regulatory 
control which make a positive contribution to seafarers’ health, safety and well-being. 
In some sectors of the seafaring industry – for example the chemical and oil sectors – 
ships are inspected by those who commercially hire them. In the oil sector the Oil 
Companies International Maritime Forum (OCIMF) – a representative organisation for 
the oil majors – routinely inspects tankers through the Ship Inspection Report 
Programne (SIRE). OCIMF (2014 [online]) states that “the SIRE programme is a 
unique tanker risk assessment tool of value to charterers, ship operators, terminal 
operators and government bodies concerned with ship safety.”  
Walters and Bailey (2013 p.124) explain: “to compete for contracts, tanker companies 
must ensure their ships are maintained and operated at a level dictated by the oil 
majors, including with respect to arrangements for the management of health and 
safety onboard.” Oil majors use the SIRE programme to determine whether or not a 
tanker is maintained and operated to the standard they require. Significantly, if a 
vessel fails to meet the required standard, it is likely to result in an oil major denying 
business across the ship owner’s entire fleet. SIRE inspections are widely regarded 
as rigorous and Bhattacharya (2009) states that the benefits SIRE poses in terms of 
safeguarding the occupational health and safety of seafarers are acknowledged by 
the seafaring industry as being considerable.  
Trade Unions also play a role in safeguarding the occupational health, safety and 
well-being of seafarers. In a study regarding the collective bargaining of seafarers 
Lillie (2006) argued that trade unions are a strong force in the seafaring industry. In 
particular, the International Transport Workers Federation (ITF) has been active in 
promoting international collective bargaining. Lillie (2004) states that the ITF has 
been instrumental in bringing about a global inter-union uniform wage rate.  
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At a shipboard level, however, trade union presence is considered to be weak 
(Walters and Bailey 2013). This is a concern for the safeguarding of seafarers’ health, 
safety and well-being as shore-based studies, such as Walters’ (2006) study on 
workers’ representation in the United Kingdom, have revealed that an important 
aspect of worker representation regarding occupational health and safety occurs in 
the workplace. Consequently, whilst private regulation in the seafaring industry plays 
an important role in the safeguarding of seafarers it is not without limitations. Viewing 
these limitations of safeguarding alongside those of both the instruments of global 
governance and flag and port state controls, suggests that there is a need for further 
research regarding safeguarding inadequacy and its implications for seafarers’ 
health, safety and well-being. 
1.3 Summary 
The review of literature in this chapter has shown how the seafaring industry has 
been transformed in the last half century. The transformation of the seafaring industry 
has a number of implications for this study. First, the link between the flag of the ship, 
the ship owner and the seafarers working onboard no longer exists. Gone are the 
days when ship owners permanently employed local seafarers to work onboard ships 
flagged to their home nation. Instead todays seafarers are precariously employed – a 
situation which has been seen in shore based industries to relate to adverse 
occupational health and safety outcomes (see for example Quinlan et al. 2001).  
Moreover, the emergence of FOC’s has reduced the implementation and 
enforcement of global legislation by the flag state – as was seen in the latter half of 
this chapter which outlined the instruments of global governance in the seafaring 
industry. This is of particular importance for this study as it indicates the inability of 
flag states to safeguard the seafaring workforce. 
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Thus, what emerges from the review of literature in this chapter concerns the broader 
structure of the seafaring industry, the ways in which work at sea is organised and the 
manner in which seafarers are employed. This chapter therefore presents an 
understanding of the extent of control which may be experienced by those who work 
at sea. Such control – and the associated power and ensuring inequalities – are 
important determinants of the organisation of work and employment which are likely 
to impact upon the health, safety and well-being outcomes of seafarers.  
In the following chapter literature regarding the organisation of work – in particular 
work patterns – and the impact features of these have on safety and well-being 
outcomes will be considered.  
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CHAPTER TWO: SEAFARERS’ OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH, SAFETY AND 
WELL-BEING 
 
2.0 Introduction 
This chapter presents literature relating to the occupational health, safety and 
well-being of those who work at sea. It provides both an understanding of what is 
currently known regarding the occupational health, safety and well-being outcomes of 
those who work at sea and highlights some of the areas where such knowledge is 
fragmented. In doing so this chapter indicates that whilst some of the occupational 
health, safety and well-being outcomes of seafarers are related to the hazardous 
nature of the maritime environment – for example poor weather conditions – many of 
the hazards experienced by seafarers are associated with the ways in which work 
and employment at sea is organised. 
In demonstrating this, the first half of this chapter explores the different aspects of 
occupational health and safety: occupational safety, occupational health concerns 
and occupational well-being. Whilst the importance of workplace safety is widely 
understood – as are occupational health concerns – historically, less consideration 
has been given to occupational well-being. Yet there are many aspects of life at sea, 
such as isolation and fatigue, which suggest that the seafaring workforce may be at 
particular risk of poor well-being outcomes – and many of these aspects are 
associated with the ways in which employment and work at sea is organised. 
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The first section considers seafarers’ occupational safety. Research has shown 
seafaring to be dangerous in terms of the likelihood of experiencing a fatality or 
personal injury: for example, in the previous decade seafarers were nearly twenty-six 
times more likely to suffer a fatal accident at work than all other workers in Great 
Britain (Roberts and Marlow 2005). The section then goes on to consider literature 
regarding seafarers’ health concerns. Owing to the nature of their work, seafarers are 
exposed to health risks – such as exposure to carcinogenic substances – which are 
rarely encountered by those employed in other occupations. Given such risks, it is 
perhaps unsurprising that seafarers’ rates of illnesses, such as heart disease and 
respiratory cancers, compare unfavourably with workers in other industries. The first 
half of this chapter concludes with a consideration of seafarers’ well-being and the 
psychosocial hazards faced by those who work at sea. These hazards include 
factors, such as stress, which have been seen to be related to the organisation of 
work and employment in other industries.  
The second half of this chapter draws on a body of literature concerning the 
organisation of work, in particular work patterns and the impact features of these have 
on safety and well-being outcomes. In doing so it presents international research 
findings on temporal factors, including working hours and time of the day in relation to 
safety and well-being outcomes. The chapter moves on to consider injury frequency 
in relation to time within a tour of duty and concludes by drawing on literature relating 
to factors which are associated with an early and late stage of a seafarer’s tour of 
duty. 
2.1 Occupational injuries, illnesses and well-being 
The ILO (2008 [online]) defines occupational health and safety as “the science of the 
anticipation, recognition, evaluation and control of hazards arising in or from the 
workplace that could impair the health and well-being of workers, taking into account 
the possible impact on the surrounding communities and the general environment.” In 
2015/16 in Great Britain there were 1.3 million individuals who experienced a 
work-related injury and 144 people were killed at work (HSE 2017). There are 
differences between the most hazardous occupations within the UK and when 
comparing fatality rates for the thirty most dangerous occupations in Great Britain, 
Roberts (2010) found merchant seafarers to be in the top ten most hazardous 
occupations in Great Britain. 
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Moreover, British seafarers were found to have relatively high mortality rates for 
several cancers – such as cancer of the liver and cancer of the larynx – as well as for 
cirrhosis and pancreatitis (Office of Populations, Censuses and Survey 1995). 
Similarly, in a more recent study Danish seafarers were identified as experiencing an 
increased overall cancer risk, in particular lung cancer, compared to the overall 
population (Kaerlev et al. 2005). Seafarers were also found to be more likely than the 
general population to engage in unhealthy behaviours – such as smoking and 
consuming high levels of alcohol (Parker et al. 1997).  
Similarly, the mental health and well-being of seafarers is a cause for concern. 
Suicide rates among British (Mayhew 1999) and Danish (Brandt et al. 1994) 
seafarers were found to be high. Poor mental health and well-being among seafarers 
has been seen to manifest itself in other less dramatic ways – such as the reported 
high levels of work-related stress (Carotenuto et al. 2012) and fatigue (Smith et al. 
2006). 
In the following sections these three main aspects of occupational health and safety: 
occupational injuries, occupational related illnesses and occupational well-being will 
be considered in turn.  
2.1.1 Accidents and injuries in the seafaring industry 
In 2002 the IMO ([online]) stated that “shipping is perhaps the most international of all 
the world’s great industries and one of the most dangerous.” Such a statement is 
supported by data obtained from the MCA which indicated that the occupational 
fatality rate for seafarers was twelve times higher than that of the general workforce 
(Allianz 2012). 
A distinction must be drawn, however, between two fundamentally different causes of 
fatalities in the shipping industry. One cause is maritime casualty, in which a disaster 
befalls a ship and impacts upon the entire ship – and all the individuals onboard. 
Maritime casualties may be caused by events such as collisions, fire, capsizing or 
explosions. These events may result in the loss of seafarers’ lives. In recent years, 
maritime casualties have included the capsizing and sinking of the cement carrier 
Cemfjord in 2015, resulting in the loss of eight lives (MAIB 2016). 
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The other cause is occupational fatality – in which an individual seafarer (or a small 
number of seafarers) are involved in a specific task and experience a work-related 
mishap which results in their death. These mishaps may include slips, trips and falls, 
which were found to account for 43% of injuries reported in a questionnaire study of 
6461 seafarers (Jensen et al. 2005). 
Data regarding fatalities among the seafaring labour force is historically – and 
consistently – grim. For example, Roberts and Hansen (2002) revealed that between 
1986 and 1995, onboard British flagged vessels, seafarers’ relative risk of mortality 
due to occupational accidents was 23.9 times higher than for all workers in Great 
Britain. Evidence from other studies suggests that mortality rates may be even worse 
in other fleets. Occupational mortalities onboard Singapore and Hong Kong fleets, for 
example, were found (between 1981 and 1995) were found to be significantly higher 
than on British vessels (Roberts 1998). 
Whilst there is a body of literature which has considered mortality rates among 
seafarers, the numbers of non-fatal injuries have been less studied and the focus has 
been on cumulative rates as opposed to incidence rates. In a study which explored 
the availability of seafarers’ non-fatal injuries data Hetherington et al. (2006) identified 
that across the global seafaring industry there is no standardised reporting system 
and the problems associated with obtaining seafarers’ health and safety data will be 
considered in chapter 3.1.1. Thus, reliance has been placed on individual studies – all 
of which are incomplete – to develop a composite understanding of seafarers’ 
accidents. 
One such study is a large-scale study conducted by Jensen et al. (2004) on rates of 
seafarers’ personal injuries which revealed that crude injury rates varied with 
demographic factors such as nationality, position onboard and age. The study which 
utilised retrospective questionnaires obtained from 6461 participants identified the 
crude rate of seafarers’ injuries as 9.1%. The authors concluded that the annual 
prevalence of seafarers’ injuries could be estimated at between 9 and 20% (Jensen et 
al. 2004). Thus, using a conservative estimate of 15% the authors estimated that 
180,000 of 1.2 million seafarers worldwide were injured during one year (Jensen et al. 
2004). This is comparable to a study by Tomaszunas et al. (1997) which estimated 
the yearly prevalence of seafarers’ injuries to be 11.5%. 
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In another study Hansen et al. (2002) similarly studied seafarers’ injury rates in 
relation to demographic factors onboard Danish flagged ships – utilising insurance 
data and data recorded by the Danish Maritime Authority – and identified 
relationships between rates of injuries and the seafarer’s age, position onboard and 
their working department onboard. Seafarers who worked as part of the deck 
department were found to have the highest risk of being injured and the risk of an 
accident causing a permanent disability was seen to increase steeply with age 
(Hansen et al. 2002). 
In the study Hansen et al. (2002) also identified a relationship between the type of 
ship and the frequency of seafarers’ injuries. They found that seafarers onboard 
coasters and roll on roll off vessels experienced higher levels of risk than seafarers 
onboard other types of vessels (Hansen et al. 2002). The study also revealed a 
relationship between the seafarers’ nationality and rates of accidents. In doing so it 
showed that foreign seafarers had lower accident rates than Danish seafarers 
(Hansen et al. 2002). The authors concluded that this variance could be a genuine 
difference and perhaps be due to dissimilarities in behaviour between different 
nationalities in the same workplace (Hansen et al. 2002). They went on to suggest 
that an alternative explanation may be that there are higher rates of under-reporting 
by some nationalities. In chapter 1.2.1 it was seen that research suggests that the 
under-reporting of injuries by seafarers is widespread and that those who experience 
precarious employment – a factor which was seen in chapter 1.1.1 to relate to 
nationality – may be particularly reluctant to report injuries. 
From such research, it can be concluded that whilst seafaring is a high risk 
occupation there is at present an incomplete picture. There is therefore an 
opportunity to explore seafarers’ occupational safety further, in particular in relation to 
aspects of their employment which are potentially related to their safety outcomes.  
2.1.2 Seafarers’ health concerns 
Moving on, whilst seafaring is undoubtedly a risky occupation in terms of workplace 
injuries, a less straightforward issue is the impact that working in the seafaring 
industry has on the health of the labour force. 
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Seafarers undergo mandatory periodic medical examinations which are designed to 
screen out incapacity and ill health (Bloor 2000). Consequently, the seafaring labour 
force exhibits the ‘healthy worker effect’ whereby unhealthy individuals leave the 
workforce – or are simply prevented from joining it in the first place. However, owing 
to the nature of their work, seafarers are exposed to health risks which are rarely 
encountered by those employed in other occupations. In one study Moen et al. (1995) 
found that on ships which carried chemical or oil products seafarers may be exposed 
to carcinogenic substances. It is perhaps unsurprising therefore that among 
Norwegian seafarers who worked in the engine department mesothelioma related 
deaths were found to be six times more common than the general population (Eriksen 
1999 cited by Bloor et al. 2000). 
In addition, cardiovascular disease has been found to be a concern for the seafaring 
labour force. In fact, among seafarers cardiovascular disease was found to be the 
single largest cause of death, accounting for 87% of fatalities in seafarers working 
onboard British merchant ships between 1986 and 1995 (Roberts 2008). These 
findings echo those which have been identified among Polish (Jaremin et al. 1996) 
and Danish (Hansen 1996) merchant fleets. 
The seafaring labour force has also been found to be subject to relatively high rates of 
infectious diseases. The worldwide travel which many seafarers are engaged in 
exposes them to tropical diseases such as Malaria (Roberts and Hansen 2002). 
Moreover, like other migrant workers – and transport workers – those who work at 
sea have been found to experience relatively high rates of sexually transmitted 
diseases. In one study, Hansen et al. (1996) found that seafarers were at an 
increased risk of HIV, hepatitis A and B, as well as Tuberculosis. 
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Studies, such as Hansen et al. (1994), have identified that many of the illnesses 
experienced by seafarers can be attributed to lifestyle choices and Oldenburg et al. 
(2009) suggested that for some seafarers the feeling of loneliness was compensated 
for through the use of unhealthy lifestyle choices such as excessive smoking or 
alcohol consumption. In a study regarding Danish seafarers – which utilised 
information recorded as part of mandatory health examinations – the number of 
overweight seafarers was statistically significant when compared to a reference group 
of individuals ashore (Hoeyer and Hansen 2005). Previously, Hansen et al. (1994) 
have attributed relatively high levels of obesity among the seafaring work force to the 
reduction in the manual workload at sea, combined with the fact that food onboard 
has become more abundant. Thus, in many respects seafarers’ health concerns pose 
a number of questions with regards to lifestyle choices and their work-life balance and 
point to the need for further investigation in this area. 
2.1.3 Well-being in the seafaring industry 
In addition to the literature which shows both seafarers’ safety and their health to 
compare unfavourably with other occupations, a body of literature indicates the 
well-being of seafarers to be of concern. Seafarers are faced with a number of 
psychosocial hazards, which can be attributed to the nature and organisation of their 
work. One such hazard is stress. Whilst many of the causes of stress experienced by 
individuals across all industries – such as large amounts of responsibility and 
workload pressures – also apply to seafarers, there are additional causes which are 
experienced by seafarers that are not routinely experienced by workers in other 
occupations. This is because the pattern of seafarers’ work (and life) is regulated, 
restricted and secluded – and some researchers have equated life at sea as akin to 
prison. Thus, it is perhaps unsurprising that as part of the Australian Fatigue, Stress 
and Occupational Health Study, 60% of the seafarers surveyed reported moderate to 
high stress levels (cited by Bloor et al. 2010). 
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Moreover, seafaring is characterised by long periods of separation from life at home 
and family members and seafarers routinely experience social isolation. Multi-cultural 
differences between seafarers onboard may heighten these feelings of social 
isolation. In one study Carotenuto et al. (2012) suggested that the isolation 
experienced by seafarers was a major cause of psychological problems. The authors 
went on to identify that separation from family members was particularly difficult for 
seafarers when family members were unwell or a death occurred. Similarly, 
Jezewska et al. (2006) revealed that seafarers identified being away from home as 
one of the most significant demotivating factors.  
Evidence from studies ashore regarding the effect of the built environment on an 
individual’s well-being (see for example Evans 2003) suggests that poor quality living 
accommodation onboard ships can also negatively affect seafarers’ well-being. In 
considering this issue Ellis et al. (2012, p.73) conducted a questionnaire study and 
found that “substantial minorities of seafarers identified their cabins as poorly 
furnished, dirty and in poor condition.” The authors went on to conclude that this issue 
was likely to have a deleterious impact on the well-being of the seafaring labour force 
and inhibit their ability to restore a sense of equilibrium following a stressful work shift. 
Research has also revealed that environmental stressors negatively affect seafarers’ 
well-being. Oldenburg et al. (2010) identified that during both their working time and 
their rest time seafarers are exposed to environmental factors such as vibration, 
noise and the motion of the ship. These environmental factors may cause sleep 
disturbances among seafarers and it should be remembered that the ship’s routine of 
maintenance and loading or discharging cargo continues for twenty-four hours a day 
with no regard for how it might affect seafarers who are resting.  
In a questionnaire study regarding seafarers’ onboard living conditions, 60% of 
respondents stated that they were disturbed by noise (Ellis et al. 2012). In the same 
questionnaire 63% said that they were disturbed by vibrations and 41% of 
respondents answered that they were unable to control the temperature in their cabin 
(Ellis et al. 2012). These issues impact not only on the amount of sleep possible but 
also the quality of sleep a seafarer experiences.  
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These issues are significant as studies have shown fatigue to be a psychological 
stressor as sleep of sufficient quality and duration is necessary for well-being. In a 
study of seafarers employed by the Royal Australian Navy, Grech et al. (2003) 
identified fatigue as a major problem. It revealed that 44% of the participants worked 
more than 80 hours a week and 62% of the participants stated that they were not 
getting enough sleep. Similarly, Gander and Le Quesne (2001, cited in Smith 2007) 
reported that 61% of officers working on inter-island ferries in New Zealand felt that 
they were regularly affected by fatigue when on duty. Worryingly, “it was also found 
that 26% of the ferry sample could recall being involved in a fatigue related incident or 
accident in the last six months” (Smith et al. 2008, p.26). 
Apart from exposure to environmental stressors there are several other reasons why 
fatigue is so widespread in the seafaring industry, such as the working patterns and 
routines of seafarers – as presented in chapter 1.1.2. Many seafarers work split shifts 
– a feature which has been seen to impair sleep and shift patterns of 6 hours on duty 
and 6 hours off duty are not uncommon. In a study regarding seafarers’ fatigue in 
relation to work shift patterns Project Horizon (2012) – a study which utilised ship 
simulators – revealed that greater levels of fatigue were found in those working shift 
patterns of 6 hours on and 6 hours off than those working 4 hours on and 8 hours off. 
Moreover, in a further study regarding seafarers’ work shift patterns onboard ships 
Condon et al. (1984) stated that the effectiveness of seafarers could be greatly 
improved by implementing a system which allowed for a daily single sleep period.  
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Research has also shown that the frequency of port calls can impact on seafarers’ 
fatigue levels. In a diary study, for seafarers working shorter tours of duty, frequent 
port calls were associated with greater fatigue (Smith et al. 2006). With methods of 
improved efficiency, for example containerisation, ships are spending less time in port 
than they once were and port turn-around times have reduced substantially. For 
example, in a study regarding the trade, infrastructure and development of Los 
Angeles, Erie (2004) reported that ship turnaround time in the port of LA had reduced 
from a week or more in the 1960s to two or three days in the Twenty-first Century. 
Moreover, in 2016 the average turnaround time for container vessels in the port of 
Hong Kong was found to be 16 hours (Mardep 2016). Clearly, quicker and more 
efficient port turnarounds are of financial benefit to ship owners. However, shorter 
port turnarounds and greater frequency of port calls negatively impact on seafarers 
who are required – for a number of reasons – to work extra hours when the vessel is 
not at sea. Whilst in port ships are subjected to inspections from various parties such 
as port state control and classification societies. Arslan and Er (2007) stated that an 
increased number of inspections – whilst the vessel was in port – was one cause of 
seafarers’ fatigue. In another study Smith (2007) revealed that increases in 
International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) requirements – such as 
maintaining a continuous gangway watch – have also increased seafarers’ 
workloads, thereby contributing to seafarers’ levels of fatigue. 
Moreover, Carter (2005) stated that seafarers were at risk of experiencing burnout, 
and senior officers were identified as being particularly at risk. In identifying the risk 
Carter (2005) revealed that the predisposing factors of burnout include homesickness 
and loneliness – factors which seafarers are known to experience. 
It is difficult however to quantify the effect factors such as poor quality living 
conditions, social isolation, loneliness and burn-out have on seafarers’ well-being. 
One possible measurement is rates of suicide and one study found that among British 
seafarers the greatest cause of traumatic occupational fatalities was suicide (Mayhew 
1999). Similarly, in a review of data from 1996 to 2009, Iversen (2012) found that 
5.9% of all seafarer deaths were the result of suicide.  
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Thus, from such research it can be concluded that the occupational well-being of 
seafarers is a concern. Moreover, the literature discussed in sections 2.1.1 and 2.1.2 
regarding occupational injuries and occupational related illnesses, indicates that there 
is a need for substantial improvement in the health and safety of those employed in 
the seafaring industry – as well as the need for further research. In addition, the 
structures of employment in the seafaring industry and the organisation of life 
onboard – as presented in chapter one – suggest that features of the organisation of 
work at sea have the potential to impact on the health, safety and well-being 
outcomes of seafarers. Thus, in the following section the limited research regarding 
occupational safety and well-being in relation to work patterns will be presented. 
2.2 Occupational safety and well-being in relation to work patterns 
Seafarers’ safety and well-being in relation to their work patterns is of interest for a 
number of reasons. First, there are a number of features which are specific to work 
patterns in the seafaring industry, such as the fact that seafarers are away from home 
for a prolonged period of time and work every day whilst they are onboard, that make 
it an especially interesting topic to study. 
In addition, the seafaring industry is a rare example of a 24 hour 365 days a year 
industry. Ships navigate and load cargo regardless of the time of the day or the day of 
the year. As Knudsen (2009, p.296) states: “weekly cycles ceased to be fixed points 
for me and yet daily life had a rhythm as regular as clockwork, marked by recurring 
events like changing the watch, breaks and meal times.”  
In this section literature regarding seafarers’ safety and well-being in relation to 
features of their work patterns will be presented. In doing so, occupational risk and 
temporal factors – such as long working hours and overtime – are presented.  
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The section goes on to consider literature regarding personal injuries in relation to 
time periods within seafarers’ tours of duty. In particular, two key studies – Hansen et 
al. (2002) and Jensen et al. (2004) – are reviewed. Literature from the offshore oil 
industry is also discussed, due in the most part to the scarcity of such literature 
relating to the seafaring industry. 
Finally, literature regarding issues which are pertinent to the beginning and end of a 
seafarer’s tour of duty are considered in section 2.2.3. These issues include the time 
seafarers spend travelling to a vessel and the uncertainty seafarers face regarding 
the date on which they will leave the vessel and return home – among others. The 
section concludes by drawing on Bailey et al’s. (2007) questionnaire study which 
explored seafarers’ perceptions of risk at both the beginning and end of a tour of duty. 
2.2.1 Temporal factors 
In chapter 1.1.2, it was seen that seafarers work long hours during a tour of duty. 
Research has identified long working hours to pose a risk among construction 
workers (Lowery et al. 1998), healthcare professionals (Gander et al. 2000), miners 
(Duchon and Smith 1994, cited in Dembe et al. 2005) and fire-fighters (Lusa et al. 
2002). Similarly, research from transport industries suggests bus drivers (Meijman 
1997) and long distance truck drivers (Mccartt et al. 2000) also experience an 
increased risk of occupational injuries when they are subjected to long working hours. 
In a study regarding seafarers’ working hours Smith et al. (2006) found that 49% of 
seafaring respondents from the offshore oil and support industry to be working more 
than 85 hours a week. In the same study 46% of respondents working in the short sea 
and coastal industry said they were working more than 85 hours per week (Smith et 
al. 2006). 
The long working hours experienced by seafarers are likely to be exacerbated by the 
under-reporting of working hours, in order to ensure compliance with rest hour 
legislation – as described in chapter 1.1.2. In a study regarding the relationship 
between recorded hours of work and fatigue in seafarers, Allen et al. (2006) revealed 
that 40% of a sample said they under-reported their working hours.  
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Long working hours, and similarly overtime schedules have been associated with 
decrements in performance, which can lead to increased risk of errors (Parkes 2007). 
In a study which explored the impact of long working hours and overtime on 
occupational injuries in shore-based occupations in the United States, Dembe et al. 
(2005, p.595) revealed that “overtime schedules had the greatest relative risk of 
occupational injury or illness, followed by schedules with extended (≥12) hours per 
day and extended (≥60) hours per week.” Overtime data in terms of extra hours 
worked per day/week for the seafaring industry is not readily available as seafarers 
are normally paid a fixed monthly salary regardless of the number of hours worked. 
However, from a study which utilised questionnaires Ellis et al. (2012) identified the 
average hours seafarers worked in every twenty-four hours to be over ten hours 
whilst the vessel was in port and nine and a half hours whilst the vessel was at sea. In 
addition, in the same study 70% of respondents reported working seven days every 
week whilst onboard (Ellis et al. 2012). Thus, whilst seafarers may not experience 
overtime working in the traditional sense, the hours they work are far more than the 
hours worked by individuals in shore-based occupations, whereby in the UK the 
working time directive prohibits individuals from working more than forty-eight hours a 
week on average (GOV 2017). 
Moving on, shore-based studies have shown a relationship between occupational 
injuries and time on task, however, few studies regarding seafarers’ occupational 
accidents and time on task exist – and it is debatable if such research is even 
desirable given that seafarers live and work in the same environment for an extended 
period, thus in a sense a seafarer is ‘on task’ for the whole period they are onboard.  
47 
 
Research from other industries, however, can shed light on the issue but the extent to 
which such findings apply to the seafaring industry is substantially limited. In one 
study Pokorny et al. (1981) investigated the accident risk of bus drivers and identified 
a peak in the third or fourth hour of the driver’s shift. Significantly, this peak was not 
affected by the exact start time of the driver’s shift (Pokorny et al. 1981). Other 
studies suggest that the risk of experiencing an occupational accident increases 
during the latter portion of a long work shift (Hanecke et al. 1998; Nachreiner et al. 
2000; Dembe et al. 2005). In a study of French lorry drivers Hamelin (1987) reported 
a substantial increase in relative risk after twelve or more hours. On reviewing 
Hamelin (1987) and other studies Folkard (2000, p.22) concluded that “it would 
appear that there is an underlying exponential increase in accident risk over time on 
duty, but with a transient, 2-4 hours increase in risk superimposed on top of this 
underlying trend.” 
Folkard’s (2000) statement is particularly interesting as it would appear to refute 
current fatigue and vigilance decrement theories. Both theories predict an increase in 
risk over time on task but the research suggests that the risk decreased between the 
fourth and the eighth hour. It is also noteworthy that the findings suggest that the 
relative risk for four hour shifts is 20% greater than the relative risk for eight hour 
shifts (Folkard 1997). Such four-hour shifts are common among seafarers, who 
generally work a three-watch system of four hours on duty followed by eight hours 
rest – as was seen in chapter 1.1.2. 
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Studies have also revealed how the risk of experiencing an occupational accident 
varies when working successive shifts. Folkard and Lombardi (2006, p.957) pooled 
results from other published epidemiological studies regarding injury frequencies in 
relation to four successive night shifts in shore-based industries and found that “on 
average, risk was about 6% higher on the second night, 17% higher on the third night, 
and 36% higher on the fourth night.” Nevertheless, such research has generally 
focused upon four successive night shifts and there is a lack of studies regarding 
longer spans of consecutive night shifts. It is reasonable to suggest that the reason 
for this is that longer spans of consecutive shifts without a rest day are unusual 
among shore-based occupation. Consequently, it is difficult to determine how risk 
varies over a greater number of consecutive night shifts and for this reason Folkard 
and Lombardi (2006, p.957) raised the question: “what happens to risk over longer 
spans of successive night shifts?” 
Research also suggests that successive night shifts are not the only type of 
successive shifts which are associated with patterns of occupational accident risk. On 
pooling results from other published studies regarding occupational injury frequencies 
and consecutive morning/day shifts Folkard and Lombardi (2006) found the relative 
risk to increase over consecutive shifts. Consequently, they concluded that: “there is 
evidence for an increase in risk over successive workdays, irrespective of the type of 
shift” (Folkard and Lombardi 2006, p.958). Little is known, however, regarding the 
relationship between the consecutive shifts that seafarers work during a tour of duty 
and occupational injury risk – as will be seen in the following section. 
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2.2.2 Time into tour of duty 
Time into tour of duty refers to the time period from the day an individual leaves home 
and arrives at a workplace – such as a ship or an offshore oil installation – to the day 
they leave the workplace and return home.. In the offshore oil and gas installation 
industry a study found that injury severity was not independent of time into tour of 
duty (Parkes and Swash 1999). The research utilised two injury categories: fatalities 
and serious injuries, and 3+ day injuries. The normal duration of a tour of duty was 
found to be two weeks and the relative proportions of each injury category were then 
considered alongside days into tour of duty. “For tour durations longer than two 
weeks, the ratios of fatalities and severe injuries to 3+ day injuries increased 
markedly, relative to tour durations of one and two weeks” (Parkes and Swash 1999, 
p. iiii). Additionally, there was a rise in percentages of fatalities and serious injuries as 
the time on the offshore installation increased beyond two weeks (Parkes and Swash 
1999). 
Similarly – in a more recent study conducted in the offshore oil and gas industry – 
Parkes (2007) identified an increase in the frequency of injuries requiring first aid 
treatment as a two-week tour of duty for offshore petroleum workers progressed. 
Conversely, serious injuries did not show a similar trend.  
Whilst such research is of interest, the two weeks’ tours of duty worked by offshore oil 
and gas industry workers are substantially shorter that the tours of duty worked – on 
average – by seafarers. In chapter 1.1.1, for example, it was seen that the average 
tour of duty for European seafarers was between three and six months – and 
between six and nine months for non-European seafarers (Oldenburg et al. 2009). 
Literature regarding seafarers’ incident frequency in relation to time into tour of duty is 
sparse, however, in one such study Hansen et al. (2002) utilised insurance data and 
data obtained from the Danish Maritime Authority and identified time phases of how 
long a seafarer had been onboard when an accident took place (a factor the authors 
termed ‘time at risk’).  
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In table 3 below the adjusted relative risk in relation to days onboard when the 
accident took place can be seen. The relative risk of experiencing an accident 
causing permanent disability was lower after the seafarer had been onboard the 
vessel for 90 days (Hansen et al. 2002). For all periods prior to 90 days, however, the 
relative risk remained about the same (Hansen et al. 2002). Additionally, for all ship 
types the risk associated with time aboard was similar. The exceptions to this were oil 
and chemical tankers “where there was a steady reduction in risk after the first month, 
ending with an adjusted relative risk after 3 months of 0.22 compared with the first 15 
days” (Hansen et al. 2002, p. 89). 
 Notified notifiable accidents not causing disability of 5% 
Accidents causing permanent 
disability of >5% 
Time aboard when 
accident took place 
(days): 
Cases 
Adjusted relative risk 
(95% CI) 
Cases 
Adjusted relative risk 
(95% CI) 
(p<0.001) (p<0.001) 
1–15 232 1.00 (reference category) 42 1.00 (reference category) 
16–30 176 0.87 (0.71 to 1.05) 22 0.60 (0.36 to 1.01) 
31–60 344 1.01 (0.85 to 1.19) 51 0.85 (0.56 to 1.28) 
61–90 201 0.86 (0.71 to 1.04) 30 0.75 (0.47 to 1.21) 
>90 326 0.62 (0.52 to 0.75) 43 0.51 (0.33 to 0.81) 
Table 3 Time aboard when accident took place (adapted from Hansen et al. 2002, p.87) 
In another study Jensen et al. (2004) used retrospective questionnaires to compute 
seafarers’ occupational accident rates. The information obtained included: “age, 
gender, working hours per day and days per week, ship type, flag state, tonnage, 
main work area, occupational position, duration of the latest tour of duty (dates of 
signing on and off plus duration in whole months and days) and whether the seafarer 
had suffered any injuries during this period” (Jensen et al. 2004, p.406). The average 
tour length of the respondents was found to be 234 days and table 4 below shows the 
adjusted and unadjusted relative risk for less than, and more than, 117 days onboard. 
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Variable 
 Total 
no. of 
hours 
work 
(x 
1000) 
Observations/ 
Seafarers 
Injury 
cases 
Unadjusted Adjusted 
 
 
IRR 95% CI P values (two-tailed) IRR 95% CI 
P values 
(two-tailed) 
1-116 
days 
 593 819 66 1     1     
117+ 
days 
 6929 2610 183 0.23 0.180.32 <0.001 0.27 0.19-0.39 <0.001 
Table 4 Injury in seafarers during latest tour of duty (Jensen et al. 2004, p. 551). 
Jensen et al. (2004) revealed 8.06 injury cases per 100 seafarers for those who had 
been onboard for less than 117 days. For those seafarers who had been onboard for 
117 days or more 7.01 injury cases per 100 seafarers was reported. Furthermore, the 
injury case rate was reported to be 111.30 and 26.41 per million hours of work for 
those who had been onboard for less than 117 days and those who had been 
onboard for 117 days or more respectively. To summarise, those who had been 
onboard for less than 117 days showed significantly greater accident rates than those 
who had been onboard for more than 117 days. Such research again suggests a 
relationship between time into tour of duty and occupational accidents in the 
seafaring industry. 
Nevertheless, despite being significant pieces of literature neither Hansen et al. 
(2002) or Jensen et al. (2004) provided details regarding when within an entire tour of 
duty an injury occurred. Both studies utilise time lapsed prior to an injury occurring 
rather than where and when within a tour of duty the injury occurred. Thus, these two 
studies do not explore the frequency of seafarers’ injuries in relation to the end of the 
seafarers’ tours of duty. In fact, Jensen et al. (2004, p. 405) stated: “self-report of the 
duration of the latest tour of duty is useful for seafarers from merchant ships with 
short-term employments, but not for ferries and other, non-specified types of ship with 
other or permanent employment.” No further justification for this statement is 
provided, however, so it is not possible to ascertain the basis of it.  
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This appears to be a substantial gap in the literature as whilst it is important to 
consider occupational accidents in relation to the number of consecutive the days the 
seafarer had been onboard prior to sustaining an injury, there are factors at both the 
beginning and end of a seafarer’s tour of duty that may impact on the likelihood of 
experiencing an occupational injury – as is considered below. 
2.2.3 The beginning and end of a seafarer’s tour of duty 
The beginning of a seafarer’s tour of duty is the time when a seafarer transitions from 
their life at home to their life onboard and some seafarers are asked to undertake this 
transition earlier than expected and return to a vessel earlier than anticipated, thus 
cutting their time at home on leave short. In a survey of 1600 seafarers (950 Chinese 
and 650 international) respondents were asked whether the “employer had ever 
asked them to return early from home leave to join a ship?” (BIMCO 2015, p.30). As 
can be seen in figure 2 below, over half of both international and Chinese 
respondents usually, regularly, or sometimes were asked to cut short their home 
leave periods. 
 
Figure 2 Frequency seafarers reported being asked to cut short home leave periods (BIMCO 2015, p. 
30) 
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Irrespective of whether they joined the vessel earlier than anticipated or not one factor 
pertinent to the beginning of a tour of duty is the time spent by seafarers travelling to 
vessels. In one study, Wadsworth et al. (2008) utilised questionnaires and daily 
diaries to study seafarers’ fatigue levels and reported that 66% of respondents stated 
that they had no opportunity to sleep between travelling to the ship and commencing 
their first shift. Of this group 47% had travelled more than 6 hours and 19% for 12 or 
more hours (Wadsworth et al. 2008). Moreover, it is not just the journey time which is 
a concern but also the changing of time zones. Moving between time zones may 
result in seafarers experiencing jet lag which has been identified by accident 
investigators as a factor predisposing a sleep-deprived state (Phillips 2000).  
Nautilus – the trade union for British and Dutch seafarers – is campaigning for 
“seafarers to be given adequate rest periods before starting duties after flying out to 
join ships overseas” (Nautilus 2017 [online]). Whilst some shipping companies 
provide seafarers with hotel accommodation near to the ship for the night immediately 
prior to joining the vessel this is not a requirement and many shipping companies do 
not and seafarers simply travel directly from the airport to the vessel. Thus, with some 
seafarers starting their tour of duty tired, it seems this period is a worry in terms of 
both seafarers’ safety and well-being.  
Moreover, the organisation of employment in the seafaring industry – as discussed in 
chapter 1.1.1 – results in many seafarers joining vessels which they have not 
previously sailed onboard. Consequently, at the beginning of a tour of duty these 
individuals lack specific workplace familiarity. In a shore-based study Underhill (2007) 
found that agency workers were particularly vulnerable to injury early in their 
placement, when the effects of unfamiliarity were most apparent. Thus, it is 
unsurprising that in their study Hansen et al. (2002, p.90) found “seafarers, who 
return to the same ship, have an overall lower risk of having an accident during the 
second or following employment period on the same ship. This study cannot explain 
this result, but it is likely that familiarity with the ship improves occupational safety.” 
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In an attempt to overcome a lack of workplace specific familiarity, new joining 
seafarers are required – by the MLC, STCW and ISM Code – to undergo 
familiarisation training. Section 6.3 of the ISM Code states: “The company should 
establish procedures to ensure that new personnel and personnel transferred to new 
assignments related to safety and protection of the environment are given proper 
familiarisation with their duties. Instructions which are essential to be provided prior to 
sailing should be identified, documented and given”.  
STCW (78), Part A, Chapter I, Section A-I/14 also states: 
“2. The company shall provide written instructions to the master of each ship to which 
the Convention applies, setting forth the policies and the procedures to be followed to 
ensure that all seafarers who are newly employed on board the ship are given a 
reasonable opportunity to become familiar with the shipboard equipment, operating 
procedures and other arrangements needed for the proper performance of their 
duties, before being assigned to those duties. Such policies and procedures shall 
include: 
.1 allocation of a reasonable period of time during which each newly employed 
seafarer will have an opportunity to become acquainted with: 
.1.1 the specific equipment the seafarer will be using or operating, and 
.1.2 ship specific watchkeeping, safety, environmental protection and emergency 
procedures and arrangements the seafarer needs to know to perform the assigned 
duties properly; and 
.2 designation of a knowledgeable crew member who will be responsible for ensuring 
that an opportunity is provided to each newly employed seafarer to receive essential 
information in a language the seafarer understands.” 
Arguably, the guidance provided by STCW and the ISM Code regarding the 
familiarisation training of new joining seafarers is vague and subjective. 
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In order to ensure the transference of safety critical information, officers also receive 
a handover – generally from the individual they are relieving. Research, however, 
indicates that this handover may be of a short duration. In a questionnaire study of 
200 seafaring officers Vidan et al. (2015) revealed that 31% of respondents reported 
a handover of less than 2 hours, 14% reported a handover of between 2 and 4 hours, 
13% reported a handover of between 4 and 6 hours and 42% reported a handover of 
more than 6 hours.  
The short duration of seafarers’ handovers is particularly concerning given the 
flexibility of the seafaring labour force and the prevalence of precarious employment 
(as discussed in chapter 1.1) which results in seafarers sailing onboard unfamiliar 
ships and even unfamiliar types of ships. Moreover, research from other industries 
has revealed some of the consequences of safety critical information being lost 
during crew changeovers. The Cullen report (1993), for example, recognised crew 
handover and failures in communication between the outgoing and incoming crews to 
be key issues in the Piper Alpha disaster, in which the North Sea oil and gas platform 
exploded resulting in the loss of 167 lives.  
There are also some factors which are particularly pertinent to the end of a seafarer’s 
tour of duty. In section 2.1.3 above, fatigue was seen to be a concern in the seafaring 
industry and in a questionnaire study regarding accommodation onboard cargo ships 
Ellis et al. (2012) revealed that 70% of respondents reported working seven days 
every week during a tour of duty. Furthermore, in a study which explored work-related 
fatigue Winwood at al. (2005) revealed that recovery from work-related fatigue mostly 
occurred between shifts. This is a concern for seafarers who not only rest and work in 
the same environment but also are onboard working consecutive shifts for prolonged 
periods of time. Consequently, seafarers are likely to accrue sleep debt and a study 
which explored seafarers’ patterns of fatigue for an entire tour of duty found that 
fatigue on waking increased between the beginning and the end of a tour of duty 
(Wadsworth et al. 2006).  
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Moreover, towards the end of a tour of duty, seafarers are likely to eagerly anticipate 
leaving the ship and returning home, and for many seafarers this period is a time of 
high spirits and happiness. This feeling of approaching the end of the time onboard is 
commonly referred to as the ‘channels’ by British seafarers (Sampson 2013) – which 
is a historical reference to when British seafarers joined and left a vessel at a port in 
the UK and knew they were approaching the end of their tour of duty when they saw 
the English Channel on their return to the UK. Just like in these “olden times” 
however, the exact date on which a seafarer will leave the vessel and return home is 
still unknown for many seafarers and today there are many reasons why seafarers 
remain onboard after the anticipated end of their tour of duty. Some seafarers remain 
onboard willingly, having requested an extension to their tour of duty. Such requests 
are likely due to the precarious employment faced by the seafaring labour force – as 
discussed in chapter 1.1.1. For many seafarers, widespread unemployment in their 
home countries and the relatively high wages earned whilst onboard make it 
preferable to remain onboard for as long as possible. After all, once they leave the 
vessel many seafarers will simply not know when they will next secure paid work. 
However, many seafarers remain onboard unwillingly, and these circumstances can 
best be termed as mandatory tour extensions and shipping companies can impose 
these extensions owing to the terms of seafarers’ contracts. Many contracts – be they 
permanent or single voyage contracts – incorporate a clause which is commonly 
referred to by seafarers as a ‘plus or minus clause’. This clause permits the shipping 
company to either reduce or extend the contracted voyage period, for example a 
seafarer with a contracted tour of duty of three months would likely have a plus or 
minus clause of one month. This would enable the shipping company to repatriate the 
seafarer once they had been onboard for two months (one month shorter than the 
seafarers anticipated voyage length) or keep the seafarer onboard for four months 
(one month longer than the seafarers anticipated voyage length). 
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There are numerous reasons as to why shipping companies might utilise the plus or 
minus clause – although it is predominantly the plus clause that is utilised and 
seafarers remain onboard for longer than they anticipated. In some countries crew 
members may be unable to leave the vessel due to visa requirements – such is the 
situation for British seafarers in China. Additionally, the vessel may be sailing a long 
ocean passage and the next port call may be several weeks' sail away. Shipping 
companies are in some cases reluctant for seafarers to leave the vessel in expensive 
countries and try to minimise repatriation costs by waiting for the vessel to dock at 
cheaper countries. Repatriation costs can be further reduced by only permitting 
seafarers to be repatriated in small groups and some seafarers may be required to 
wait until such a group can be formed.  
In the BIMCO (2015) survey discussed at the beginning of section 2.2.3 respondents 
were also asked whether their employer had ever asked them to extend their 
contractual voyage period, and the responses can be seen in figure 3 below. Less the 
20% of both international and Chinese respondents reported that they had never 
been asked to extend their tour of duty. It is important to note, however, that it is not 
clear in the survey if this extension refers to staying onboard past the date they 
anticipated leaving the vessel or beyond their contracted period (as explained above). 
 
Figure 3 Frequency seafarers reported being asked to extend contractual voyage periods (BIMCO 
2015, p.30) 
58 
 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that seafarers perceive that their colleagues are more 
at risk of experiencing an occupational accident if the colleague is approaching – or 
has past – their expected time onboard. For example, one Master (cited in Knudsen 
2009 p.300) said: “If I have an able seaman whose wife is about to divorce; if he has 
just recovered from a flu, or maybe he has been aboard one month longer than he 
should, then you can feel he is tired; and it may be more dangerous than if he was 
well.”  BIMCO (2015, p.30) also recommends that “management practices should 
protect seafarers as far as possible from changes to their time at sea and leave 
ashore”. 
There is no heuristic available however to translate, for example, a seafarer staying 
an extra month more than expected onboard into an occupational safety 
consequence. Intuitively though it would seem such a time would pose an increased 
risk and research regarding this issue is required. Similarly, it is not possible to 
quantify the impact mandatory tour extensions have on a seafarer’s well-being. In 
fact, it is not possible to quantify the effect many of the features presented here have 
on seafarers’ well-being. 
It is possible however to quantify how seafarers perceive risk at different periods of 
time into tour and in one study Bailey et al. (2007) utilised questionnaires to explore 
seafarers’ perceptions of risk and two thousand three hundred and seventy-two 
seafarers from fifty countries responded. A question asked in the questionnaire was: 
“In your opinion, how great is the risk to a seafarer’s health and safety due to these 
factors?” (Bailey et al. 2007) One of the fifteen factors given was “having just joined 
the ship” (Bailey et al. 2007, p.60). On the five-point response scale, two was defined 
as low risk, three as medium risk and four as high risk. Having just joined the ship was 
given a perceived risk overall mean of 3.0 and table 5 below shows the perception of 
the risk for “having just joined the ship” categorised by onboard hierarchy, onboard 
department, ship type and nationality. 
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Onboard hierarchy 
Managers 3.18 
Senior 3.21 
Junior 3.01 
Rating 2.90 
Onboard department 
Engineering 3.00 
Deck 3.10 
Shore-side 3.20 
Catering 2.80 
Ship type 
Tankers 2.95 
Bulk carriers 3.23 
Dry cargo (non bulk) 3.00 
Passenger 2.86 
Working vessels 3.21 
Nationality 
India 3.06 
Philippines 2.90 
United Kingdom 3.18 
China 3.40 
Netherlands 2.59 
Table 5 Perception of risk ordered for “having just joined the ship” categorised by onboard hierarchy, 
onboard department, ship type and nationality (adapted from Bailey et al. 2007, pp.62, 63, 65, 69) 
Interestingly, the relationship between the perceived risk for having just joined the 
ship and the number of years’ experience in the company that the seafarer had was 
unclear. 
The factor ‘approaching the end of the time onboard’ was given a perceived risk 
overall mean of 2.9 and this perception of risk can be seen categorised by onboard 
hierarchy, onboard departments, ship type and nationality in table 6 below. For the 
factor ‘approaching the end of the time onboard’, nationality, rank and department 
were predictors for perceived risk.  
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Table 6 Perception of risk for approaching the end of time onboard categorised by onboard hierarchy, 
onboard department, ship type and nationality (adapted from Bailey et al. 2007, pp. 62, 63, 65, 69) 
The research by Bailey et al. (2007) suggests that seafarers perceive the factors 
which increase risk at the beginning of a tour of duty and those at the end of a tour of 
duty to afford similar levels of risk. Thus, it can be seen that not only does literature 
identify a relationship between seafarers’ days lapsed onboard and incidences of 
occupational injuries (Hansen et al. 2002 and Jensen et al. 2004) but also that 
seafarers perceive a relationship between specific time periods with a tour of duty and 
risk (Bailey et al. 2007). 
2.3 Summary 
The review of literature in this chapter demonstrates that there are numerous aspects 
associated with the organisation of work that impact on the health, safety and 
well-being outcomes of workers. The relationship between seafarers’ occupational 
health, safety and well-being and the organisation of work at sea is especially 
interesting as there are features of seafarers’ work patterns – such as the 
requirement to work every day for an extended period – which are unusual in 
comparison to shore-based occupations.  
Onboard 
hierarchy 
Managers 2.91 
Ship type 
Tankers 2.91 
Senior 3.02 
Bulk carriers 2.96 
Junior 2.84 
Dry cargo 
(non bulk) 2.78 
Rating 2.72 
Passenger 2.79 
Onboard 
department 
Engineering 2.70 
Working 
vessels 2.80 
Deck 3.00 
Nationality 
India 3.12 
Shore-side 2.90 
Philippines 2.67 
Catering 2.80 
United 
Kingdom 2.96 
 China 3.14 
Netherlands 2.46 
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Moreover, there are a number of factors, such as seafarers’ lack of familiarity with a 
vessel, which make it reasonable to suppose the beginning of a tour of duty may be 
particularly risky – in terms of operational and personal safety, as well as well-being. 
Equally, factors such as cumulative fatigue would suggest the end of a tour of duty to 
be risky. Therefore what emerges strongly from the review of the literature are the 
start and end of a tour of duty as areas of particular interest. Moreover, what is 
apparent in this chapter is how some factors relating to the organisation of work and 
employment at sea – such as a seafarers’ lack of workplace specific familiarity and 
long working hours – have the potential to impact on the health, safety and well-being 
outcomes of those who work at sea. Such factors also indicate that there are aspects 
of the organisation of work and employment at sea – such as delays in repatriation – 
which are concerned with job control and the issue of power, both onboard vessels 
and in the seafaring labour market in general. Yet research in the seafaring industry 
has so far failed to adequately explore these associations and the impact they have. 
There is therefore a clear opportunity to further investigate how the organisation of 
work and employment at sea impacts on the health, safety and well-being 
experiences of seafarers. Such an exploration is the aim of this study and in order to 
achieve this aim this study utilises mixed methods research, the components of which 
are the analysis of shipping companies’ safety data and the semi-structured 
interviewing of seafarers. In the following chapter these methods will be considered in 
detail. 
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CHAPTER THREE: METHODS 
 
3.0 Introduction 
The purpose of this thesis is to address the question ‘what are the health, safety and 
well-being experiences of seafarers in relation to the organisation of work and 
employment at sea?’ It was seen in the previous chapter that seafaring is a relatively 
dangerous occupation and the review of the literature identified numerous features 
regarding the organisation of work and employment at sea that could be expected to 
impact upon seafarers’ health, safety and well-being. These features included 
seafarers travelling for a prolonged period to join a vessel and having no opportunity 
to sleep between travelling and commencing their first shift (see Wadsworth et al. 
2008). And the uncertainty seafarers faced regarding the date on which they would 
leave a vessel and return home. It also showed that seafarers themselves perceived 
risk differently at various time periods within a tour of duty (see Bailey et al. 2007).  
In the previous chapter, it was also seen that in the offshore oil and gas installation 
industry injury severity was found to be significantly related to an aspect of the 
organisation of work: time into tour (see Parkes and Swash 1999). The review of the 
literature also revealed that studies had identified a statistically significant relationship 
regarding the number of consecutive days a seafarer had been onboard when an 
injury occurred (see Hansen et al. 2002 and Jensen et al. 2004). Moreover, it was 
highlighted that successive shifts and long working hours – features which are 
prevalent in the seafaring industry – adversely impact on the occupational safety of 
workers in shore-based industries. Thus, the findings from academic research would 
support the supposition that there are features of the organisation of work and 
employment at sea which relate to seafarers’ health, safety and well-being outcomes.  
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In order to explore these features of the organisation of work and employment at sea, 
and consider the research questions posed an appropriate methodological approach 
was required and in this chapter it is this methodological approach which will be 
discussed. The chapter provides an account of how the research was conducted and 
justifications for the methods of inquiry I employed. 
This chapter consists of four main sections, the first of which considers how this study 
was designed. In doing so it explains how I obtained the seafarers’ injury data which 
makes up the quantitative component of this study. It goes on to consider mixed 
methods research and my rationale for utilising both quantitative and qualitative 
research methods. 
The use of a pilot study is considered in section two and the lessons learned from the 
pilot study discussed. The third section presents an explanation of how the 
interviewing of seafarers was conducted and in this section an overview of the data 
analysis is also given. In the final section of this chapter the issues of risk and ethics 
in research are explored. In doing so it considers my position as a practitioner 
researcher and the implications of my position. 
3.1 Designing the study 
Previous studies which have explored seafarers’ health, safety and well-being have 
utilised several different research methods. These methods have included 
questionnaires (see for example Bailey et al. 2012), accident data obtained from 
maritime administrations (see for example Ellis et al. 2009) and interviews (see for 
example Sampson et al. 2016). 
In this study a mixed methods approach was implemented and the ways in which the 
qualitative and quantitative methods of this study were integrated will be discussed in 
section 3.3.2. The qualitative research component of this study comprises the 
semi-structured interviewing of 37 seafarers, of various ranks, onboard four vessels 
and this method of generating data is discussed in detail in section 3.3 of this chapter. 
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The quantitative research component of this study comprises shipping companies’ 
incident data combined with human resources data. These data were obtained from 
three multi-national shipping companies and contain 650 incidents. These incidents 
are all injuries – of all severities – which were reported to the three shipping 
companies over several years (the exact time periods are detailed in chapter five). 
The manner in which the safety data were obtained is important as different sources 
are subject to varying criteria for inclusion, for instance, some sources only record 
incidents which result in lost working time. Thus, in section 3.1.1 the substantial 
difficulties associated with obtaining such data and the possible sources from which 
such data could be obtained are discussed.  
3.1.1 Obtaining seafarers injury data 
In the review of the literature in chapter two it was seen that literature regarding 
injuries in the seafaring industry is sparse and incomplete, perhaps due to the 
difficulties in collecting such data, which are a consequence of the complex global 
nature of the industry. The main sources for collecting data which could be used to 
explore the relationship between features of the organisation of work and 
employment at sea and incidences of occupational injuries are: P and I clubs, national 
maritime administrations, confidential reporting schemes and shipping companies. 
There are, however, substantial problems associated with each of these data 
sources. 
For example, P and I club datasets only record data relating to incidents which are 
sufficiently large to justify recording (Ellis 2007). Thus, such datasets would provide 
no information regarding injuries which required first aid or basic medical treatment 
but did not result in any lost work time. Furthermore, there is no standard format 
between different P and I club datasets so such data are difficult to accurately collate. 
In addition, due to the sensitive nature of the data recorded by P and I clubs’ the data 
are not publicly available. 
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Similarly, Philips and Dalty (2006) suggest that national maritime administrations tend 
to focus on accidents which involve a fatality. Thus, again such datasets would not 
provide information regarding incidents which resulted in non-fatal injuries. Moreover, 
whilst maritime administrations are required by SOLAS and MARPOL to record 
information regarding accidents occurring onboard ships whilst in their water and 
onboard all vessels flagged to their nation – regardless of their geographical location 
when the incident occurred, these data are rarely publicly available and in some 
maritime administrations poorly recorded (Ellis 2007). 
Confidential voluntary reporting schemes tend to include information regarding 
incidents of all severities. However, such schemes – an example of which is the UK 
based ‘Confidential Hazardous Incident Reporting Programme’ – have very limited 
coverage and thus are not particularly appropriate for obtaining statistical data 
regarding maritime occupational accidents (Ellis 2007). 
Finally, the ISM Code requires all shipping companies to record accident data for their 
fleet (Oltedal and McArthur 2010). Generally, accident data from companies is viewed 
favourably as a data source due to its high level of detail but as these data are 
sensitive in nature, they are not publicly available. Importantly, such datasets may 
include specific injury details and contextual factors. 
Thus, a significant strength of this study is that the incident data were obtained from 
shipping companies. Moreover, whilst data regarding deployment dates for the 
injured seafarers were not contained in the shipping companies’ injury data sets 
these data were obtained from the shipping companies’ human resources 
departments. Consequently, it was possible to combine injury data with human 
resources data which contained information regarding important features – such as 
the date the seafarer joined the vessel and the date the seafarer expected to leave 
the vessel. The ability to analyse a combination of shipping company accident data 
and human resources data enabled an exploration of seafarers’ safety in relation to 
an important aspect of the organisation of work at sea – seafarers work patterns – 
and the resulting analyses are presented in chapter five. 
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Gaining access to these data was relatively complex – as will be revealed below – 
and the difficulties I experienced in obtaining access likely go some way to explaining 
the dearth of academic research in the seafaring industry revealed in various places 
throughout the literature review presented in chapters one and two. 
In total I was able to gain access to three shipping companies’ data sets. One data 
set was obtained from Company A, a multinational company which owns and 
operates oil, chemical and gas tankers. The second data set was provided by 
Company B, a multinational shipping company which owns and operates a variety of 
offshore vessels. These vessels primarily provide support services to the offshore oil 
and gas extraction industry. The third data set was obtained from a large container 
shipping company – Company C. 
Initially, contact was made with Company A via an email sent to the Human 
Resources department. The introductory email was forwarded internally to the 
crewing department and a reply was received stating the company would be willing to 
provide the requested data. The data were sent as Microsoft Excel spreadsheets via 
email from a Health Safety Environment and Quality (HSEQ) Superintendent, a 
shore-based individual who was employed by the shipping company to oversee and 
monitor the seafaring labour force onboard the company’s vessels in all matters 
relating to health, safety and the environment. Table 7 below shows the variables 
which were obtained from Company A. 
Vessel name Root cause 
Event date Type of contact 
Event description Part of body injured 
Type of incident Nature of injury 
Medical leave duration Crew position 
Immediate cause (unsafe condition) Activity when injured 
Immediate cause (unsafe acts) Location 
Underlying cause (job factors) Age range 
Underlying cause (human factors) Nationality 
Control actions area improvement Company seniority 
Table 7 Variables sent by Company A 
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The name of the ship, the event date, the date the seafarer signed on the ship and 
the date the seafarer expected to leave the ship were then provided by the crewing 
department of Company A via email and as such it was possible to match the HSEQ 
and crewing data by utilising the ship’s name and the incident date.  
The HSEQ department from Company B provided the relevant dates and the incident 
details all in the same Microsoft Excel spreadsheet and again the spreadsheets were 
sent via email. The variables contained in the spreadsheets can be seen in table 8 
below. 
Event date Area of operation 
IP signed on Nature of injury 
Severity (incident type) Cause of injury 
Activity Rank 
Part of body injured 
 
Table 8 Variables sent by Company B 
It was then possible to calculate the expected sign-off date for the seafarer as all 
seafarers were employed by Company B on five week contracts.  
Data from Company C were all obtained from a HSEQ superintendent, and the 
company required a research participant disclaimer to be completed – and this 
disclaimer can be seen in appendix i. However, only the injury severity and the date 
the seafarer joined the vessel, the date of the incident and the date the seafarer left 
the vessel were obtained from Company C. As the date the seafarer was expected to 
leave the vessel was not obtained it was not possible to conduct some of the desired 
analyses for incidents obtained from Company A, as will be explained in chapter 5.2. 
I remained in contact with the shipping companies and received monthly updates – 
which pertained to injuries which had occurred in the period since I had received the 
initial data set. I then included these latest injuries in my data set and I continued in 
this vein until December 2014. 
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The three shipping companies who provided the data were European based 
multi-national shipping companies which operated ships worldwide. Walters and 
Bailey (2013, p.1) state: “European fleets are probably among those delivering best 
practice in terms of the protection of workers” and thus it is likely that the quantitative 
data explored in this study is from the better end of the seafaring industry. Moreover, 
the fact that these three companies granted me access to their safety records 
suggests they are relatively transparent – again indicating that they operate at the 
better end of the industry. 
A further indicator of the shipping companies’ standards can be seen in the flags 
under which their vessels sail, with shipping companies with particularly poor 
standards typically utilising flags from the Paris MoU’s black list (as seen in chapter 
two). Vessels from the three companies sail under several flags from both the Paris 
MoU’s white and grey lists (Paris MoU 2017). This again suggests the shipping 
companies and the vessels they own and operate are at the better end of the 
industry. The fact that the three companies operate vessels sailing under a range of 
different flags, however, is important as research (see for example Psaraftis et al. 
1998) suggests a relationship between vessels’ flags and accident frequencies.  
Moreover, it is also important that the three companies’ vessels operate worldwide as 
previous research (see for example Hansen et al. 2007) has tended to focus on single 
geographic locations. Furthermore, the vessels include tankers (product tankers, 
VLCCs, chemical tankers and gas carriers), offshore support vessels (anchor 
handling tug supply vessels, platform supply vessels, field and subsea support 
vessels) and container vessels. This range of vessel types is particularly noteworthy 
as previous research (Philips and Daltry 2006; Lu and Tsai 2008) has tended to focus 
solely on a specific vessel type. The combination of studying a range of vessel types, 
which operate worldwide and sail under a range of flags, thus increases confidence in 
the robustness of the data set. 
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3.1.2 Mixed methods research 
In addition to the seafarers’ injury data this study also utilised a qualitative research 
method – the semi-structured interviewing of seafarers – and thus this study can be 
considered as mixed methods research. Bryman (2008, p.1) defines mixed method 
research as “the application of two or more sources of data or research methods to 
the investigation of a research question.” The primary purpose of using a mixed 
method research design in this study was to provide a deeper and broader 
understanding of how features of the organisation of work and employment at sea 
impacted on seafarers’ health, safety and well-being than either qualitative or 
quantitative approaches alone would have enabled. Bringing the findings from the 
qualitative and quantitative components together was also instructive as the findings 
from the interviews helped to guide the analysis of the data obtained from the 
shipping companies – an issue which will be considered in more detail in chapter five. 
The interviews were also used to explore possible reasons as to why the relationships 
identified in the shipping companies’ data exist. To further understand this, it is 
necessary to consider each step on the research process I undertook.  
First, preliminary data sets were obtained from three shipping companies in the 
manner detailed in section 3.1.1 above. There are, however, several weaknesses that 
can be associated with this approach. In using data collected by others I was not 
familiar with the data and required a period of familiarisation. I was fortunate, 
however, that I had access to those who had collected the data and these individuals 
assisted me to familiarise myself and importantly they were able to answer any 
queries I had.  
Moreover, since the data were provided by shipping companies’ Superintendents I 
was dependent on the data that they were willing to supply to me and as discussed 
above I was unable to obtain one key variable from one of the Superintendents, 
despite knowing that the data was held by the shipping company. I also had no 
control regarding the quality of the data, and this issue, and other specific limitations 
of the datasets used in the analyses will be discussed in greater detail in chapter five. 
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Nevertheless, the secondary analysis of the shipping companies’ safety data served 
a number of purposes. It provided an essential illustration of the risks to their personal 
safety experienced by seafarers at different periods of time within tours of duty, 
findings which strengthen the arguments regarding seafarers’ safety in relation to 
work patterns. It also highlighted the variables recorded – and perhaps more 
importantly the variables not recorded – by the shipping companies following an 
incident.  
Second, a pilot study in which five seafarers were interviewed was conducted and the 
pilot study and the lessons learnt from it will be considered in greater depth in section 
3.2. 
Third, interviews were conducted with thirty-seven seafarers onboard four vessels 
and this research process will be discussed in section 3.3. By utilising this qualitative 
research method, it was possible to explore the health, safety and well-being 
perceptions and experiences of seafarers in relation to the organisation of work and 
employment at sea. In particular, semi-structured interviews were utilised. The term 
semi-structured refers to “a context in which the interviewer has a series of questions 
that are in the general form of an interview schedule but is able to vary the sequence 
of questions…. the interviewer usually has some latitude to ask further questions in 
response to what are seen as significant replies” (Bryman 2008, p.196). Thus, whilst 
such an approach provided a degree of structure for comparability, it also allowed 
respondents to answer on their own terms. Importantly, as a practitioner turned 
researcher, the conducting of semi-structured interviews enabled me to challenge my 
own opinions and thoughts which I inevitably took into the interviews with me. Thus, 
the semi-structured nature of the interviews enabled the seafarers to express how 
they viewed and perceived the organisation of work and employment at sea and 
allowed me to gain an insight into their views. 
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Finally, an analysis of both the shipping companies’ safety records and the interview 
data was conducted. In their work, which explores ways in which qualitative and 
quantitative methods can be successfully integrated, Steckler et al. (1992) suggest 
that qualitative methods can be utilised to assist in the development of quantitative 
measures and qualitative methods can held to explain quantitative findings. It was 
these approaches to integrating the qualitative and quantitative findings that I took in 
this study. The findings from the interviews with seafarers guided the analysis of the 
injury data. In particular, seafarers’ definitions of the start and end of a tour of duty, 
which were revealed during the interviews, were used to quantify the time periods 
used in the analysis of the shipping companies’ data – an issue which will be 
considered in more depth in chapter five. The strength of this approach was that it 
enabled me to get closer to the lived experiences of seafarers than would have been 
possible had I simply analysed the injury data in accordance with my own ideas and 
biases. This was particularly important given my position as an insider researcher and 
the potential for bias associated with this, issues which will be considered in greater 
detail in section 3.4.1. 
The qualitative findings were used to shed light on some possible explanations for the 
quantitative findings which emerged. For example, findings from the interviews 
regarding the under-reporting and delayed reporting of incidents by seafarers – which 
will be seen in chapter five – revealed some of the possible reasons for the patterns 
which emerged in the analysis of the shipping companies’ data sets. In utilising both 
qualitative and quantitative research methods I was able to overcome some of the 
limitations of using a single research method design. 
3.2 Pilot study 
Prior to conducting the qualitative component of this study I conducted a pilot study of 
the qualitative research method. Whilst pilots of qualitative research are less common 
than pilots of quantitative research, they are not unheard of. This is because there are 
a number of advantages of conducting pilots for qualitative research. 
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In this section the reasons why a pilot study was utilised and how the pilot study 
informed and helped to direct the main study will be presented. The advantages of 
conducting a pilot study are considered and the manner in which the pilot study was 
conducted discussed. The lessons learnt by conducting a pilot study are also 
reflected upon and finally in the latter part of this section possible themes for future 
consideration are outlined. 
3.2.1 Conducting a pilot study 
In total five pilot study interviews were conducted at a British university which trains 
seafarers in maritime studies. The interviews were conducted over two consecutive 
days in September 2014 in a room provided by the university.  
In order to ensure compliance with ethical requirements all the participants were 
contacted via email one week prior to the interviews taking place and all the 
participants signed a consent form giving their consent to take part in the study and 
for the interview to be recorded3. Whilst this method of finding participants was 
convenient it was in no way a representative sample. The method, however, was 
deemed suitable for this pilot study, due in the main to the pilot study’s primary aim of 
testing and refining the interview schedule. 
Owing to the limitations in the sampling strategy all the participants were employed in 
the deck department and furthermore all respondents had obtained at least an Officer 
of the Watch (unlimited) licence. Thus, all the participants were educated and trained 
seafarers who had demonstrated the capacity to obtain a British Certificate of 
Competency. In terms of hierarchy the lowest interviewed was a recently qualified 
officer who had completed twelve months as a deck cadet and was soon to join a 
vessel as a junior deck officer. Further up the hierarchy were experienced deck 
officers and two of those interviewed had recently obtained Chief Officer licences and 
were anticipating joining vessels as Chief Officers in the near future. The length of 
tours worked by participants varied from twenty-eight days to five months. 
 
  
                                            
3 Further information regarding obtaining ethical approval and ethical considerations can be seen in 
section 3.4.2 
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All the participants in the pilot study were male, however, this is understandable given 
the fact that female seafarers are estimated to make up just 2% of the global 
seafaring labour force (IMO 2015). There were no apparent issues in the pilot study 
regarding my gender and the only comments made relating to my position as a 
researcher appeared to be based on the fact the participants were aware of my 
previous employment onboard deep-sea tankers. For example, one Deck Officer 
stated: 
“On tankers you’re always doing tank inspections, going down the pump 
room, you’re always doing something that is related to the cargo, aren’t you? 
Whereas offshore you’ve got lots of different cargoes and when you do tank 
inspections and stuff it’s more of a deck focus part of the industry whereas 
tankers are very much about the tank isn’t it?” (Deck Officer A). 
All the participants were European with four being British nationals and one being a 
Lithuanian national and only one participant did not speak English as their native 
language. This individual however was proficient in speaking English. 
Whilst these limitations in the sampling of the pilot study participants are undesirable 
they are not insurmountable given that the pilot study’s main aim was to refine the 
interview schedule, an aim which was met and which is further discussed in the 
following section. 
3.2.2 Lessons learnt from the pilot study 
Refining a research instrument, such as an interview schedule, is perhaps the 
greatest advantage of conducting a pilot study and some researchers – such as 
Bryman (2008) – have conducted pilots explicitly to develop and refine research 
instruments. Others (see for example Turner 2010) have framed questions utilising 
experiences gained during pilots. Moreover, Bryman (2008) suggested that a pilot 
study provides the opportunity to become familiar with an audio recorder, a piece of 
equipment that I was not previously familiar with. 
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My main motivation for conducting a pilot was that I wanted an opportunity to test and 
refine my interview schedule prior to going onboard a vessel – which as will be seen 
in section 3.3 was the method I utilised for accessing seafarers. The testing of the 
interview schedule was warranted owing to the substantial complexities in gaining 
access to ships on which to conduct research. Such complexity is due to both 
logistical and procedural issues. For instance, ships’ schedules may vary at 
short-notice and consequently ships may not call at planned ports, or the arrival at the 
planned port may occur on an earlier, or later, date than anticipated. Moreover, ISPS 
requirements are stringent and as such it is no longer the case that individuals can 
simply enter a port area and approach a ship – regardless of their intentions.  
By testing my interview schedule I was able to ascertain if the schedule was suitable 
for answering the research questions of the study, prior to undertaking the complex 
task of arranging access to ships on which I could conduct my research. I was also 
able to test how my questions were phrased and this was of importance as the 
interviews were conducted in English, which is my native language. I was aware, 
however, that many of the seafarers I would interview onboard vessels would not be 
native English speakers. An example of this issue was experienced during the pilot 
study when it became apparent that the phrase “time into tour” was not understood by 
even those seafarers for whom English is a first language, and this lack of 
understanding was attributed to my accent. Consequently, the previously planned 
uses of the phrase were altered.  
Testing my interview schedule also involved trying to identify ways in which I could 
improve the elicitation of responses. The pilot study enabled me to recognise parts of 
the interview which did not flow and where I found it difficult to encourage a 
comprehensive narrative from the participant. An example of this relates to interview 
questions regarding the participant’s experience of being injured whilst at sea, which 
proved to be particularly problematic. During the first interview the participant’s 
immediate response was that they had never experienced an injury. When the same 
response was given in a later interview conducted, I did not immediately move on to 
the next question as can be seen by the quote below this brief period of silence 
allowed the respondent to recall an incident and alter their response. 
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“I’ve not really injured myself {pause}. Actually, no that’s not true I cut my arse, 
I fell over. This was the end of the trip we were moving stuff on deck and I was 
supervising the guys and then I was concentrating on what they were doing.” 
(Deck Officer D). 
Whilst I could potentially notice these points during the interview, the issue became 
much clearer and easier to consider upon transcribing each interview and reflecting 
on it. 
Another important issue – which became apparent in the early stages of the pilot 
study – was that I could explore the quantitative data I had obtained in a different 
manner. The logical approach to considering seafarers’ occupational injuries in 
relation to time was to consider them chronologically. However, comments made by 
Officers A and B – as can be seen below – suggested a difference in working patterns 
and work intensity towards the end of a tour of duty of duty. Thus, the findings from 
the pilot study indicated the importance of considering the quantitative data in a 
manner which worked chronologically backwards from the end of the tour of duty 
rather than chronologically forwards from the beginning. 
“Your last sort of few days on board you don’t do anything, any risk anything 
you just don’t do anything because out of sods law you’re bound to hurt 
yourself so anything that’s slightly risky for the last week or so onboard don’t 
do it. You get someone else to do it or you just leave it” (Deck Officer B). 
“[During the last week I do] less work really because you want time to do your 
handover notes don’t you and stuff like that” (Deck Officer A). 
Consequently, I learnt several useful and valuable lessons by conducting a pilot 
study. 
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3.3 Interviewing seafarers 
After refining my interview schedule – in the ways suggested from the pilot study – I 
commenced interviewing seafarers. In order to interview seafarers, however, I first 
needed to access them and researchers have utilised a number of approaches to 
access seafarers, such as through a shore-based maritime training centre (see for 
example Sampson et al. 2016). Such an approach, however, would have restricted 
both the rank and the nationality of the seafarers interviewed. This is because, in 
general, seafarers utilise maritime training centres in their home country and it is 
predominantly officers and cadets who attend such centres. The implication being 
that if I accessed UK maritime training centres my sample would have been heavily 
skewed towards British nationals and officers (and trainee officers), thus preventing 
the inclusion of the perceptions and experiences of ratings and seafarers from other 
nations in my study. 
Utilising a seafaring centre within a port was also considered, particularly as such an 
approach had proved successful for other researchers (see for example Sampson et 
al. 2016). I was able to obtain consent from a number of seafaring centres within the 
UK to conduct interviews, however, upon visiting one of the centres for a preliminary 
visit prior to conducting my study – it emerged that only a very small number of 
seafarers attended the seafaring centres in the UK, with seafaring centres in other 
parts of the world proving more popular.  
Consequently, I opted to conduct interviews onboard ships. Bhattacharya (2009) and 
Sampson (2013) conducted interviews with seafarers’ onboard ships, 
and adopting such an approach also enabled me to access the range of seafarers 
onboard. Like these researchers, it further meant I was able to conduct the interviews 
in an environment with which the seafarers were familiar – and with which they were 
comfortable. Sailing onboard the vessels during a voyage would have permitted more 
time in which to conduct the interviews but owing to my personal circumstances this 
was not possible. Therefore, I spent time onboard the vessels when they were in port. 
Whilst this approach meant the time I could become acquainted with the seafarers 
was limited, my previous experience of working at sea helped in building rapport with 
them quickly and effectively. This issue is discussed further in section 3.4.1. 
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It is important to acknowledge that interviewing a number of seafarers sailing onboard 
the same ship is different to interviewing individual seafarers each sailing onboard 
different ships. Thus, there was a weakness of my approach in that seafarers were 
most likely to talk about their most recent experiences and seafarers onboard the 
same vessel were likely to have similar recent experiences. To overcome this 
weakness, I asked seafarers to reflect on their broader experiences, including their 
experiences onboard other ships. 
In this section I will first discuss in greater detail the interviews I conducted with 
seafarers before moving on to explain the manner in which I analysed qualitative data 
I had collected. 
3.3.1 Conducting interviews onboard ships 
In total four ships were visited in four different UK ports. Each of the ships were 
visited for the duration of their stay in port, which in each instance was approximately 
two days. The consent to visit each of the ships was obtained from the Captain, who I 
contacted via email. In order to email the Captains directly a ships’ agent – a local 
shore-based individual who is employed to assist a ship whilst the ship is in port – 
who knew which ships would be arriving in the port, was able to facilitate contact 
between myself and the Captains. The use of a gatekeeper was important as it is 
widely acknowledged by researchers that seafarers are difficult to access. 
Bhattacharya (2009, p.95) for example, described the difficulties he had in gaining 
access to seafarers and stated that “getting access to conduct research onboard 
ships is considerably more complex than shore-based industries because of a series 
of procedural and logistical problems involved.” The facilitating approach of the agent 
helped me to navigate the procedural and logistical problems – such as ensuring I 
had security clearance to access the port – and owing to the approach I utilised I did 
not experience refusals from any of the Captains contacted. 
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In my initial email I provided the Captain with information about myself, my intentions 
whilst onboard and the scope of my research. On one of the vessels it became 
apparent that this information had been shared by the Captain with others onboard 
when the Chief Engineer informed me that he had checked my credentials online 
prior to my visit. 
As well as not experiencing any refusals from the Captains I contacted on two 
occasions the Captains expressed pleasure that they themselves had been contacted 
by a researcher to obtain permission to visit rather than the shipping company 
providing consent on behalf of the Captain and simply assigning a researcher to the 
vessel. One seafarer even stated that he was willing to participate as the request had 
not come from the shipping company and therefore he was confident that I was “not a 
company mole”. It should be noted, however, that this approach resulted in the issue 
that my consent to visit was assigned to the one ship only and if an issue were to 
arise regarding the vessel’s schedule it was not possible to attend another of the 
shipping company’s vessels instead. Therefore – and also owing to the ship’s tight 
schedules and the fact that the schedules were frequently altered – it was imperative 
that I was ready to travel to the ship at short notice and able to arrive at the ship 
immediately after it berthed, as any delay would result in a reduction in the already 
short period available to interview the seafarers. With these issues in mind I was able 
to keep up-to-date with the ship’s schedule by both maintaining contact with the agent 
and tracking the vessel’s Automatic Identification System (AIS) online.  
Upon arrival, I initially met with the vessel’s Captain and provided information as 
required. Onboard ships 3 and 4 the Captain assisted in introducing me to other 
seafarers onboard and on ships 1 and 2 the Captain instructed a junior officer to 
assist me. 
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In total thirty-seven interviews were conducted and the average duration of each 
interview was approximately fifty-three minutes. The number of seafarers interviewed 
varied from ship to ship and on each of the ships a full spectrum of views was 
included with senior officers, junior officers and ratings interviewed. Table 9 below 
provides a summary of the interviews conducted along with the number of officers 
and ratings onboard each ship. Further details regarding the interviewed seafarer’s 
position onboard, nationality and age can be seen in appendix ii. It is noteworthy that 
on each of the ships there were seafarers of three of more nationalities and were 
therefore multi-national crewed vessels. 
 
 Officers interviewed 
Ratings 
interviewed 
Total 
seafarers 
interviewed 
Officers 
onboard 
Ratings 
onboard 
Total 
seafarers 
onboard 
Ship 1 3 7 10 Unknown Unknown 23 
Ship 2 10 2 12 12 9 21 
Ship 3 5 2 7 6 4 10 
Ship 4 6 2 8 6 4 10 
Total 24 13 37    
Table 9 Summary of interviews conducted 
 
3.3.2 Analysis of interview data 
All the interviews were recorded using a digital tape recorder. Whilst onboard I also 
wrote brief field notes regarding my observations and after conducting each ship visit 
I transcribed each interview and typed up my field notes. I used the CAQDAS 
programme NVivo to assist in the analysis and began by importing the transcriptions 
and field notes into the programme.  
I commenced the analysis by reading through all the transcripts and made a small 
number of notes regarding what struck me as particularly interesting. I then re-read 
the transcripts and started assigning codes which identified a topic that emerged from 
the interview transcripts. In some instances, the topics were captured in a few words, 
whilst in others they were narrated in far greater detail and ran into several pages of 
text.  
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Once I had fully completed this process I reviewed the codes in relation to the 
transcripts. In instances where I had used different words to describe the same 
phenomenon I changed these to the same phrase, thus making a consistent code. I 
began to look for connections between the codes and flagged up such examples. For 
example, I identified if particular ideas were from seafarers who were employed in a 
specific manner or if they were common among seafarers of a particular rank. 
I then grouped the codes together into categories based on features they had in 
common. This process was conducted for a number of reasons. First, it served to 
make the data more manageable. It also enabled the data to be organised in a way 
that it could be used to address the research question posed in this study. The 
categories discussed here give rise to the themes which are presented in the 
subsequent findings chapters. 
3.4 Further considerations 
In this final section, some of the main considerations I needed to be aware of both 
whilst collecting my data – and throughout the course of my study more generally – 
are presented. In brief these considerations include my position as a researcher, 
ethical principles in social research and risks in research. 
Acknowledging my own position as a researcher is important as: "a researcher's 
background and position will affect what they choose to investigate, the angle of 
investigation, the methods judged most adequate for this purpose, the findings 
considered most appropriate, and the framing and communication of conclusions" 
(Malterud, 2001, p. 483-484). Thus, my position as a researcher likely shaped this 
study – and it is important to understand how, and perhaps more importantly the 
steps I took to avoid potential bias. 
The ethical principles in social research are also important, and these principles tend 
to revolve around harm to participants, lack of informed consent, deception and 
invasion of privacy. The steps I took to ensure the research I conducted was ethical 
are detailed in section 3.4.2. Such steps included providing interview participants with 
written and verbal information regarding the study and asking them to sign a consent 
form so as to ensure I had informed consent to conduct each of the interviews. 
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In section 3.4.2, the steps I took to reduce the risk to both myself – and the potential 
risks posed to the seafarers who participated in my study – are detailed. Bloor et al. 
(2010, p.45) state that: “qualitative research frequently involves extended personal 
contact with research participants in a range of research settings that cannot (and 
arguably should not) be closely controlled by the researcher, so some residuum of 
researcher risk is inevitable.” Such risks I faced included working as a lone 
researcher in an inherently dangerous environment. Importantly, I was also mindful of 
the fact that my research may pose a risk to the participants, particularly as I was 
asking them to discuss topics which were of a sensitive nature – such as their 
experiences of personal injuries. 
3.4.1 Position as a researcher 
In considering my position as a researcher, perhaps a good way to start is by 
acknowledging my own occupational history. The origins of my connection with the 
seafaring industry began when I embarked on a cadetship. After successfully 
completing training as a Deck Cadet – during which time I worked onboard container 
vessels, a product tanker, an offshore support vessel and a passenger ferry – I was 
awarded an Officer of the Watch Certificate of Competency. I went on to sail as a 
Third Officer onboard product tankers. Thus, throughout this study I was a practitioner 
researcher and there were several advantages because of my position.  
In section 3.3.1 it was seen that I conducted interviews with seafarers’ onboard ships 
whilst the ships were in port. My experience as a seafarer enabled me to quickly build 
a rapport with the seafarers I interviewed. This was critical, given the relatively short 
period I spent onboard. It also gave me the capacity to understand the technical 
terms used during the interviews without needing to interrupt the flow of the 
conversation to ask, for example, what was meant by the term ECDIS (the electronic 
chart display and information system used to navigate ships). My ability to build a 
strong rapport – owing to my insider status – meant that I was successful in getting 
seafarers to talk expansively about their broader experiences. This was especially 
important given that I wanted to prevent seafarers from focussing solely on their most 
recent experiences – an issue discussed in section 3.3. 
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My knowledge of the working routine onboard also enabled me to use my time 
onboard efficiently. For instance, I was aware of the times when watchkeepers would 
change watches and when individuals would likely be found in the communal areas 
onboard. 
Importantly, my experience as a seafarer appeared to encourage those who were 
reluctant to participate in my study. Through my occupational history I could express 
empathy and indicate that I too had been ‘one of them’. 
It is important to acknowledge that there are problems associated with insider 
research. I ensured I was explicitly familiar with these problems and throughout my 
study I was aware of the potential for making assumptions based on my own prior 
knowledge. I was also aware of the issue that I may overlook – or simply not see – 
important information. My awareness of my potential bias on both data collection and 
analysis ensured I regularly reflected on these issues to ensure that my study 
retained its integrity and quality. 
3.4.2 Ethics and risk in research 
Throughout my study I maintained awareness of risks to myself – as well as the 
potential risks to the individuals who participated in my study – and in order to reduce 
the risks of conducting research and try to ensure my safety as a lone researcher I 
implemented a number of measures. First, I wore the appropriate personal protective 
equipment as designated by the port and the ship whilst conducting the fieldwork. At 
all times I complied with the instructions given to me by port workers and members of 
the ship’s crew.  
Prior to travelling to any of the fieldwork locations I left details of my itinerary with my 
designated person and upon completion of each field visit I contacted my designated 
person and confirmed that all was well. In addition to this the ship’s agent and port 
security were kept informed of my whereabouts and I updated them once I had 
concluded my field visit. 
Throughout the fieldwork I was also mindful of the fact that my research may pose a 
risk to the participants. I was therefore conscious of the fact that my participants may 
have had professional and personal welfare interests to protect. 
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All the methods used to conduct this research were carried out in compliance with 
both the requirements of Cardiff University’s School of Social Science Research 
Ethics Committee and the Statement of Ethical Practice of the British Sociological 
Association (BSA 1992).  
Prior to conducting the interviews I submitted an application to the SREC and 
obtained ethical approval. The ethical approval documentation can be seen in 
appendix iii. As part of my application for ethical approval I also submitted my 
interview guide, which outlined the areas which I intended to cover during the 
interviews. This interview guide can be viewed in appendix iv. 
Before I conducted the interviews all the participants were informed that they could 
terminate the interview at any time and I provided each of the participants with an 
information sheet – which can be seen in appendix v. 
I also asked each of the participants to read and sign a consent form and a copy of 
this form can be seen in appendix vi. The consent form is clear in stating that the 
participant is taking part voluntarily and that they have the right to withdraw their 
consent for the use of any data generated at any time. Additionally, the consent form 
explains that any information will remain anonymous and confidential.  
The irony of asking seafarers to talk about their perceptions and experience of the 
organisation of work and employment at sea in relation to their health, safety and 
well-being, whilst the vessel was in port, a period which is known to be especially 
busy was not lost on me. I was acutely aware that taking part in my study could 
potentially result in seafarers’ violations of rest hours regulations. Consequently, I 
stipulated to all individuals that I would not conduct any interviews if in doing so rest 
hour violations would occur. 
To ensure all data remain private and confidential I have followed data protection 
rules and all participants’ names were removed and replaced with anonymous 
identifier codes. To assist in analysing the data I retained the rank of the participant 
and the anonymous identity of the ship on which they were interviewed (ships 1, 2, 3, 
4). Christians (2005) suggested that insiders in organisations may be able to 
recognise pseudonyms and other details, such as locations. Therefore, with this issue 
in mind, in some instances in this study it has been necessary to be somewhat vague 
about specific details. 
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All data have – at all times – been stored securely and separately and electronic data 
have been stored on a password protected computer. Additionally, all data will 
continue to be stored securely for five years following the completion of the study, 
thereby complying with the requirements set by Cardiff University. 
3.5 Summary 
This chapter has presented an explanation of the research methods utilised in this 
study, which were chosen to ensure that the research questions posed in this study 
were extensively addressed. In doing so it has shown why I utilised shipping 
companies’ safety data to explore seafarers’ safety in relation to features of work 
patterns – an important aspect of the way in which work is organised. It has also 
discussed the advantages of conducting semi-structured interviews with seafarers to 
gain an insight into their perceptions and views regarding the impact of features of the 
organisation of work and employment at sea on their health, safety and well-being. In 
this chapter, I have detailed the manner in which I have utilised mixed methods 
research to address the research question: 
What are the health, safety and well-being experiences of seafarers in relation 
to the organisation of work and employment at sea? 
The chapter has also explained the reasons why I conducted a pilot study and the 
lessons I learnt from the pilot study – such as the need to allow for pauses to give 
respondents time to comprehensively answer my questions. It also presented the 
ethical considerations taken into account during this study, and discussed my own 
position as a researcher. In doing so I acknowledged my position as an insider 
researcher and how my awareness of this was important in ensuring my data 
collection and the analysis of the data was conducted with integrity. 
In addressing the research question the findings from the shipping companies’ safety 
data and the ways in which the qualitative data guided the analyses can be seen in 
chapter five. Before this, however, the findings from the semi-structured interviews 
with seafarers which paint a picture of a seafarer’s tour of duty are presented in 
chapter four. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: SEAFARERS EXPERIENCES OF A USUAL TOUR OF DUTY 
 
4.0 Introduction 
This chapter – the first of three findings chapters – seeks to give a flavour of life as a 
seafarer and, in particular, to provide an understanding of the organisation of work 
and employment at sea. It therefore presents seafarers’ experiences relating to how 
the work they undertake is organised and the manner in which they are employed. In 
presenting these findings the chapter is arranged into a number of themes, each of 
which were identified through discussions during the course of the interviews with the 
seafarers who took part in this study about their own personal experiences of life at 
sea. Thus the accounts in both this chapter and chapter six specifically draw upon the 
interview transcripts and field notes from the four ships visited.  
In the first half of this chapter, themes relating to seafarers’ employment are explored. 
In chapter one it was seen that precarious employment is prevalent within the 
seafaring industry and the vast majority – but not all – seafarers are employed on 
single voyage contracts. Precarious employment methods have been seen in other 
industries to be associated with negative health, safety and well-being outcomes and 
thus these are of particular importance when considering the impact that the 
organisation of work and employment at sea has on the health, safety and well-being 
of seafarers. This chapter, therefore, makes comparisons between the experiences 
and perceptions of those individuals who were permanently employed and those who 
were precariously employed.  
In the latter half of this chapter, the seafarers’ experiences of the routine of life 
onboard are presented. In doing so it considers the working routine onboard and how 
a relatively small number of seafarers operate a ship twenty-four hours a day, seven 
days a week. It also considers seafarers’ rest hours and goes on to present findings 
regarding fatigue and seafarers’ perceptions of risk in relation to fatigue. Such issues 
may be present throughout a seafarer’s entire tour of duty, from the first day they 
arrive on the vessel to the day they leave the ship and return home.  
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In exploring the issues which may be present throughout a seafarer’s tour of duty, the 
descriptions presented in this chapter help to situate and contextualise the findings 
presented in chapter six – which relate to particular time periods within a tour of duty. 
Moreover, to understand how the organisation of work and employment at sea 
impacts on the health, safety and well-being of seafarers it is necessary to look 
beyond the specific time periods identified by both literature and the seafarers in this 
study and consider how seafarers experience a usual tour of duty. 
4.1 Seafarers’ employment 
Research in shore-based industries has revealed a number of relationships between 
occupational health, safety and well-being and the organisation of employment. For 
example, Quinlan et al. (2001) found precarious employment to be associated with a 
deterioration of workers’ health and safety in terms of personal injury rates and risk of 
disease. Literature regarding well-being outcomes and the organisation of 
employment also highlights precarious employment as a concern (see for example 
Lewchuk et al.’s discussion on employment strain 2003). 
Many of the features related to the organisation of work and employment which have 
been shown to be associated with poor occupational health, safety and well-being 
outcomes in shore-based industries are prevalent in the seafaring industry and 
consequently similar adverse outcomes might be expected for seafarers. 
4.1.1 Stable employment 
Literature (see for example Ellis et al. 2012) has shown substantial variations in the 
organisation of employment experienced by seafarers and such differences may be 
dependent upon a number of factors. Research (see for example Bloor and Sampson 
2009) also indicates that, depending on the manner in which they are employed, the 
periods of time when an individual is at sea can be regular for some and ad hoc for 
others. 
In chapter 1.1.1 it was seen that, generally, seafarers from more economically 
developed countries experience stable employment conditions, regardless of their 
rank, which results in fixed periods of time at sea followed by fixed periods of time at 
home. During their time both at sea and at home these seafarers received a monthly 
salary. The findings from this study corroborate this and one rating who was from a 
developed nation explained the manner in which he was employed: 
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“I have a permanent contract for the last, well I sign a permanent contract in 
2007 so 7 years’ permanent contract I work 5/5, 5 weeks on 5 weeks off” Chief 
Cook ship 1. 
Those seafarers who were permanently employed were not subjected to the same 
earning uncertainty as their precariously employed colleagues. This had a number of 
important implications for their health, safety and well-being – something which will 
become apparent as this chapter progresses. 
The scheduling of some seafarers who were permanently employed was organised in 
a manner in which two seafarers were employed in the same role on a consecutive 
rotational basis. Thus, when one individual was onboard, the other was at home – 
and vice versa. Throughout the interviews, seafarers used the term ‘back-to-back’ to 
describe returning to the same vessel for each tour of duty and rotating this position 
with another individual, resulting in the position onboard being consistently filled by 
the same two seafarers. 
It was apparent, however, that it was predominantly only the senior officers from 
economically developed countries who experienced this schedule, whilst senior 
officers from less economically developed countries were not routinely scheduled in 
this manner. For example, onboard one of the ships discussed here, the Captain and 
Chief Engineer who were both European were employed on back-to-back schedules 
whilst the other two senior officers, the Chief Officer and Second Engineer, who were 
from developing nations, were employed using single voyage contracts. 
The seafarers who experienced back-to-back scheduling reported arranging their 
relief schedule between themselves – rather than the shipping company arranging 
the dates on which they joined and left the vessel. As one Second Engineer 
explained: 
“I could just email [seafarer’s name] and say can you join now and he would 
just say yes or no and then that’s how we do it. We arrange our reliefs and then 
I just go and see the captain and say [seafarer’s name] is coming this port” 
Second Engineer, ship 2. 
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In many respects the organising of employment in this manner relieves the shipping 
company of many of the issues related to arranging for a seafarer to join a vessel. For 
example, as will be presented in chapter 6.1.1 it emerged that in some circumstances 
shipping companies provided seafarers with very little notice prior to joining a vessel 
and consequently they were sometimes unable to leave home and join the vessel on 
such short notice. 
The convenience of allowing the seafarers to make their own arrangement has 
resulted in these seafarers enjoying a far greater degree of control than their 
colleagues not utilising such a scheduling arrangement, as one Second Engineer 
explained: 
“Yeah we just do it as we want, I just, I could do it a week early…. you have to, 
well the seniors have to average 75 day trips, so you can’t do 3 weeks on all 
the time, you could maybe do it once but then, well I’m sure they’d let it go 
once without an issue but you can’t just do 3 weeks on 3 weeks off all the time” 
Second Engineer ship 2. 
A seafarer’s ability to arrange their own relief schedule is of significance when 
considering issues regarding both the start and end of a tour of duty – as will be seen 
throughout chapter six. In chapter 6.1.1 it will be seen that the experience of a 
seafarer who knows the date they will be joining a vessel a number of weeks in 
advance is substantially different to the experience of a seafarer who receives 
instructions to join a vessel at short notice. A seafarer’s ability to arrange their own 
relief schedule also has important implications for mandatory tour extensions – as will 
be seen in chapter 6.2.2. 
The greater flexibility afforded by a back-to-back schedule relies to an extent upon the 
willingness of both seafarers to settle upon an agreement between themselves – if no 
agreement can be reached the shipping company dictates the relief pattern. 
However, in such circumstances it is not unusual for one seafarer to seek a move to 
another vessel. 
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Lewchuk et al. (2003) argue that scheduling uncertainty – that is an individual’s 
control over when they work – is an important component of employment strain, 
which in turn relates to job strain. Since traditional measures of job control – such as 
those suggested in the classic study by Karasek (1979) – argue that workers 
experience higher levels of well-being when they perceive higher levels of job control 
it could be reasoned that seafarers who experience higher levels of autonomy 
regarding when they work may experience higher levels of well-being. 
In the light of such arguments it is unsurprising that the accounts of seafarers 
revealed that employment on a back-to-back schedule – which allows the seafarer a 
relatively high degree of control regarding when they join and leave a ship – was 
highly favoured and something which many strived for. For example, onboard ship 2 
terms set by the charterer required all officers to be of a certain nationality4 and a 
shortage of junior officers of this nationality employed by the shipping company had 
resulted in many of the officers (of this nationality) working a back-to-back schedule. 
As the Fourth Engineer explained: 
“3 months on 3 months off at the moment, yeah just the way it’s worked out on 
this ship, it’s quite good yeah, my contracts not 3 months on 3 months off but 
just on this ship you know with being English [British] crewed it’s like easier to 
just get 2 people doing back to back” Fourth Engineer, ship 2. 
Undoubtedly, the Fourth Engineer was pleased by his back-to-back status, something 
which under normal circumstances he would not have experienced until he reached 
the rank of Second Engineer. 
Seafarers who experienced back-to-back scheduling reported remaining in contact 
with their reliever whilst they were at home via email or social media and 
consequently were aware of the vessel’s upcoming schedule. Furthermore, by 
remaining in contact the seafarers were able to apprise one another of any potential 
problems which were likely to impact upon their pre-determined relief schedule. One 
Chief Engineer explained: 
                                            
4 The nationality restrictions set by the charterer were related to issues of national security 
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“This time for example I got in touch [via email] with my oppo [opposite] and his 
father in law had died so he obviously can’t come so I’m staying the extra 10 
days” Chief Engineer, ship 2. 
Again, the consequence is that these individuals retain a degree of control and such 
control has positive implications for seafarers’ well-being outcomes. 
4.1.2 Flexible employment 
In comparison, other seafarers, and particularly those from less economically 
developed countries (such as the Philippines), experienced far less control and 
substantially more employment uncertainty. They were precariously employed and 
more often than not, employed through third-party crewing agencies. Thus, 
corroborating Ellis et al’s. (2012) study in which it was revealed that the type of 
employment experienced by seafarers was significantly related to the seafarers’ 
nationality. 
The crewing agencies employed the seafarers on voyage contracts5 and as such only 
paid the seafarers a wage whilst they were at sea. Upon returning home these 
seafarers are likely to obtain a further voyage contract from the manning agency for 
further employment. However, this is not guaranteed. One AB explained how he had 
secured subsequent employment with a manning agency but as part of this 
employment they had transferred him multiple times between not only different 
shipping companies but also different ship types: 
“My first vessel is LPG it was a Norwegian company and then after that I think 
3 times contract in the LPG that was 9 months [contracts] and after that I 
transfer but this is the same manning in Manila but different owner it was in 
Italy but same LPG and then I have 3 times contract there as 9 months and 
then I try to work in oil chemical tanker it was in Norwegian flag but the owner 
is Swedish and then I don’t know I have been many times there I don’t 
remember how long I was working there and then after that the manning in 
Manila they planned to transfer here. It was almost 7 years here in this 
company as an AB” AB ship 3. 
                                            
5 It should be noted that whilst individuals employed directly by shipping companies normally hold 
permanent contracts, a small number of shipping companies do utilise voyage contracts. This is 
particularly the case in the cruise sector. 
91 
 
The above quote illustrates how an AB had worked for four different shipping 
companies via the same crewing agency. When a crewing agency provides repeat 
employment for a seafarer within a shipping company, the seafarer is likely to join 
different vessels for each subsequent tour of duty. As one AB explained: 
“This is first time on this vessel I was, my first vessel in this company was ship 
A and then after that only one contract in ship A and then transfer in ship B so I 
was then three times in ship B and then after that ship C. Ship C I been there 3 
times also and then after Ship C I was in Ship D one time and then after ship 
D, ship E and then now here [ship F]” AB ship 3. 
Nevertheless, sailing onboard different vessels operated by the same shipping 
company for subsequent tours of duty is not a scenario which is unique to seafarers 
precariously employed. Some seafarers who were employed on permanent contracts 
by a shipping company were also seen to work onboard different ships for each 
subsequent tour of duty. This situation has negative implications for seafarers’ safety 
as research from other industries highlights an increased risk when workers are 
unfamiliar with a specific workplace. Breslin and Smith (2006) for example, found that 
workplace specific inexperience contributed to occupational injury risk, irrespective of 
the age of the worker, in various shore-based industries. Moreover, in research 
specific to the seafaring industry Hansen et al. (2002) revealed that seafarers who 
returned to the same ship for subsequent tours of duty had a decreased risk of 
experiencing an injury. 
Irrespective of the adverse safety outcomes associated with deploying seafarers to 
unfamiliar vessels, the findings indicate that seafarers are considered as flexible 
employees who can be employed across a range of work situations. In theory this 
situation permits seafarers to exert some job control as they can transfer their labour 
across the various sectors of the seafaring industry. It was explained in chapter 1.1.1 
that this flexibility is underpinned by STCW which provides seafarers with a universal 
qualification which is applicable for any vessel type. In light of this functional flexibility 
– a term utilised by Leong (2012) – it is unsurprising that when asked about his 
employment history one British AB, who at the time was employed onboard an 
offshore vessel replied: 
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“[I’ve worked onboard] Royal Fleet Auxiliary, several different ship types. I 
worked on a submarine tender or repair ship which used to repair nuclear subs 
and Royal Navy ships. I’ve worked on the tankers which refuel at sea other 
ships, I’ve worked on stores carrying ships which obviously is self-explanatory. 
I worked for [shipping company name] so marine cable laying round the UK 
and across the world. I’ve worked on ferries, roll on roll off ferries out of Dover. 
What else have I done? Within [shipping company name] as well route clearing 
ships which before the cable gets laid they go out and drag grapnels behind 
the ship and clear the cable route before a big ship comes in and actually lays 
the cables for real. I’ve worked on survey vessels, I worked for a company that 
worked alongside the government testing new build ships, new design and 
new build ships carrying stuff on there that they wanted to test out for the 
forces” AB ship 1. 
This response was not untypical and many of the seafarers interviewed had worked 
onboard vessels across different sectors of the seafaring industry. 
Seafarers’ perceptions of changes to the type of vessel on which they were employed 
varied and for some seafarers the changes were perceived in a negative manner. 
During the interviews, it was indicated that moving between sectors of the seafaring 
industry was a consequence of the economic realities that some seafarers – 
particularly those from less economically developed countries – faced. Thus, some 
seafarers moved – or were moved by crewing agencies – from sector to sector 
irrespective of their personal preferences. One of the components of Lewchuk et al.’s 
(2003) employment strain model (as presented in chapter 1.1.1) is location 
uncertainty – a component which considers a worker’s control over their work 
location. Viewed in light of Lewchuk et al. (2003) argument seafarers’ lack of control 
over the vessels to which they were deployed is a concern for well-being outcomes. 
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Moreover, a lack of ship type experience was perceived to have negative implications 
for not only the unfamiliar seafarer – but also for the other seafarers onboard and the 
operational safety of the vessel, as the following example indicates. Onboard one of 
the ships discussed here an AB with many years of experience in the offshore sector 
of the seafaring industry was sailing onboard a tanker. The seafarer’s lack of 
familiarity with tankers had resulted in an unofficial routine in which the AB did more 
of the work which is similar across vessel types, such as lookout duties and less work 
that is tanker specific such as tank cleaning, as one AB explained: 
“We’ve just done a lot of tank cleaning on here before going to dry dock and 
line washing and educting and that some of it had to be done during night time 
like m1e and [seafarers name] burst it between the 2 of us, we went sixes and 
me and [seafarers name] agreed, I had a bit more experience especially when 
it comes to draining the lines and that because at the time we had one new lad 
not too clued up on that and the last thing you want to be doing is trying to get 
him to do something so what we were doing during the daytime was just 
working like normal two of us together and when it got dark he [new seafarer] 
went to the bridge and I just stayed on, done what needed to be done” AB 2, 
ship 2.  
This example illustrates how the flexibility of the seafaring industry works in practice. 
If experienced crew members are unable – or unwilling – to alter their own work 
routine to accommodate inexperienced seafarers, there is the potential for an 
increase in risk. 
In light of the above example, it is perhaps unsurprising that the accounts of seafarers 
suggested having seafarers onboard who were familiar with the vessel was greatly 
favourable. In particular, seafarers with vessel specific familiarity were deemed to be 
less of a risk than those who were unfamiliar. As one Captain explained: 
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“Well this ship as you're aware has a regular crew so it works pretty well I 
would say because people come back to the same ship…. from that point of 
view this ship has an advantage over other ships which is reflected in the fact 
that we haven’t had a lost time accident in over 10 years. That’s not an 
accident if you like that that’s happened it’s because of experienced people” 
Captain, ship 2. 
The Captain went on to state: 
“We've just got a new third mate joining so you could say that now is a 
heightened risk because he’s new to the company and new to the ship so 
that’s a heightened risk purely because he’s new so we just have to then make 
sure he knows what he’s doing, we can’t just say tell him to get on and do stuff 
unsupervised, we supervise until we know he isn't a complete incompetent if 
you see what I mean, so yes I would say yes because he’s a new guy he’s an 
increased risk which we have to be aware of” Captain, ship 2. 
As highlighted in the comment made by one of the Captains, seafarers moving 
between different ships for subsequent tours of duty also has implications for 
colleague familiarity – an issue which will be presented in chapter 6.1.2. 
4.1.3 Tour of duty duration 
Irrespective of their familiarity with a vessel, the seafarers interviewed experienced 
vastly different tour of duty durations – ranging from five weeks to six months – and 
there were a number of factors found to impact upon tour duration. The dependency 
of tour duration on the seafarers’ employment type, rank and qualifications was 
evident on all the vessels discussed here and the disparity onboard a single vessel 
ranged from tours of six weeks to six months – with senior officers experiencing the 
shortest tours of duty and ratings the longest. 
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The differences in tour of duty durations experienced by seafarers were particularly 
apparent onboard vessels which were sailing busy trading schedules. The accounts 
of seafarers suggested that vessels which were trading hectic schedules were 
undesirable and consequently the seafarers perceived that shipping companies 
experienced difficulty in recruiting and retaining senior officers to sail onboard such 
hectic vessels. Therefore, senior officers onboard busy vessels wielded more power 
in terms of the tour of duty durations they worked in comparison to their colleagues 
onboard quieter, more desirable ships.  
Onboard one of the ships discussed here – which was undertaking a busy trading 
schedule – the senior officers were contracted to work tours of duty which were two 
months long, the same as their colleagues on other vessels. However, regardless of 
their contracted terms these individuals were working six week tours. When asked 
whether the shipping company had expressed any issues regarding these unofficial 
shorter tours of duty, one Chief Engineer replied: 
“[The shipping company can] take it or leave it really. Otherwise they’d have to 
find 2 new Chief Engineers and 2 new Masters and they will never find it” Chief 
Engineer, ship 4. 
Thus, it is apparent that the experience of senior officers onboard busy ships was one 
of greater power and flexibility in terms of tour duration than both colleagues of the 
same rank sailing onboard other less hectic vessels and also individuals of lower 
ranks sailing onboard the same vessel. In part this greater flexibility was possible as 
the senior officers were sailing a back-to-back schedule and all of the senior officers 
assigned to the vessel were happy to schedule six week tours of duty. Junior officers 
and ratings sailing onboard hectic vessels had no such power as they were not 
employed on a back-to-back schedule and they were only likely to be sailing onboard 
the vessel with a particularly busy trading route for a single tour of duty. Additionally, 
junior officers and ratings perceived that the shipping company could easily replace 
them with another seafarer willing to accept the conditions. 
Differences in the duration of tours of duty between seafarers of different nationalities 
who held the same qualifications and were employed in the same role were also 
evident. As a Swedish Second Officer working six week tours explained:  
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“There’s a Polish [Second Officer] and a Croatian [Second Officer]. The 
Croatian he has I think 3 months and the Polish I don’t remember but they 
have a much longer contract than we have” Second Officer, ship 4. 
The findings regarding differences in tour duration relating to nationality corroborate 
Oldenburg et al. (2009) in which substantial differences between the average tour 
durations for different nationality seafarers were revealed. 
It is notable that the Swedish Second Officer, despite working and living alongside the 
other Second Officers for a period of weeks, was unsure of their tour of duty duration. 
The Second Officer went on to state: 
“They [the two other Second Officers] try to get shorter [tours] but money rules 
so that’s a bit difficult for them” Second Officer, ship 4. 
The two Eastern European Second Officers however, were aware of the Swedish 
Second Officer’s considerably shorter tour of duty and had asked the shipping 
company to reduce their own tours in line with the Swedish Second Officer’s – a 
request which had been denied. The Swedish Second Officer expressed his opinion 
that this refusal was down to the increase in costs caused by seafarers working 
shorter tours. 
The vast differences in tour of duty durations appeared to be a taboo topic with those 
seafarers sailing shorter tours careful not to mention the topic in front of colleagues 
who were sailing longer tours. Moreover, the topic was addressed in a guarded 
manner during the interviews, however, one Third Engineer – who worked far longer 
tours than his colleagues onboard – stated: 
“What is annoying is Danish guys serving on this vessel have short [tour] due 
to vessel operating short voyage even if the person is of the same rank as me, 
like 6 weeks on 6 weeks off, max is 10 weeks on 10 weeks off. So, look in a 
humane way something wrong with me being an Indian. Does it mean I should 
suffer and work? I have 5 months and 2.5 months at home……Yes 
irrespective of [their] contract, yes it says otherwise but due to vessels 
operation they have come to some mutual agreement with manning” Third 
Engineer. 
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The quote indicates that the Third Engineer’s Danish colleagues had been able to 
negotiate unofficial shorter tour of duty durations with the shipping company – 
something which the Third Engineer had been unable to arrange. Thus, the 
disparities in tour of duty duration between seafarers of different nationalities again 
highlights the very significant differences in the levels of power and control held by 
seafarers. 
To avoid any potential conflict conversations between seafarers regarding an 
individual’s tour of duty tended to focus around how long they had left onboard the 
ship as opposed to the overall length of the contract. This approach enabled all 
seafarers to express that they were leaving the ship in a certain period of time – 
something which was looked forward to – rather than drawing attention to their very 
different terms of employment. 
Nevertheless, the length of time seafarers thought was remaining to them onboard 
was not necessarily what would occur in practice. This was because, as explained in 
chapter 2.2.3, many seafarers’ contracts contain a clause which permits the shipping 
company to send the seafarer home prior to the end of their tour – or more often – 
impose a mandatory tour extension. Mandatory tour extensions are a cause for 
concern for a number of reasons, as will be seen in chapter 6.2.2. 
4.2 The life of a seafarer 
Working away from home for prolonged periods of time makes the life of a seafarer 
somewhat unusual, and Thomas and Bailey (2009) describe the life of a seafarer as 
fragmented. The reason for this is that seafarers experience two distinct phases that 
may perhaps be viewed as two distinct lives: one when they are at sea and the other 
when they are at home. There is no blurring of the boundaries between the two, 
seafarers do not usually do paid work when they are at home but during their time at 
sea seafarers are always in the workplace. Apart from short periods of leave ashore 
in port, once at sea, seafarers do not leave their workplace for prolonged periods of 
time. Consequently, employment as a seafarer is not like most other work. 
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Working at sea has several features which indicate that psychosocial issues may be a 
particular concern and Carter (2005, p.61) argues that “there is a range of constraints 
at sea which may influence the ability of people to adopt coping skills to reduce or 
remedy pressures.” Since many jobs onboard ships are safety critical any 
decrements in performance – whether they are due to psychological or other reasons 
– may risk the safety of those who work at sea (Carter 2005). 
4.2.1 Multi-national crews 
Since seafarers must live as well as work onboard a ship, they must also live (and 
work) alongside their colleagues – which is an aspect of life that is not normally 
experienced by employees in shore based industries. The number of seafarers who 
must live and work together onboard a ship varies. However, of the vessels discussed 
here, one of which is an offshore pipe layer and three are tankers, there were 
between ten and twenty-three seafarers onboard6 – as presented in chapter 3.3.1. In 
terms of crew size these vessels are representative of the industry as a whole in 
which the average crew size was found to be fifteen (Bergantino and Marlow 1998). 
Working alongside one another on each ship were seafarers of different nationalities, 
who had different first languages and were of different religions and cultures. On the 
four ships discussed here English was the working language onboard. However, 
onboard two of the ships there were no native English speakers, a situation which is 
not unusual7.   
                                            
6 Onboard ship 1 there were a number of project workers. These are employees who are not involved 
with any aspect of the vessel but are onboard to carry out the tasks which the vessel has been 
contracted for, such as the laying of pipes. In this study project workers are not considered to be 
seafarers. 
7 A summary of the nationalities and first languages of the seafarers on each of the ships visited can 
be found in appendix vi. 
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Each of the ships had three or more nationalities of seafarers onboard and would 
therefore be considered as multi-national crewed vessels. In chapter 1.1.2 it was 
seen that some writers have suggested that seafarers prefer to work onboard 
multi-national crewed ships (Sampson and Zhao 2003). Reasons for such a 
preference tend to be based around the idea that greater respect is afforded to 
individuals of different nationalities and as such it is easier to maintain non-conflictual 
relationships onboard (Sampson and Zhao 2003). Other scholars, however, such as 
Oldenburg et al. (2009) suggest that some seafarers – particularly non-Europeans – 
do not view working as part of a multi-cultural crew in a positive light. 
Onboard one of the ships discussed here, which was predominantly British crewed, 
seafarers of other nationalities who were onboard were the subject of suspicion, in 
particular with regards to the theft of foodstuffs from the crew mess – corroborating 
Oldenburg et al.’s (2009) suggestion that not all seafarers prefer multi-national 
crewed ships.  
Moreover, multi-national crews also have an implication for social isolation. Sampson 
and Zhao (2003) revealed that onboard multi-national crewed vessels, some 
seafarers may communicate in their native language, leaving those who do not 
understand this language isolated. This is a cause for concern as social isolation has 
been seen to adversely impact on the well-being of seafarers (Sampson and Thomas 
2002). 
A further implication of mutli-national crewing is the potential for divisions among the 
crew onboard a ship. During the fieldwork divisions were evident between different 
nationalities of seafarers which in some cases blurred the occupational hierarchy 
onboard. For example, onboard one of the ships discussed here the table for the 
senior officers at meal times seated the Swedish Second Officer alongside the 
Swedish Captain, Chief Engineer and Chief Officer. According to the rank hierarchy 
the Filipino Second Engineer should have sat in the place of the Second Officer but 
instead the Second Engineer, a senior officer sat on the junior officers’ table (the 
onboard occupational hierarchy can be seen in figure 1 in chapter one).  
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Whilst this peculiarity was likely to be the result of the Swedish Second Officer 
sharing a native language and cultural norms with the Swedish Captain, Chief 
Engineer and Chief Officer, differences between the terms of employment for the 
Second Officer, who was permanently employed and the Filipino Second Engineer, 
who was employed on a voyage contract may also have played a role.  
A similar finding emerged during Sampson’s (2013) fieldwork during which onboard a 
ship with Swedish and Filipino officers and Filipino ratings, the Filipino officers were 
excluded from the communal officer spaces. In her study Sampson (2013, p.112) 
argued that the Filipino officers were “denied their proper occupational status as 
normally recognised and operationalised onboard”. Such a situation also serves to 
isolate these Filipino officers (in both this study and Sampson 2013) – since they 
were isolated from the Filipino ratings due to their officer status and also isolated from 
their fellow officers because of their nationality. As presented above social isolation 
has been seen to adversely impact on seafarers’ well-being outcomes. 
4.2.2 Temporal synchrony 
The lack of temporal synchrony onboard vessels may also serve to isolate seafarers 
as a lack of temporal synchrony was seen to result in unstable work teams – an issue 
which will be considered further in chapter 6.1.2. Onboard each of the ships 
discussed here were seafarers who had recently joined, individuals who had been 
onboard for a number of months and were approaching the end of their tour of duty 
and seafarers somewhere in between. Moreover, seafarers were engaged in varying 
tour of duty durations and consequently between the seafarers onboard there was a 
lack of temporal synchrony – with seafarers joining and leaving the vessel on a 
regular basis. 
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Onboard tankers a lack of temporal synchrony is a SIRE8 requirement for officers. 
SIRE requirements stipulate that the Captain and Chief Officer must not both leave 
the ship within two weeks of each other. The same requirement exists for the Chief 
Engineer and Second Engineer. In the review of the literature in chapter 2.2.3 it was 
seen that numerous industrial disasters have been attributed – at least in part – to the 
loss of safety critical information following the changeover of workers. For example, 
the Cullen (1993) report concluded that this issue played a role in the Piper Alpha 
disaster. As such this two-week period – stipulated by SIRE – is to ensure that senior 
officers have an adequate overlap to minimise the risk of losing safety critical 
information during a crew changeover. However, the two-week overlap experienced 
by some seafarers was perceived by some as unnecessary, as one Second Engineer 
explained: 
“[Second Engineer’s name] doesn’t regard that [SIRE requirement] as a rule so 
he just leaves and then we get a message saying ‘why have the Second 
[Engineer] and Chief [Engineer] left together again it’s not allowed’” Second 
Engineer, ship 2. 
As a consequence of all of the senior engineers being employed on a back-to-back 
schedule these seafarers were able to determine their own relief schedule and whilst 
the shipping company expressed concern regarding the lack of overlap, the account 
of the Second Engineer suggested it was a common occurrence. If the shipping 
company had organised the relief of the Second Engineer and Chief Engineer a 
two-week overlap would have been scheduled, which would have resulted in one of 
the individuals remaining onboard for two weeks longer than they had wanted to. 
When a seafarer’s date to leave the vessel was not affected, the accounts of 
seafarers suggested there was an appreciation that a lack of temporal synchrony 
between individuals onboard could improve safety. As one Bosun explained:  
“You’ve got people around you who should say ‘stop you’re doing it wrong’ cos 
not everyone changes the same crew change so you're always staggered on 
the crew change especially the AB’s” Bosun, ship 1. 
                                            
8 The SIRE programme, as presented in chapter 1.2.3 is a “unique tanker risk assessment tool of 
value to charterers, ship operators, terminal operators and government bodies concerned with ship 
safety” (OCIMF 2015 [online]) 
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Thus, there was a tacit understanding that those seafarers who had recently joined 
may not be as familiar with procedures and therefore required guidance from 
colleagues who were not newly joined.  
As a result of a lack of temporal synchrony individual seafarers conceived private 
calendars which identified significant events possessing meaning to the individual – 
such as the date on which they anticipated leaving the vessel and returning home. 
From the findings, it emerged that life at sea was not influenced by traditional 
shore-based temporal markers and the accounts of seafarers suggested that 
alternative temporal markers were utilised in marking the passing of time which 
related to their own individual private calendars. As one Deck Cadet explained: 
“I start counting down, I work on ports I might say I’ve got 3 ports to go, 2 ports 
to go, 1 port to go” Deck Cadet 3, ship 2. 
Exploring how seafarers conceived private calendars highlighted the salient reality 
that for many, life onboard was simply something to be endured before they could go 
home. Moreover, understanding how seafarers counted down to their expected leave 
date is of particular interest when considering issues regarding specific time periods 
within a work pattern, as will be seen in greater detail in chapter six. 
A further aspect of temporal synchrony which emerged from the interviews relates to 
the hours in the day. Due to the twenty-four-hour nature of work at sea many 
seafarers worked split shifts which included a day shift and a night shift each day. 
This resulted in a situation with some seafarers resting whilst others were working – 
but seafarers who were resting were occasionally summoned to work at short notice. 
Throughout a tour of duty the seafarers remained in the workplace and as such were 
considered as available to work even during scheduled rest periods if required. The 
findings revealed the lack of temporal synchrony between different shifts resulted in 
resting seafarers – who were summoned to work – placing reliance on their on-duty 
colleagues to ensure operational and safety standards were maintained. One Bosun 
explained: 
“You should have the same safety standard nights as you do days, the only 
difference is as I’ve said for me is being woken up in the middle of the night but 
yeah I’ve got [night] AB’s who I should be able to trust, if I’m doing something 
wrong they should be able to say that’s wrong” Bosun, ship 1. 
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The comment made by the Bosun implies that those seafarers who were summoned 
to work during their rest period were unlikely to be as safety conscious as those 
individuals who were scheduled to be working at that time. This perception indicates a 
link between the organisation of work at sea – in particular hours of work – and their 
occupational safety. 
4.3 The routine of life onboard 
Lamvik (2002) suggested that time at sea is both linear and circular. Linear as a ship 
is on the move and seafarers are oriented to the near future and circular due to the 
rhythm of the daily routine onboard.  
From the findings it emerged that in some respects, the routine of life onboard was as 
regular as clockwork, with recurring events such as the changing of the watch and 
meal times occurring at the same time each day. Seafarers in general carried out 
repetitive tasks on a daily basis, seven days a week and as such the shore based 
notion of weekly cycles ceased to become fixed points. As one First Officer explained: 
“The routine you know like the well every day’s the same, every day you are 
eating on the same time, every day you are starting the day from the same 
things” First Officer, ship 1. 
In other respects, some aspects the routine of life onboard were found to be irregular. 
For example, one of the ships discussed here did not berth on arrival at a port, 
instead the vessel drifted9 and once the terminal was ready to berth the vessel the 
Captain was provided with one hour’s notice to prepare the vessel. During this hour 
the preparing of the vessel for arrival was prioritised above all else – and the 
seafarers onboard worked regardless of if they were scheduled to work or not. Thus, 
the working routine of the seafarers was interrupted by the requirements of the 
terminal. 
                                            
9 Drifting refers to a vessel which is underway but not making way – that is they are afloat (not at 
anchor) but not using any means of propulsion 
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4.3.1 Working routine 
In chapter one, table 2 gives an example of shipboard working arrangements and the 
working hours of each seafarer onboard. Of the ships discussed here, the seafarers 
on the three tankers worked similar hours to those shown in table 2 whilst those 
individuals onboard the offshore vessel worked one twelve-hour shift in every 
twenty-four-hour period. 
As indicated in table 2, the engineers onboard the three tankers worked 0800 till 
1700. Between the hours of 1700 and 0800 the engine room became an unattended 
machinery space (UMS). This is a relatively recent development as previously 
technology did not enable machinery spaces to be sufficiently monitored whist 
unattended. Following advances in technology, during the hours in which the 
machinery space was unattended one engineering officer was on-call and was 
responsible for responding to any alarms. This duty engineer position rotated 
between the engineering officers onboard on a nightly basis and for the three vessels 
with a Chief Engineer, Second Engineer and Third Engineer this meant that as well 
as their usual day work each engineering officer was also on-call one night in every 
three. 
Whilst members of the engineering department onboard work additional hours on a 
rotational basis, members of the deck department reported working additional hours 
when the vessel was in port and this is also illustrated in table 2. The table, however, 
does not consider that alongside periods of fixed routine duties – be they at sea or 
when in port – there were also periods of time when the seafarers had to work 
additional hours. For example, when participating in emergency drills which were, 
generally, conducted in the early afternoon. Thus, those who would normally be 
resting during this time – such as the 0400-0800 watchkeepers – were awake and 
participating in emergency drills.  
Moreover, the scheduling of emergency drills may not take into account the vessel’s 
trading schedule – particularly if the vessel is undertaking a hectic trading pattern. On 
one of the ships discussed here an emergency drill was held despite the berthing of 
the vessel late the previous night, a procedure which had required all deck personnel 
as well as the Chief Engineer and one other engineering officer, many of whom had 
interrupted their periods of rest for the vessel’s arrival. 
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These examples of emergency drills and a vessel’s arrival in port also illustrate how 
the hours worked by seafarers involved periods of monotonous individual activities 
which were punctuated by high intensity collaborative activities. For example, 
onboard one of the ships discussed here the Second Officer reported spending many 
weeks whilst the vessel was at sea watchkeeping, a monotonous individual activity. 
However, upon arrival at a port the Second Officer assisted in the mooring of the 
vessel – an activity which was high intensity and involved the collaboration of other 
seafarers. 
During some activities, such as arrival at port there is no scope for individual 
seafarers to control their own working routine. Likewise, a strict watchkeeping 
schedule is adhered to and meal times occur at the same time daily, regardless of the 
vessel’s trading pattern. Despite the rigidity of the routine of life onboard a paradox 
occurs in that some seafarers are able to control and adjust their own working routine. 
To understand this, it is necessary to appreciate that whilst watchkeeping officers 
adhere to a strict routine, they are generally able to control their own working hours 
and the temporal ordering of tasks outside of their watchkeeping responsibilities.  
For example, a Third Officer might watchkeep between the hours of 0800 and 1200 
and then again between 2000 and 0000. In addition to watchkeeping they are likely to 
be allocated additional duties. These additional duties must be conducted outside of 
watchkeeping periods, and consequently whilst at sea table 2 specifies that bridge 
watchkeepers undertake two hours of non-watchkeeping duties. In describing his 
routine one Third Officer explained: 
“I was on the 8-12 watch then and if you’ve got safety stuff to do, you know 2 
hours during the day after lunch and of course they can call you for mooring as 
well……. Sometimes when we were like at anchor and it was really hot cos we 
were stuck off UAE, so after dinner in the evening I’d go and make a round on 
deck or whatever instead of after lunch” Third Officer, ship 2. 
Thus, whilst table 2 in chapter one indicates that a Third Officer undertakes 
non-watchkeeping duties between 1300 and 1500 this may not necessarily be 
accurate. Some days a Third Officer may not work these two hours and other days 
they may work these two hours earlier or later. 
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The degree of control over their working routine experienced by the seafarers was 
seen to vary depending upon the rank of the seafarer. The ratings interviewed 
reported that their working routine was controlled by the senior officers and generally, 
tasks were set each day by those seafarers sailing in management positions. Tasks 
were set according to the operational needs of the vessel and the prevailing weather 
conditions. Consequently, it emerged that the delegating of tasks took little – if any – 
consideration of the ratings’ individual preferences. 
In comparison those seafarers sailing in management positions reported being able – 
albeit to a limited extent – to plan their own work day and thus the experiences of 
these individuals were different, as one Chief Cook10 explained: 
“Sometimes you have harder day but the next day you can compensate it a 
little bit do different kind of work but my job you know I do different things every 
day I have some routine jobs but I can plan for myself” Chief Cook, ship 1. 
Moreover, senior officers were – in some respects – able to control both their own 
working routine and the working routine of others onboard, as one Chief Engineer 
explained: 
“Saturday afternoons and Sunday afternoons we are usually cheating the 
working time. We say that we work but actually we are relaxing” Chief 
Engineer, ship 4.  
Similarly, one Captain explained:  
“If I want to go ashore for example I can plan my administration work and 
maybe to do it the next day” Captain, ship 4. 
                                            
10 Whilst the position of Chief Cook would not be considered a management position onboard a 
vessel, the Chief Cook would be the senior member of the catering department and as such would 
schedule the work of themselves as well as any other cooks who may be onboard and the mess man. 
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From these comments it is apparent that senior officers were able to utilise the power 
they hold in regards to controlling their own working routine to exert their own 
preferences on how and when they worked. Moreover, senior officers were able to 
control the working routines of more junior seafarers onboard. Such a scenario was 
possible due to a lack of direct oversight from management ashore. Similarly, 
Sampson (2013, p.88) suggested that onboard a ship actions can be carried out 
which do not attract the attention of shore-side and a ship’s Captain “can chose to do 
a great deal to impact upon the workload of individuals and of the crew as a whole.” 
A lack of direct oversight from shore-side meant that consistency was not maintained 
onboard and the working routines of some seafarers changed when a new senior 
officer joined the vessel. For example, when asked about his working routine, one 
Deck Cadet responded: 
“It depends on the chief mate or whatever so with the last Chief Mate we 
worked all day Saturday and got a half day or usually a full day off on a Sunday 
but obviously, this Chief Officer is new and I think its half day Saturday full day 
Sunday but it might be work, but usually I get at least one day [off]” Deck Cadet 
2, ship 2. 
Whilst such a change may be unsettling this account was not untypical. However, 
some senior officers such as the Chief Engineer onboard ship 2 endeavoured to 
utilise his power in controlling the working routine of others to offer these individuals 
flexibility in line with their preferences. He explained:  
“[A] 7 o’clock start in the morning is quite early but the lads want to do that in 
order to finish at 4 if possible so I’ve had people start at 8 and finish at 5 I’m 
flexible either way, whatever they want to do” Chief Engineer, ship 2. 
Not all senior officers were reported to be considerate and the power held by senior 
officers to control the working routine of others was not always a positive feature – 
particularly when others had to carry out additional work as a result of abuses of this 
power. One Third Officer explained:  
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“When I was with [company name] I was doing sixes11 all the time cos we had 
this lazy Chief Officer” Third Officer, ship 2.  
The comment by the Third Officer indicates that instead of the usual working routine 
of 4 hours on/8 hours off the Chief Officer had instructed him to work 6 hours on/6 
hours off – thereby working the hours the Chief Officer should have been working. 
Clearly the Chief Officer would not be popular onboard – due to what would be 
perceived by many as an abuse of their power. However, other than asking the 
Captain to address the issue, there would be little the junior officers could officially do 
in such a situation unless additional duties resulted in the breaking of rest hour 
legislation. Moreover, whilst an example of this did not emerge during this study, the 
situation with the Chief Officer begs the question of what the seafarers could have 
done if it was the Captain – rather than the Chief Officer – who was abusing his 
power. In her ethnographic work Sampson (2013) revealed an example of a Captain 
who was described as a bully, who overtly and unpleasantly exercised his power to 
the detriment of the other seafarers onboard. 
It is perhaps therefore unsurprising that findings regarding seafarers’ experiences of 
job control were seen to strongly relate to perceived well-being outcomes. That is 
those seafarers who perceived they could control aspects of their working routine 
onboard reported improved well-being outcomes. This finding again relates to 
Karasek (1979) and the job demand control model – as considered in section 4.1.1. 
Importantly, seafarers live as well as work onboard a ship and arguably job control 
takes on a far greater significance than for workers in shore-based occupations, since 
the power held by senior officers does not just refer to seafarers’ autonomy in terms 
of carrying out work related tasks but also when they rest – as will now be seen. 
  
                                            
11 Working a schedule of 6 hours on/ 6 hours off 
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4.3.2 Rest hours and fatigue 
In chapter 1.1.2 it was seen that unlike in most industries, the seafaring industry 
legislates for the minimum number of hours a seafarer must rest rather than the 
maximum number of hours they may work. Onboard a ship the Captain holds the 
responsibility of ensuring rest hour legislation is upheld in accordance with the MLC 
(2006) and one Captain stated: 
“This last couple of week I’ve been fatigued because we've been in dry-dock 
and we had lots of, especially [towards] the end, lots of time pressure to get the 
ship out so I had to, but I do have the authority if you like from the company to 
stop and not sail if there’s enough people tired I can stop the ship, which I did 
once. I refused to sail from the dry-dock on the last night because the 
engineers were knackered” Captain, ship 2. 
The Captain went on to explain: 
“I just told them [shipping company] I wasn’t sailing. They [engineers] were 
going to be finished around 10 at night so I said I won’t sail until 8 o’clock the 
next morning, the company fully backed me on that so I do have that authority 
and they do back me up, but I would have done it anyway” Captain, ship 2. 
The quote indicates that in practice – as well as on paper – the exercise of power by a 
Captain in relation to rest hours is significant and similarly, another Captain explained 
how: 
“There are also cases that we have postponed departures and so on and 
arrivals, of course we had to keep our rest hours and [terminal operator] for 
example know about it so they accept that we can wait until we are rested if we 
have had for example tank cleaning on a short trip” Captain, ship 4. 
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From these comments it is apparent that when necessary a Captain can postpone 
events so as to ensure the crew onboard are rested and importantly, such a decision 
is supported by the shipping company and terminal operators. Such support is likely 
to increase a Captain’s willingness to make the decision to postpone a vessel’s arrival 
or departure. It could be argued that these findings represent the better end of the 
seafaring industry and such support may not be extended to all Captains across all 
vessels. In her ethnographic work, Sampson (2013) suggested that Captains were 
subjected to pressure from shore-side to maintain a tight schedule and only very 
rarely did Captains resist this pressure. 
It is noteworthy that the examples presented above indicate that the Captains 
postponed certain events due to their colleagues onboard being overly tired – rather 
than the Captains themselves being fatigued. Nevertheless, the postponement of a 
vessel is not a regular occurrence and the experiences of seafarers suggest that the 
current rest hour legislation may not be sufficient to cope with the workload, with one 
Captain describing how: 
“You have situations that you are tired, you have to work, you must work but 
you really really want to go to bed but the job has to be done” Captain, ship 4. 
Likewise, a Deck Cadet explained: 
“The rest hour legislation means you can do sixes [work six hours on/six hours 
off] for 3 months straight and I think after 2 even 3 weeks of that I think your 
performance is going to start dropping significantly, I’m not sure it protects 
maybe enough” Deck Cadet 2, ship 2. 
The experiences of seafarers suggest that the current rest hour legislation does not 
necessarily provide a sufficient amount of rest and for many seafarers a working 
schedule of six hours on/six hours off was considered particularly arduous. One Third 
Officer matter-of-factly stated: 
“Sixes is a killer, everybody knows that” Third Officer, ship 2. 
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This is akin to Smith et al.’s (2006) observations of increased negative health and 
safety outcomes when a two-man watch system was in force – a system which 
utilises a working schedule of six hours on/six hours off. Moreover, in an exploration 
of seafarers’ health and safety regulations Bloor (2003) argued that there was a 
regulation deficit and in particular rest hours’ regulations were insufficient – 
something which was apparent in the analysis of the data in this study. 
Worryingly, the accounts of seafarers also suggested that non-compliance with rest 
hour regulations was commonplace and widespread. One Second Officer explained:  
“This time I think I have red12 twice in 3 weeks” Second Officer, ship 4. 
In many instances, however, this non-compliance was simply not recorded by 
individual seafarers and the following account was not untypical: 
“When we are playing, gambling with the rest hours to make sure we don’t get 
red for a stupid half an hour somewhere. I’ll have a look, maybe I took 2 hours’ 
lunch instead of 1 hour, little bit forgery, not big forgery, just small” Chief 
Engineer, ship 4. 
Moreover, during the interviews a seafarer described an event in which he had 
recorded a non-compliance with rest hour legislation and the records were altered by 
the senior officers onboard in a manner which resulted in the non-compliance not 
being recorded. The seafarer explained the incident as follows: 
“Everybody was breaking hours of work then and later on you know you go 
and look at your hours of work and you’re still in compliance somehow even 
though you filled it in yourself and you were in noncompliance. The Chief had 
been tampering with it so I asked you know what’s going on and he says oh he 
was told to do it because what happened was like the ship, the port and the 
tugs is all owned by the same company so it’s kind of like a cover-up” Third 
Officer, ship 2. 
  
                                            
12 ‘Red’ is a commonly used term to describe breaking rest hour legislation as a widely-used computer 
based rest hour recording programme uses the colour red to highlight any episodes of 
non-compliance. 
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The comments made by the Third Officer – and the Chief Engineer above – suggest 
that seafarers were able (and willing) to alter and falsify records that are legally 
required. Consequently, the falsifying of records enabled seafarers to appear as rule 
abiding, when this was not the case. The appearance of rule abiding was considered 
as important as in doing so the seafarers avoided inciting unwanted attention from 
shore-side. Many of the seafarers appeared to be fearful of drawing attention to 
themselves as they considered such attention might inhibit them from securing future 
employment. It is noteworthy that in the above example, whilst the Third Officer was 
willing to record non-compliances, the Chief Officer – reportedly in conjunction with 
the shipping company – falsified records so as to avoid unwanted attention from 
external agencies such as Port State Control. This situation poses a number of 
questions regarding how seafarers are safeguarded and how they are able to not 
comply with the regulations that are in place to protect them. 
In some circumstances, however, the oversight from external agencies meant that it 
was not possible to inaccurately record hours of rest and one Chief Engineer 
explained it thus: 
“There’s times when you cannot cheat with the rest hours, we do that we 
cheat, we try to avoid the red we try to trick a little bit but if it’s not possible it’s 
not possible and then they become red” Chief Engineer, ship 4. 
The Chief Engineer went on to say: 
“Somethings you cannot move [rest hours] too much because arrival and 
departure is always noted the times officially in the logbooks and everything so 
them I cannot move and also when we’re taking bunkering I cannot move that 
because those are official times logged there. That’s the first thing they 
[inspectors] check, how many engineers were awake” Chief Engineer, ship 4. 
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Here the Chief Engineer suggests that in some circumstance the oversight of some 
external agencies – such as Port State Control and SIRE inspectors – resulted in 
seafarers accurately recording rest hour non-compliances. It is concerning, however, 
that the Chief Engineer did so only as he could not ‘cheat’. Clearly, the Chief Engineer 
– an individual who holds a very senior position onboard – perceived it as acceptable 
to falsify rest hour records in situations he considered himself unlikely to be caught. 
Thus seafarers weighed up the likelihood of being caught falsifying records by 
external agencies and when they perceived the likelihood to be low the avoidance of 
drawing shore-side’s attention was chosen as a greater concern than being ‘caught’ 
by the external agencies. These findings suggest that the safeguarding of seafarers 
by external agencies is somewhat limited – and this is a concern for their health, 
safety and well-being. 
Given these findings it is unsurprising that the inaccurate recording of rest hours is 
well-known by external agencies and the MAIB stated: “The records of hours of rest 
onboard many vessels, which almost invariably show compliance with regulations, 
are not completely accurate” (MAIB 2004, p.13). The present findings confirm this 
view and the accounts of seafarers suggested that the under-recording of working 
hours is widespread. This is a concern as literature (see for example Smith et al. 
2006) demonstrates a clear link between under-recording of working hours and 
increased levels of fatigue among seafarers.  
During the interviews it emerged that the fatigue experienced by the seafarers was 
particularly apparent at both an early and late stage of a tour of duty and findings 
regarding this will be presented in chapter six. However, the accounts also suggested 
that the experience of fatigue was dependent upon factors affecting all seafarers 
onboard such as weather conditions and the vessel’s schedule. As one Chief 
Engineer explained: 
“Winter time is much more fatiguing because its bad weather all the time. Last 
night was a little bit rolling again and you cannot sleep, it’s impossible and then 
you try to catch up when you come in port for a few hours. You become tired 
during the winter season” Chief Engineer, ship 4. 
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Clearly, the weather conditions and the vessel’s schedule can cause fatigue 
irrespective of an individual seafarer’s time within a tour of duty. As a field note 
records: 
“Everyone onboard seems to have found the recent dry-docking particularly 
tiring. Those who have recently joined seem to view it as tiring as those who 
have been here for months” (Devereux field note 2014). 
Regardless of the perceived cause of increased fatigue, such fatigue was negatively 
associated with safe working practices and the following example provides a strong 
illustration: 
“I know during this trip [when working excessive hours] I was not doing things I 
would normally do, when it was at its worst for a start we didn’t have time to do 
it but as things were picking up again I was just cutting corners, so an example 
is the other day I’d finished pumping sludge and normally I would shut the 
valves regardless as it’s good practice but I was like ‘ah I’ll probably have to 
pump that later on’ so I just left the valves open which normally I would never 
do that sort of thing. Obviously not major short cuts but things that are actually 
alright but bad seamanship should we say, so yeah leaving valves open when 
they should be closed, not watching things that should be watched, or not 
recording things that should be recorded but when I’m doing it I’m not thinking 
‘oh I’m tired so I’m going to leave that’, I’m just thinking ‘right can’t be arsed 
with that’ and walk away.” Second Engineer, ship 2. 
This comment was not unusual – throughout the fieldwork it was apparent that the 
seafarers perceived fatigue as a risk to operational safety. The accounts of seafarers 
also suggest that fatigue was widely perceived to negatively impact upon personal 
safety and the following account was not untypical: 
“Being tired, it’s a big problem people getting injured. You get more slack when 
you're tired so it increases your chance of getting hurt.” Fourth Engineer, ship 
2. 
Similarly, one Captain stated: 
  “If you're tired risk definitely increases” Captain, ship 2.  
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Thus, seafarers associated fatigue with increased negative safety outcomes and this 
perception is of importance when considering seafarers’ experiences regarding risk 
throughout a tour of duty and findings regarding this issue will be presented in chapter 
six. Moreover, research (see for example Smith et al. 2006) has also shown fatigue to 
be a concern for seafarers’ well-being – as well as linked to ill health among the 
seafaring population. 
4.4 Summary 
The findings presented in this chapter shed light on how a usual tour of duty was 
experienced by seafarers. It was seen that the organisation of employment and work 
within the seafaring industry varied substantially and many, though not all, seafarers 
experience precarious employment. Findings regarding the prevalence of widespread 
precarious employment corroborate the literature (see for example Bloor and 
Sampson 2009) presented in chapter one. 
Importantly in this chapter it was revealed that the use of precarious employment 
methods were perceived to impact on the safety and well-being outcomes of the 
seafarers in this study. Again such findings corroborate studies (see for example 
Quinlan et al. 2001) in which precarious employment has been seen in other 
industries to be associated with adverse occupational health, safety and well-being 
outcomes. 
The chapter started by revealing that those seafarers who experienced permanent 
employment were able to exert some control over their deployment scheduling, whilst 
those who were precariously employed were more often obliged to accept the 
deployment scheduling of the shipping companies. Control over deployment 
scheduling was seen to particularly impact upon seafarers’ well-being outcomes. 
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Similarly, there were a number of other findings which also relate to the presence (or 
otherwise) of power and control among seafarers in different work and employment 
situations. For example, some seafarers had the ability – albeit to a limited extent – to 
control their own working routine. This was particularly the case for senior officers 
who were able to exert their own preference on how and when they worked. Such 
control had perceived positive implications for their personal safety and the 
operational safety of the vessel. Various studies (see for example Karasek 1979) 
have also emphasised how high levels of job control in positions with high levels of 
demand improve outcomes in terms of employee well-being.  
As a consequence of the inequity among the labour force, some seafarers were found 
to be more vulnerable than others. Those who were precariously employed at the 
lower end of the onboard occupational hierarchy were revealed to be especially 
vulnerable. As a result, they were reluctant to do anything which may impede their 
ability to secure future employment, and they experienced limited onboard job control. 
Job control is also likely to affect how seafarers are able to mitigate for the additional 
challenges which may be present – in particular at an early and late stage of a tour of 
duty – and it is these findings regarding the beginning and end of a tour of duty which 
will be presented in chapter six. Before this findings from the analysis of seafarers’ 
injury data – which was obtained from three multi-national shipping companies – are 
presented. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: SHIPPING COMPANIES’ INCIDENT DATA 
 
5.0 Introduction 
In the previous chapter interviews were used to gain an insight into seafarers’ health, 
safety and well-being experiences in relation to the organisation of work and 
employment throughout a usual tour of duty. It was seen that the terms of 
employment varied between seafarers, as did specific workplace familiarity. This 
qualitative research shed light on seafarers’ experiences and perceptions of power 
and control. The experiences of seafarers – when considered in light of occupational 
safety literature from shore-based industries – further suggest that those who work at 
sea may be more vulnerable to adverse safety outcomes at certain time periods 
within a tour of duty. For example, many seafarers lacked workplace specific 
familiarity. In a shore-based study, Underhill (2007) found that agency workers were 
particularly vulnerable to injury early in their placement, when the effects of 
unfamiliarity were most apparent. This is particularly important given the fact that – as 
revealed in the review of literature in chapter one – seafarers not only frequently 
move between vessels for subsequent tours of duty, but may also move between 
sectors of the seafaring industry, a situation which was experienced by many of the 
seafarers in this study. Thus seafarers may be more vulnerable to occupational 
injuries at an early stage of time into tour of duty.  
The situation is something of a paradox, however, considering that – as seen in 
chapter two – in the offshore petroleum industry Parker (2007) identified an increase 
in the frequency of injuries requiring first aid treatment as a two-week tour of duty 
progressed. In a similar vein, in a review of studies Folkard and Lombardi (2006) 
found relative risk of injury to increase over successive workdays. Such literature 
would suggest that seafarers may also be particularly vulnerable to occupational 
injuries at a late stage of time into tour of duty.  
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Steered by such literature and, importantly, by the experiences of seafarers’ which 
emerged during the interviews regarding their perceived potential vulnerabilities at 
both the beginning and end of a tour of duty, this chapter explores seafarers’ 
occupational injury frequencies in relation to time within a tour of duty. Therefore, in 
this chapter the following two sub-questions will be considered: 
1. Can a significant relationship be identified between incidences of seafarers’ 
occupational injuries and time within a tour of duty? 
2. What are the variables that relate to incidences of seafarers’ occupational 
injuries and time within a tour of duty? 
5.1 Shipping companies’ injuries data sets 
The lost time incident frequency (LTIF) rate was obtained for each of the three 
shipping companies. This rate refers to the number of lost time injuries13 occurring 
onboard all vessels operated by the company per one million exposure hours. 
Between the years 2010 and 2013, on average seafarers sailing onboard tankers 
were most at risk of experiencing a LTI (0.87) (Figure 4). The average LTIF for 
seafarers onboard container ships was similar (0.86), whilst those seafarers onboard 
offshore vessels were the least likely to experience a LTI (0.59). 
 
 
Figure 4 Annual lost time incident frequency 
 
                                            
13 Lost Time Injuries are the sum of fatalities and Lost Workday Cases 
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Figure 5 below presents the total recordable case frequency (TRCF) rate for tankers, 
offshore vessels and container vessels. The TRCF rate is the total number of 
recordable cases (lost time incidents (LTI) + medical treatment cases (MTC) + 
restricted work cases (RWC))14 per one million exposure hours. The average TRCF 
rate for 2010 until 2013 for each of the three companies has been calculated and 
similar to findings regarding the LTIF rate, seafarers onboard offshore vessels were 
the least likely to experience a recordable injury (1.81). The average TRCF rates for 
seafarers’ onboard container ships and tankers were 2.54 and 2.25 respectively. 
Over the period 2010-2013 the three shipping companies’ incident data show a 
downward trend with incident rates decreasing year on year – with a couple of 
exceptions – as shown in figures 4 and 5. 
 
Figure 5 Annual total recordable case frequency 
 
  
                                            
14 Details regarding injury classifications can be seen in appendix viii. 
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LTIF and TRCF rates are not always publicly available. However, as a comparison in 
2011 INTERTANKO found the average LTIF to be 1.39 and the average TRCF to be 
3.23 for vessels within the INTERTANKO pool. Therefore, in terms of their average 
safety records over the years stated all three shipping companies whose injury data 
are analysed here performed better than the INTERTANKO average15. This would 
suggest that the three shipping companies are from the better end of the shipping 
industry.  
5.1.1 Merging data from different shipping companies 
In each of the three data sets injures incurred by seafarers sailing onboard vessels 
operated by the shipping companies were recorded. However, as stated in chapter 
three the three sets of data did not record identical information. For example, 
Company A provided the date on which the seafarer was expected to leave the 
vessel, whilst Company C gave the actual date the seafarer left the vessel16. A 
summary of the data obtained from each source can be seen in table 10 below.  
Shipping 
company Vessel type Date joined 
Expected 
leave date 
Actual leave 
date 
Other 
independent 
variables17 
Injury type 
A Tanker      
C Container      
B Offshore      
Table 10 Data received from each shipping company 
 
The time period covered by the three data sets also differed. The data provided by 
Company A covered all incidents from 2012 until 2013 inclusive. The data obtained 
from Company B covered incidents which occurred between January 2010 and 
September 2013 inclusive. Company C provided data regarding all incidents which 
occurred in 2012. To aid clarity the companies A, B and C will be referred to by the 
type of vessels they operate which are tankers, offshore vessels and container 
vessels respectively. 
                                            
15 The TRCF rate for container vessels in both 2010 and 2011 however was worse than the 
INTERTANKO average 
16 In some instances it was therefore not possible to know if the seafarer left the vessel as a result of 
the injury or if they had left the vessel as it was the scheduled end of their tour 
17 See 5.1.2 for information regarding the independent variables 
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A total of 650 incidents from the three shipping companies were analysed. Of these 
133 (20.5%) occurred to seafarers onboard tankers, 404 (62.2%) were experienced 
by seafarers onboard offshore vessels and 113 (17.4%) occurred onboard container 
vessels. Injuries onboard tankers, offshore vessels and container vessels differed in 
the total number of injuries recorded. However, this is consistent with the different 
time periods involved and differences in hours of exposure. 
5.1.2 Independent variables and injury classifications 
Upon commencing an analysis of the independent variables it became apparent that 
some contained data which were either too ambiguous or missing to such an extent 
that they were not usable. Thus, these variables were removed. In the offshore 
dataset these variables were ‘activity when injured’ and ‘cause of the injury’ – both of 
which were too sparsely populated to allow for any analysis. In the tanker data set the 
variables removed were ‘medical leave duration’, ‘nationality’, ‘LTI total monetary 
value’ and ‘company seniority’ as these variables were not sufficiently populated. The 
variables ‘immediate cause’, ‘root cause’, ‘type of contact’, ‘activity when injured’, and 
‘control actions area improvement’ were also removed from the tanker data set as the 
data was too ambiguous. For example, ‘control actions area improvement’ was 
predominantly filled with the response ‘not applicable’. 
To ensure consistency between the datasets recoding of the independent variables 
was conducted and the following variables were used in the analysis: ‘part of the body 
injured’, ‘type of injury’, ‘rank of the injured seafarer’, ‘shipboard location where the 
injury occurred’ and the ‘working department of the injured seafarer’. 
The recoding of variables ‘part of the body injured’ and ‘type of injury’ was done 
broadly in line with the coding of UK HSE data (Parkes and Swash 2000) and these 
categories can be seen in table 11 below. 
Part of the body injured Type of injury 
Arm Break/fracture 
Leg Sprain/strain 
Torso Lacerations/open wounds 
Head Burns (scald/chemical) 
Other Bruise 
 Other 
Table 11 Recoding of 'part of the body injured' and 'type of injury' variables 
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The independent variables ‘rank of the injured seafarer’, ‘location’, and ‘the working 
department of the injured seafarer’ were recoded in to the categories seen in table 12 
below and such recoding was based on my own professional seafaring knowledge. 
Rank of the injured seafarer Shipboard location where the injury occurred 
Working department of the 
injured seafarer 
Officer Hull Deck  
Rating Engine room Engine 
Other Superstructure Other 
 Other  
Table 12 Recoding of 'rank of the injured seafarer' and 'shipboard location where the injury occurred' 
variables 
 
Additional details regarding the recoding of the independent variables shown in tables 
11 and 12 can be found in appendix vii. 
The severity of the injuries was classified by the HSEQ Superintendents employed by 
each of the shipping companies, using OCIMF ‘Marine injury reporting guidelines’. 
OCIMF (1997, p.3) state the intention of the guidelines is to “provide a consistent 
method among tanker operators for collecting, classification and reporting, and 
communicating data on all injuries occurring onboard.” Each injury was classified as 
one of the following: 
• Fatality  
• Lost Workday Case (LWC) 
• Restricted Work Case (RWC) 
• Medical Treatment Case (MTC) 
• First Aid Case (FAC) 
Further details regarding these injury classifications can be seen in appendix viii. 
As seen in chapter 4, there are other factors such as the manner in which a seafarer 
is employed and the hours of rest seafarers experience which are important but these 
were not recorded in the three shipping companies’ injury datasets. Consequently, 
the analysis was conducted using only the variables – as described in this section – 
which were recorded by the shipping companies. 
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First, an analysis of the frequencies of the independent variables was conducted and 
the results from this can be seen in appendix ix. 
Following this an analysis was carried out for the distributions across injury severity – 
for recordable case injuries – between vessel types differed significantly as can be 
seen in table 13 below (x² 34.357, d.f. 4, p <.0005). 
Vessel type 
Injury severity 
Fatality LWC RWC MTC Total 
Tankers 0 (0.0%) 22 (34.9%) 25 (39.7%)  16 (25.4%) 63 (100.0%) 
Offshore 2 (2.1%) 24 (25.5%) 56 (59.6%) 12 (12.8%) 94 (100.0%) 
Containers 2 (1.8%) 61 (54.0%) 24 (21.2%) 26 (23.0%) 
113 
(100.0%) 
Total 4 (1.5%) 107 (39.6%) 105 (38.9%) 54 (20.0%) 
270 
(100.0%) 
x² 34.357, d.f. 4, p <.0005 
Table 13 Injury severity across vessel types 
The data regarding injury severity are shown graphically for each company in figure 6. 
There were no fatalities onboard tankers. However, there were two fatalities on both 
offshore vessels and container vessels in the time periods studied. It can be seen that 
the majority of injuries onboard container vessels fell into the lost time injury category, 
whereas the majority of those onboard offshore vessels fell into the restricted work 
accident category. The injuries onboard tankers are more evenly distributed across 
injury categories (excluding fatalities), with relatively large proportions falling in the 
lost time incident and restricted work accident categories. The reason for this marked 
variation in the three distributions is unclear. It was shown in the review of the 
literature in chapter 1.1.2 that the types of tasks carried out by seafarers onboard 
different types of ships can be somewhat different, however, it is not clear how such 
differences may impact upon injury severity. 
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Figure 6 Severity of injuries 
In addition to the incidents shown in table 13 and figure 6 a total of 380 first aid cases 
were analysed. These incidents account for 58.5% of the injuries recorded and data 
regarding them were obtained from tankers and offshore vessels. 
5.1.3 Defining time aspects of a tour of duty 
The duration of a tour of duty for all seafarers onboard offshore vessels was 35 days. 
For those seafarers onboard tankers the expected tour durations varied from 45 days 
to 339 days. Of those seafarers sailing on a tanker who reported an incident, 18.0% 
had a tour duration of three months or less, 43.6% had a tour duration of more than 
three months but equal to or less than six months, 36.1% had a tour duration of more 
than six months but equal to or less than nine months and 2.3% had a tour duration of 
more than nine months. As data regarding the date the seafarers expected to leave 
the vessel were not provided by the container vessel company it is not possible to 
know the exact expected tour durations of these seafarers. However, it is known that 
such seafarers are generally employed on tours of between three and six months. 
All three data sets included the number of elapsed days at the time the incident 
occurred and the days into tour variable was collapsed into three categories which 
corresponded to the three different phases – start of a tour, middle of a tour and end 
of a tour – as suggested by seafarers during the qualitative component of this study.  
For example, one Deck Cadet stated: 
“The first week I don’t know my way around….” Deck Cadet 3, ship 2.  
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Similarly, a Fourth Engineer explained: 
“For me the first week I’m always really tired….” Fourth Engineer, ship 2. 
Thus during this analysis the start of a tour of duty was defined as the first seven days 
a seafarer was onboard, with the day they arrived onboard the vessel considered to 
be day one. 
The quantifying of the end of a tour of duty was conducted in the same manner, with 
seafarers suggesting a time frame. For example, one Second Engineer said: 
“I’d say a week before I go home…..” Second Engineer, ship 2. 
Similarly, one Chief Engineer suggested: 
“My last week of my trip is a quieter time for me….” Chief Engineer, ship 2. 
Ratings also made the same suggestion of a time frame regarding the end of a tour: 
“The last week it’s not tired but you have worked for, you can see you’ve 
stayed and worked 12 hours for 7 days a week, in the last week you see 
forward to go home” Storekeeper, ship 1. 
Thus, the analysis regarding the end of a tour of duty was defined as the last seven 
days a seafarer was expecting to be onboard, with the day they were expecting to 
leave the vessel considered to be day seven. Throughout the analyses the first and 
last days onboard were included as full days. It is important to note that the date the 
seafarer expected to leave has been utilised rather than the actual date they left the 
vessel. This is because findings from the interviews conducted with seafarers suggest 
that their perceptions were related to the expectation of leaving the vessel. For 
example – as will be seen in chapter six – seafarers talked about their experiences 
regarding a change in their mindset as they approached the end of their expected 
time onboard. This can be illustrated with an example – which will be seen in the next 
chapter –  in which one Captain stated: 
“When they [ratings] start to get in the end of 6 months, then they are already 
home some of them in the head. I mean when they are in the end of the 
contract” Captain, ship 4.  
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From this quote – and also the comment made by the Storekeeper above – it is 
apparent that seafarers perceived that they experienced a change in their mindset 
when they approached the end of their tour of duty, whether the ratings in the 
example remained onboard for another month does not alter this fact. 
For this reason, injuries which occurred during a tour extension have been included in 
the ‘end of tour’ category throughout this chapter. The category ‘middle of tour’ refers 
to incidents which did not occur either at the start or end of a tour, as defined above.  
5.2 Question 1: Can a significant relationship be identified between incidences 
of seafarers’ occupational injuries and time within a tour of duty? 
To answer this question firstly the rates of incidences at the start, middle and end of a 
tour were compared for each of the three shipping companies. It can be seen in table 
14 below that the distribution of incidences was greater during the start of a tour of 
duty for offshore vessels compared to tankers and container vessels. However, this 
finding does not imply that the start of a tour was more dangerous onboard offshore 
vessels as the shorter tours worked by seafarers onboard offshore vessels means 
that for such seafarers the time period classified as the middle of the tour was much 
shorter than for their tanker and container vessel colleagues. For example, onboard 
the offshore vessels considered in this chapter the middle of the tour was three 
weeks, whereas the middle of the tour for seafarers onboard the tankers and 
container vessels discussed here was anywhere between seven weeks and more 
than nine months. The same explanation also applies to incidences at the end of a 
tour. 
Additionally, the shorter tours and correspondingly shorter leave periods experienced 
by the offshore seafarers studied resulted in these seafarers working a larger number 
of individual tours on an annual basis and thus they experienced a greater number of 
starts and ends of tours per year than their tanker and container vessel colleagues. 
As previously stated data regarding when a seafarer expected to leave the vessel 
were not obtained from container vessels and therefore an analysis of end of tour 
incidents was not possible for these incidents.  
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 Tankers Offshore vessels Container vessels 
Start of tour 3 (2.3%) 82 (20.9%) 3 (2.9%) 
Middle of tour 120 (90.2%) 240 (61.2%) 
102 (97.1%) 
End of tour 10 (7.5%) 70 (17.9%) 
Total 133 392 105 
Table 14 Injuries in relation to time into tour onboard tankers, offshore vessels and container vessel 
A chi-square test (X² 14.061, d.f 4, p <.001) showed that injuries were not equally 
distributed and incidents were less likely during the end of a tour than during the rest 
of a tour of duty onboard offshore vessels. This suggests that there were less 
incidents at the end of a tour than would be expected by chance. In chapter two it was 
revealed that in one study injury risk decreased after the seafarer had been onboard 
for 117 days (Jensen et al. 2004). The findings from the offshore seafarers here, 
however, show that whilst the end of a tour was the safest the risk did not decrease 
linearly as time into tour progressed, as will be seen below. The methods employed 
by Jensen et al. (2004) – as discussed in chapter 3.1.1 – did not identify changes in 
risk during different periods of time within an entire tour of duty and as such are not 
comparable to findings from this study. 
In addition to the incidents shown in table 14 above, 30 incidents occurred after the 
date on which the seafarer expected to leave the vessel. Nearly 7% of injuries 
recorded onboard offshore vessels and 3% of injuries recorded onboard tankers 
occurred during tour extensions. As the seafarer’s expected leave date was not 
obtained for incidents onboard container vessels it is not possible to know the 
frequency of tour extension injuries onboard these vessels. Moreover, there were a 
number of significant challenges that meant very little could be concluded regarding 
the frequency of tour extension incidents. As the overall frequency of seafarers 
working tour extensions was unknown it was not possible to consider how this 
incident rate related to tour extensions overall. Also – as will be seen in chapter six – 
seafarers and shipping companies considered tour extensions as different time 
periods and as such even if the shipping companies provided details regarding the 
frequency of tour extensions these data would not correspond to the seafarers’ 
perceptions of tour extensions.  
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As the tour durations of the seafarers onboard tankers and container vessels varied it 
was not possible to conduct a chi-square test for each week of a tour of duty for these 
two data sets. A way of overcoming this inherent limitation was to test the number of 
incidents as a function of weeks into tour for the first four weeks a seafarer was 
onboard. Unlike in the analysis of incidences across the categories start, middle and 
end of tour, incidents which occurred during tour extensions were not included in the 
analysis of the weekly distribution of incidences. 
A chi-square test (x² 7.800, d.f. 3, p <.05) showed that onboard tankers the 
distribution of incidences across the first four weeks into tour differed significantly. In 
particular, the fourth week of a tour was more risky than the first three weeks of a tour. 
Conversely, the distribution of incidences across the first four weeks of a tour did not 
differ significantly for offshore vessels or container vessels (offshore vessels: x² 
4.226, d.f. 3, p .238, container vessels: x² 6.238, d.f. 3, p .101). The distribution of 
incidences across the first four weeks of a tour can be seen for each of the data sets 
in figure 7 below. 
 
 
Figure 7 Injuries in relation to week since start of tour onboard tankers, offshore vessels and container 
vessels 
Onboard tankers there were more incidents during the fourth week of a tour of duty – 
in comparison to the first three weeks – than would be expected by chance. 
Furthermore, figure 7 shows the frequency of incidences  increased linearly as the 
first four weeks within a tour progressed. 
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Comparatively, within the first four weeks onboard container vessels the distribution 
of incidents was likely due to chance. 
The lack of significance for incidences within the first four weeks of a tour for offshore 
vessels is of particular interest, given that onboard these vessels tours were five 
weeks in length and when analysed as an entire tour, significance was identified (as 
will be seen below in figure 9). 
Figure 8 below shows the number of incidents as a function of weeks into tour for the 
last four weeks of a seafarer’s tour for the tankers’ and offshore vessels’ data sets. As 
previously explained the data set obtained from the container vessels did not record 
the date the seafarer expected to leave the vessel and as such it was not possible to 
include this data set in the analysis of incidences at the end of a tour. For both tankers 
and offshore vessels the distribution of incidences across the last four weeks of a tour 
differed significantly (tankers: x² 8.250, d.f. 3, p <.05, offshore: x² 14.839, d.f. 3, p 
<.005). In particular, onboard tankers the penultimate week of a seafarer’s tour was 
riskier than the two preceding weeks and the last week. Onboard offshore vessels the 
distribution of incidences across the last four weeks showed a linear decline as the 
last four weeks progressed. As such, the last week of a seafarer’s tour was the safest 
compared to the preceding three weeks.  
The findings shown in figure 8 again show that a significant relationship could be 
identified between incidences of seafarers’ injuries and time into tour. The reasons for 
a spike in incidents in the second last week of a tour onboard tankers are unclear and 
the literature identified in chapters one and two provide little in the way of an 
explanation.  
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Figure 8 Injuries in relation to week from end of tour onboard tankers and offshore vessels 
As previously stated – unlike seafarers onboard tankers and container vessels – 
offshore seafarers all expected to work the same tour length and as such it was 
possible to analyse the distribution of incidences across an entire tour for offshore 
seafarers. 
Figure 9 below plots the number of all incidents combined as a function of weeks into 
tour for an entire tour for the offshore vessels’ data set. The distribution of incidences 
on a weekly basis across an entire tour differed significantly (x² 11.486, d.f. 4, p <.05). 
In particular, the frequency of incidences was greatest in the second week onboard 
and the last week at sea was the safest. 
When considering the findings regarding incidents onboard offshore vessels shown in 
figure 7 – no significance within the first four weeks of a tour – and figure 8 – 
significance within the last four weeks of a tour – it is apparent that a significant 
relationship between incidences of seafarers’ injures and time into tour was identified 
only in the last week of a tour. This suggests that when considering seafarers’ 
occupational safety it is important to consider the entire tour. Literature identified in 
chapter two – such as Hansen et al. (2002) and Jensen et al. (2004) – explored 
incidents in relation to the progression of time since the start of a deployment and this 
approach would not have enabled the findings regarding offshore vessels shown here 
to be identified. 
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Figure 9 Injuries in relation to week into tour onboard offshore vessels 
In answer to the question ‘Can a significant relationship be identified between 
incidences of seafarers’ occupational injuries and time within a tour of duty?’, yes 
such a relationship could be identified onboard offshore vessels and tankers. No such 
relationship was apparent for container vessels. However, the limitations regarding 
the lack of data identifying the date the seafarer was expected to leave the vessel 
have resulted in an incomplete analysis of these data. 
The frequency of incidences of seafarers’ injuries in relation to time within a tour of 
duty and how this relationship related to injury severity onboard offshore vessels was 
also explored. In figure 10 below the number of incidences categorised by injury 
severity are shown as a function of weeks into tour for an entire tour for the offshore 
vessels’ data set.  
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It was not possible to statistically test injury severity across an entire tour as the 
necessary categories did not provide sufficiently high frequencies. However, it was 
possible to analyse the distribution of recordable cases (fatalities, lost workday cases, 
restricted work cases and medical treatment cases) across an entire tour for offshore 
seafarers. The distribution of incidences classified as recordable cases onboard 
offshore vessels across an entire tour differed significantly (x² 13.186, d.f. 4, p <.05). 
The likelihood of experiencing a recordable case injury was the lowest in the last 
week of a tour, compared with the other four weeks of a tour and this distribution can 
be seen in figure 11. 
 
Figure 10 Injury severity in relation to week into tour onboard offshore vessels 
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Figure 11 More severe incidents in relation to week into tour onboard offshore vessels 
The chi-square test result suggests that there were less total recordable case injuries 
during the last week of a tour – onboard offshore vessels – than would be expected 
by chance. This finding shows that with the less severe first aid case injures removed, 
a significant relationship between incidences of seafarers’ injuries and time into tour 
was still evident. This suggests that the occurrence of less severe first aid case 
injuries does not mask the identified relationship between occupational injuries and 
time into tour. As it was not possible to conduct analyses of the more severe injuries 
by type, it is unfortunate that little else can be concluded regarding injury severity and 
its relationship with seafarers’ incidents and time into tour. 
The significant chi-square test result indicates that the relationship between 
incidences of seafarers’ occupational injuries and time within a tour of duty warrants 
further analysis. For example, it would be useful to identify the incident characteristics 
– such as where onboard the incident occurred and the rank of the seafarer who 
sustained the injury – which may be related to a seafarer experiencing an injury at a 
particular period of time within a tour of duty. 
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5.3 Question 2: What are the variables that relate to incidences of seafarers’ 
occupational injuries and time within a tour of duty? 
To answer this question a number of binary logistic regressions were conducted. 
Binary logistic regression was identified as an appropriate method as all the 
independent variables were nominal variables, with no hierarchy and a number of 
predetermined categories. As the variables were not linear and were groups of 
absolute variables there were limited statistical analyses available.  
In total, four binary logistic regressions were conducted and these were: 
1. Start of a tour vs. all later incidents (middle and end of a tour) 
2. End of a tour vs. all earlier incidents (start and middle of a tour) 
3. Start of a tour vs. middle of a tour (end of tour incidents not included) 
4. End of a tour vs. middle of a tour (start of tour incidents not included) 
This method ensured that separate incidents at the start and end of a tour were 
compared with any other time within a tour (1 and 2) and separate incidents at the 
start and end of a tour were compared with the middle of a tour (3 and 4). 
The following variables were identified for use in the binary logistic regression 
models: 
1. Rank of the seafarer 
2. Type of injury sustained 
3. Shipboard location where the injury occurred 
4. Part of the body injured 
5. Working department of the injured seafarer 
As was seen in section 5.1.2, the variables were recoded and where necessary they 
were merged to form new variables. Further details of this can be found in appendix 
vii. 
Following checks for missing data, Pearson chi-square tests were used to test the 
relationship between the criterion variable (i.e. time into tour when the incident 
occurred) and the independent variables. As per convention the significance level 
was set at p= <.05 (see for example Field 2009). It was not possible to identify a 
significant relationship between any of the five independent variables separately and 
the dependent variables (time into tour).  
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Finally, before the binary logistic regressions were conducted the independent 
variables were tested for multi-collinearity. No multi-collinearity was identified 
between the five independent variables. 
Each of the four models were run for incidents onboard tankers and offshore vessels 
combined and there were no significant variables identified for rest of tour (start and 
middle of tour) vs. end of tour (R² .023 (Cox and Snell), .041 (Nagelkerke). Model x² 
4.934, d.f. 8, p .765) and the omnibus test of model coefficients suggested the model 
had a very poor fit. 
There were, however, significant variables in the other three binary logistic regression 
models. As can be seen in table 15 below the odds of a seafarer working in the 
engine department reporting an injury at the start of a tour (compared to all later 
incidents) were 66% less than a seafarer classified as ‘other working department’. 
Similarly, the odds of a seafarer working in the deck department reporting an injury at 
the start of a tour were 75% less than an ‘other department’ seafarer. 
  Odds ratio 95% CI 
Department 
  Other Department (n= 159) 1* 
 Engine Department (n= 111) 0.34* (0.12-0.92) 
Deck Department (n= 142) 0.25** (0.11-0.59) 
 
Note R² .066 (Cox and Snell), .115 (Nagelkerke). Model x² 13.158, d.f. 8, p .107. * p < .05, ** p < .005. 
Table 15 Start of tour vs. all later incidents logistic regression (tankers and offshore vessels) 
 
Table 16 below shows that the odds of both engine department and deck department 
seafarers were less (71% and 79% respectively) than other department seafarers to 
report an injury at the start of a tour (compared to the middle of a tour). 
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  Odds ratio 95% CI 
Department 
  
Other Department (n= 134) 1** 
 
Engine Department (n= 95) 0.29* (0.10-0.83) 
Deck Department (n= 126) 0.21** (0.09-0.51) 
 
Note R² .086 (Cox and Snell), .143 (Nagelkerke). Model x² 10.151, d.f. 8, p .255. * p < .05, ** p < .005. 
Table 16 Start of tour vs. middle of tour logistic regression (tankers and offshore vessels) 
 
The odds of a deck department seafarer reporting an incident at the end of a tour 
(compared to the middle of a tour) were 60% less than a seafarer classified as other 
working department, as can be seen in table 17 below. 
  Odds ratio 95% CI 
Department 
  
Other Department (n= 128) 1 
 
Deck Department (n= 130) 0.40* (0.18-0.88) 
   
Note R² .040 (Cox and Snell), .067 (Nagelkerke). Model x² 9.026, d.f. 8, p .340. * p < .05. 
Table 17 End of tour vs. middle of tour logistic regression (tankers and offshore vessels) 
 
The four binary logistic regression models – as outlined above – were then conducted 
for only incidents which occurred onboard offshore vessels and the results were 
similar. There were no significant variables for rest of tour (start and middle of tour) 
vs. last week of tour (R² .037 (Cox and Snell), .061 (Nagelkerke). Model x² 8.840, d.f. 
8, p .356). Unlike for tanker and offshore vessels combined, there were no significant 
variables for middle of tour vs. end of tour (start of tour not included) (R² .056 (Cox 
and Snell), .085 (Nagelkerke). Model x² 11.501, d.f. 8, p .175), for injuries which 
occurred only onboard offshore vessels. 
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Table 18 below shows that the odds of a deck department seafarer reporting an injury 
at the start of a tour (compared to all later incidents) were 61% less than an ‘other 
working department’ seafarer. 
  Odds ratio 95% CI 
Department 
  
Other Department (n= 138) 1 
 
Deck Department (n= 76) 0.39* (0.16-0.96) 
 
Note R² .065 (Cox and Snell), .115 (Nagelkerke). Model x² 7.048, d.f. 8, p .531. * p < .05. 
Table 18 Start of tour vs. all later incidents logistic regression (offshore vessels) 
 
Similarly, the odds of a seafarer working in the deck department reporting an injury at 
the start of a tour (compared to the middle of the tour) were 66% less than an ‘other 
department’ seafarer, as can be seen in table 19 below. 
  Odds ratio 95% CI 
Department 
  
Other Department (n= 115) 1 
 
Deck Department (n= 62) 0.34* (0.13-0.87) 
 
Note R² .084 (Cox and Snell), .124 (Nagelkerke). Model x² 8.822, d.f. 8, p .358. * p < .05. 
Table 19 Start of tour vs. middle of tour logistic regression (offshore vessels) 
 
It has therefore been established that some aspects of the seafarer’s working 
department were significant predictors for injuries at particular periods of time within a 
tour of duty in the tankers and offshore vessels’ data sets. For tankers and offshore 
vessel incidents combined the seafarer’s working department was a significant 
predictor for the start of tour vs. all later incidents, start of tour vs. middle of tour and 
end of tour vs. middle of tour. 
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When offshore vessel incidents were tested on their own a seafarer’s working 
department was a significant predictor for just the start of tour vs. all later incidents 
and start of tour vs. middle of tour for incidents onboard offshore vessels. The 
reasons for this difference regarding the end of tour vs middle of tour having a 
significant predictor variable for tanker and offshore vessels incidents combined and 
not for offshore vessel incidents tested on their own, however, are not immediately 
clear.  
Therefore, to answer the question: ‘What are the variables that relate to incidences of 
seafarers’ occupational injuries and time within a tour of duty?’ only the seafarer’s 
working department was identified as a factor which related to time within a tour of 
duty and incidences of occupational injuries. 
These findings – or more precisely lack of significant findings – from the binary 
logistic regression models are important as whilst previously in this chapter a 
significant relationship between seafarers’ occupational injuries and time within a tour 
of duty was identified the data collected by shipping companies provides very little in 
the way of any explanation regarding this relationship. 
What emerged from the analyses, however, was the scale and breadth of the 
variables which had not been recorded by the shipping companies following an injury. 
For example, nothing about the manner in which the injured seafarer was employed 
was known, nor was the seafarer’s familiarity with the vessel – or indeed familiarity of 
working at sea – known. These extensive deficiencies in the information recorded by 
the shipping companies are a significant limitation regarding the use of shipping 
companies’ safety data to explore seafarers’ safety experiences in relation to the 
organisation of work and employment at sea. 
5.4 Limitations 
There are also several other limitations regarding the quantitative component of this 
study. It became apparent during the analyses that one limitation of the data obtained 
was the low number of cases in some of the categories – such as fatalities and lost 
workday cases – and without sufficient numbers of cases it was not possible to 
conduct all the desired analyses.  
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In addition, Company C were unwilling to provide the date the seafarer expected to 
leave the vessel and for this reason only a partial analysis of incidents experienced 
onboard container vessels was conducted. Data regarding independent variables 
were also not obtained from Company C and as such it was not possible to conduct 
any further analysis regarding the circumstances of incidents which occurred onboard 
container vessels. 
There are also a number of reasons to be somewhat sceptical of the accuracy of any 
findings obtained from shipping companies’ incident records. First, it is widely 
acknowledged that the under reporting of incidents in the seafaring industry is 
common place and there are many reasons for this. It was seen in the review of the 
literature in chapter one that many seafarers experience precarious employment and 
as such these individuals may be averse to reporting an incident which they perceive 
will negatively impact upon their career. However, even for seafarers who are lucky 
enough to experience permanent employment, the perception of being blamed for an 
incident may result in it not being reported. As one Second Officer explained: 
“If I was going to get bollocked for it mainly, well back when I was cadet, I 
wouldn’t care as much now obviously. Actually, there was another time on 
[ships name] I was coming down a ladder and I swung on the thing and I 
slipped off and landed on top of my foot and I didn’t report it and my foot 
swelled up quite badly but I didn’t report it because [captains name] was the 
old man and it was an Indian Second Mate so he’d make a big thing about it, 
write a report, I couldn’t really be bothered with that so I never told anyone” 
Second Officer, ship 2. 
In some circumstances, when an incident occurs onboard a ship the injured individual 
is alone. Such a lack of witnesses means that seafarers may be able to hide the 
occurrence of the event. One Captain openly stated that other seafarers onboard 
were able to hide non-serious injuries and that he himself would be reluctant to report 
an injury, primarily due to the paperwork required in such a situation. He explained: 
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“If I don’t report it I think it’s not so serious. Let’s say that I go on a ladder here 
and I miss the steps and I fall down and I hit my arm but I feel that ah it’s just 
nothing. To report something it’s a lot of paperwork all the time, I don’t want to 
have so much paperwork so any minor of myself if not so necessary. If 
anybody else I have to report it, if they come to me I report but there can be the 
situation also that they keep it for themselves” Captain, ship 4. 
The comment suggests that if an incident was reported to the Captain then the 
Captain would be obliged to report the event to the shipping company. In practice, 
however, this was not always the case and a Captain may avoid reporting an incident 
to the shipping company if the seafarer to whom the injury occurred was willing to not 
involve the shipping company and the injury was not serious enough to require 
shore-side medical assistance. The following dialogue is from an interview with a 
Second Officer who had stated that he had previously reported an injury to the 
Captain: 
Me - “Did the office find out about it [the injury]?” 
Second Officer, ship 2 - “Nah it wasn’t really serious enough”  
Many of the seafarers interviewed suggested that they would not report non-serious 
injuries, particularly if they did not require medical assistance. As one Third Officer 
explained: 
“[If it] requires medical assistance or you need to see a doctor then yeah I 
would report it, something minor that doesn’t require medical assistance of any 
kind then no I wouldn’t” Third Officer, ship 2. 
For some seafarers the remoteness of the ship when an incident occurred meant that 
little could be done with regards to diagnosing and treating the injury without diverting 
the ship. Such a diversion would be hugely costly to the shipping company and would 
likely be an inconvenience for other seafarers onboard. As one Second Officer 
explained: 
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“I thought it [my foot] was broken actually but if it was broken we were sailing 
past Bermuda at the time and I don’t know what the old man would’ve done. 
He’d have had to phone radio medical, Danish ship so he’d have phoned radio 
medical and they might have said I should be got off and then that would divert 
the ship off course and I wouldn’t be very popular so that’s part of the reason I 
didn’t tell” Second Officer, ship 2. 
Whilst such findings regarding the under-reporting of incidents in the seafaring 
industry are interesting they add little to the current body of literature regarding this 
well-known issue. However, findings regarding the impact of time within a tour of duty 
on incident reporting are particularly salient to this study. For some seafarers the 
reporting of an incident at an early stage of a tour of duty would be avoided where 
possible, as one Deck Cadet explained: 
“If it was a serious one I’d do it anytime but it if was one that needed a bit of 
attention but could wait I probably won’t do it as soon as I join a brand-new 
ship I’d be like try not pester them just get used to the ship then when you get 
to know people I’d tell them, yeah I’d tell people, I probably would tell people at 
any point in the trip but less keen, depends how serious and whether I need 
their attention. I wouldn’t do it at the start so much, I’d be shy, not knowing how 
people might respond to it, they might say piss off you girl or something like 
that so yeah most likely at the start of the trip” Deck Cadet 3, ship 2. 
The Deck Cadet suggested that his desire to avoid drawing attention to himself and 
the worry of being perceived as a hindrance by his new and unfamiliar colleagues 
would result in him being averse to reporting an injury.  
Conversely some seafarers suggested they would be less likely to report an incident 
at a late stage of their tour and one reason for this was to avoid completing the 
additional paperwork such an incident would entail. A Second Officer stated: 
“Like at the end of the trip, especially when you’re going home you don’t want 
to write a report, the last thing you want to do is write a report” Second Officer, 
ship 1. 
The Second Officer went on to explain: 
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“Maybe people wouldn’t report it at their last day because they can’t really be 
bothered, you just want to go home” Second Officer, ship 1. 
If an individual would shortly be leaving the vessel they may be willing to wait until 
they got home to seek any treatment for an injury they may need. As one Fourth 
Engineer explained: 
“If I was going to get off in a few days then I’d probably be less likely to report it 
you know, if I broke my finger and I was going to get off in a day I’d probably 
just go home to my doctors” Fourth Engineer, ship 2. 
Such a scenario is potentially more likely to apply to seafarers from more 
economically developed countries who have access to high-quality healthcare in their 
home country. In contrast the fact that health care is funded by the shipping company 
for any injuries or illnesses a seafarer experiences whilst onboard may make the 
opposite true for seafarers from less economically developed countries.  
The qualitative findings regarding the reporting of incidents among seafarers suggest 
that caution should be exercised when considering findings regarding shipping 
companies’ injury data – in particular the patterns of reported injuries in relation to 
time within a tour of duty. The accounts of some seafarers suggest that there may be 
a greater likelihood of under reporting incidents at particular periods within a tour of 
duty and as such any significant differences regarding injury frequency in relation to 
time within a tour of duty may be the result of reporting differences. 
5.5 Summary 
The findings presented in this chapter provide a novel exploration of the frequency of 
seafarers’ occupational injuries in relation to time into tour. However, it is unlikely to 
present a completely accurate picture of seafarers’ injuries owing to the likelihood of 
substantial under-reporting of injuries. This has been identified in a number of studies 
(see for example Bhattacharya 2009) and the findings which emerged during the 
interviews in this study further corroborate this by indicating that the injuries that 
seafarers reported to shipping companies were simply the tip of the ice-berg. 
Consequently, the true scale of occupational injuries experienced at sea is unknown. 
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Moreover, the findings presented in this chapter indicate that, when an injury was 
reported, the shipping companies were not recording variables which could shed-light 
on why seafarers might be more vulnerable to occupational injuries at certain time 
periods within a tour of duty. The findings presented in chapter four suggested that 
there are a number of factors which are important in this regard, including, for 
example job insecurity, workplace familiarity and fatigue. However, information 
regarding factors such as these are not present in the shipping companies’ injury 
records. This is a particular concern as research from other industries has identified 
associations between such factors and occupational injury frequency – for example 
Underhill (2007) found agency workers’ workplace familiarity to be related to injury 
frequency. Similarly, literature from the seafaring industry (see for example Hansen et 
al. 2002) has identified associations between seafarers deployment to a familiar 
vessel for subsequent tours of duty and injury frequency. Bodies such as the MCA 
(2003) have also identified associations between working hours, fatigue and injury 
frequency. Yet despite such evidence, the shipping companies did not record 
variables, such as workplace familiarity and rest hours, which relate to the 
organisation of work and employment at sea.  
The consequence of shipping companies not recording such variables is that little is 
known regarding some of the factors that might be related to accident causation. This 
is a cause for concern in terms of seafarers’ occupational safety as any actions 
shipping companies may take to improve the safety outcomes of their workforce are 
not based on a full and complete story. It is also somewhat ironic that many of the 
variables relating to the organisation of work and employment which have been seen 
in other industries to be associated with injury frequency (see for example Quinlan 
1999) – such as whether or not an individual is precariously employed – are actually 
controlled by the shipping companies themselves. This, of course, suggests that 
companies do have these data available, but currently do not relate them to the 
information they collect about injuries at sea.  
Finally, none of the shipping companies collected data that provide any indication of 
seafarers’ well-being, let alone how it may fluctuate with time into tour of duty.  
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Taken together, these findings suggest that the shipping companies’ data are unlikely 
to adequately describe the extent of seafarers’ occupational harm, or the relevant 
aspects of the contexts in which it occurs – which, of course, has significant 
implications for their ability to mitigate it. 
In the following chapter we return to a qualitative analysis to further explore the 
relationship between the organisation of work and employment and seafarers’ 
experiences of health, safety and well-being. 
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CHAPTER SIX: THE EARLY AND LATE STAGES OF A TOUR OF DUTY 
 
6.0 Introduction 
This chapter – the third and final findings chapter – seeks to shed light on the 
experiences of seafarers at both an early and late stage of a tour of duty. It does so 
as during the interviews it emerged that there were a number of features pertinent to 
the organisation of work and employment at sea that were important for health, safety 
and well-being experiences which occurred at the beginning and end of a tour of duty. 
Similarly, in the review of literature in chapters one and two it was seen that a number 
of factors – such as unfamiliarity and cumulative fatigue – were prevalent at either the 
beginning or end of a seafarer’s tour of duty, and these factors had been found to be 
associated with adverse health, safety and wellbeing outcomes in other industries 
(see for example Underhill 2007).  
As with chapter four, this chapter draws upon the interview transcripts and field notes 
from the ships visited and once again the themes presented in this chapter are those 
which were brought to light by the seafarers in this study talking about their own 
personal experiences of life at sea. 
Unlike in chapter five however, in this chapter the beginning and end of a tour of duty 
are not quantified – they are notions which have been developed to make sense of 
the experiences and perceptions of seafarers. The terms were utilised in order to 
provide an insight into how the beginning and end of a tour of duty were understood 
by seafarers and in many instances the seafarers themselves quantified these time 
periods (as was seen in chapter 5.1.3). 
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This chapter progresses chronologically and begins by considering those factors 
which are pertinent to an early stage of a tour of duty. In the review of literature 
presented in chapter two it was seen that many seafarers were asked by their 
employer to return early from home leave to join a ship (BIMCO 2015). Moreover, 
Wadsworth et al. (2008) revealed that seafarers often had no opportunity to sleep 
between traveling to a ship and commencing their first work shift. Both of these issues 
– returning to a vessel early and not sleeping following prolonged travel to a worksite 
– are likely to result in fatigue, an issue which is known to adversely impact on 
occupational safety and wellbeing outcomes (see for example Carotenuto et al. 2012 
and MCA 2013). Thus, with this literature in mind this chapter begins by describing 
how seafarers experience events immediately prior to arriving at a ship and how 
these experiences differ depending on the manner in which the individual is 
employed. The findings regarding seafarers’ experiences upon joining a vessel and 
how they adjust as newcomers are also presented. 
In the latter half of this chapter the experiences and perceptions of seafarers in 
regards to a late stage of a tour of duty are presented. The literature – in chapter 2.2.3 
– revealed that some seafarers are asked to extend their contractual voyage period 
(BIMCO 2015) and many seafarers are unsure of the date on which they will leave the 
vessel and return home. Steered by such literature the text considers seafarers’ 
experiences at the end of a tour of duty and the how the issue that the date a seafarer 
leaves the ship is not fixed impacts on their health, safety and well-being. 
In presenting the findings from this research relating to the beginning and end of a 
seafarer’s tour of duty this chapter sheds a light on issues relating to job control and 
the variations in power experienced by seafarers in different work and employment 
situations, and the impact that such power had on mitigating some of the adverse 
features of the organisation of work and employment at sea. 
6.1 The start of a tour of duty 
At the start of a tour of duty seafarers must transition from life at home to life at sea. 
The contrast between the time wealth experienced by seafarers at home and the long 
hours worked at sea is vast and life onboard involves a strict routine of watch 
patterns, set meal times and limited rest periods.  
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Yet from the moment a seafarer joins a vessel they are at work and Sampson (2013, 
p. 88) states: “It is difficult to overstate the impact of work, and work schedules, on the 
lives of seafarers’ onboard cargo vessels. The work of the ship is prioritised above all 
else. If something needs doing onboard a way is found to get it done. There are no 
holidays, no concessions to sea sickness or minor ailments, little concession to 
weather conditions and no account at all of the time of day or night when a ship enters 
port.” Consequently, the start of a tour of duty is an important period, however, prior to 
this it is necessary to consider how seafarers spend their time immediately preceding 
the start of a tour of duty. 
6.1.1 Time preceding the start of a tour of duty 
In exploring seafarers’ experiences immediately prior to joining a vessel it was seen 
that many of the seafarers in this study did not arrive onboard the vessel in a physical 
or mental condition conducive to work. 
Chapter 4.1.1 revealed that some seafarers were able to plan their own deployment 
schedule – in conjunction with another seafarer of the same rank – and consequently 
these seafarers often knew many months in advance the approximate date on which 
they would leave home and join a vessel. Other seafarers, however, reported 
receiving deployment scheduling information from a crewing agency. 
During the analysis it was revealed that joining information was often sent via email 
and the information included the name of the ship the seafarer was joining and an 
electronic flight ticket from the seafarer’s home airport to the nearest airport to the 
ship.  
The examples in chapter 4.1.2 indicate that many seafarers had no control regarding 
which vessel they were assigned to and consequently they perceived low levels of 
control over where they worked – something which in shore based industries 
research has been linked to adverse well-being outcomes (Lewchuk et al. 2003). 
The seafarers reported that in some circumstances the joining instructions were 
passed from the shipping company to themselves at very late notice. For example, an 
AB told of how:  
“They [crewing department of shipping company] tried 12 hours once and I 
said no way.” AB 2, ship 2.  
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As an individual who was permanently employed the AB felt able to refuse as he was 
confident that the shipping company would arrange for him to join the vessel at a later 
date. The AB suggested that he was particularly aggrieved by the short notice as the 
vessel was sailing a regular itinerary and consequently he felt that the shipping 
company would have been aware of the vessel’s movements far in excess of twelve 
hours. 
The short notice provided by the shipping company was in some cases perceived as 
a cost saving method. When asked about receiving flight details the day before flying 
one Second Officer responded: 
“[the shipping company] have to catch the, try to catch the vessel being 
alongside so then that’s not to spend money for the hotel and so on. It’s yeah, 
it’s normal money saving, then waiting for the ships prospects for the berthing 
prospects then they can arrange flights” Second Officer, ship 3. 
The implication of such short notice is that shipping companies consider seafarers as 
available for work irrespective of the length of time notice is given prior to being 
expected to work. Bergmans and Gardiner (2007) suggest that being available for 
work is both a disposition and a capacity and the varying domestic situations 
experienced by seafarers result in some seafarers being more available than others. 
For example, a seafarer who provides childcare is likely to be less available than a 
seafarer who does not provide childcare.  
Moreover, the notion of being available for work for seafarers is different to an 
individual in a shore-based occupation – since unlike shore-based workers, seafarers 
are leaving home and in effect putting their lives on hold for a prolonged period.  
In addition to receiving little notice prior to joining a vessel some of the seafarers 
reported arriving at the ship in an indirect manner. For example, the majority of the 
seafarers from the Philippines stated that they had visited a crewing agency office 
immediately prior to joining. This visit to a crewing agency office enabled the 
seafarers to complete paperwork and other contractual requirements prior to joining a 
ship.  
It also emerged that some seafarers arrived at a vessel after attending STCW or 
company specific training courses, as a field note records:  
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The Third Mate joined yesterday evening but left home a week ago to attend a 
[company name] training course (Devereux field note 2014). 
Worryingly some seafarers also reported experiencing a much shorter duration at 
home than they had initially expected – as the following account from one of the Third 
Officers interviewed indicates: 
“I heard originally I was supposed to be joining December 1st and then they 
said ‘oh we want you to join earlier’. I mean I’ve only been home for 1 month 
after sailing for 7 months” Third Officer, ship 2. 
For those seafarers who were permanently employed their leave duration was 
dependent on the duration of the tour of duty worked preceding the leave period – 
although as will be seen in section 6.2.2 the findings indicated that mandatory tour 
extensions meant that such leave was not guaranteed. Other seafarers employed on 
a more ad hoc basis – such as those utilising single voyage contracts – had little 
certainty in terms of leave duration. When asked about how long he would have at 
home, one Wiper responded: 
“Probably [a] maximum of two months” Wiper, ship 4. 
It was seen that for such seafarers – particularly those from less economically 
developed countries – further employment was prioritised over lengthy leave periods. 
Moreover, during the analysis it emerged that in some instances, seafarers were 
transferred directly from one ship to another. There are numerous reasons why this 
may happen, for example, if onboard a product tanker a chemical cargo is scheduled 
for carriage and a Deck Officer holds an oil endorsement but not a chemical 
endorsement. The seafarers indicated a transfer from one ship to another was not a 
welcome scenario as they must leave a vessel and work-team they had become 
familiar with and begin the process of adjustment and transition all over again. 
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Onboard one of the ships discussed here a Deck Cadet – who was onboard at the 
time of the fieldwork – had left the vessel a week or so previously as the vessel was 
scheduled to undertake a dry-docking period and a number of shore-based 
individuals from the shipping company were required to be onboard during the 
dry-docking. As the vessel did not have enough cabins to accommodate the Deck 
cadet and these individuals, the Deck Cadet returned home for a short period of time. 
The situation was explained in this manner: 
“He signed on about 2 months before me but he wanted to do the dry-dock, he 
stayed on for that, he’s been on a long time but then he got sent home just 
before the dry-dock because all the cabins were full but he then managed to 
get back for dry-dock because someone went home with injury and now he’s 
still here until he gets sent home” Deck Cadet 2, ship 2. 
Unusually the Deck Cadet had re-joined the vessel and consequently he was sailing 
two tours of duty with a leave period of just a few days between the tours. The Cadet 
reported that he was willing to endure the situation in order to ensure he achieved the 
minimum amount of sea time required to take his officer exams. Moreover, the Cadet 
indicated that he has prioritised returning to the familiar vessel over a longer leave 
period. 
Thus, from the findings it was apparent that there were numerous reasons why some 
seafarers arrived at a vessel in an indirect manner. That a seafarer may have had 
other obligatory employment requirements immediately prior to joining a vessel, 
however, was not always obvious to other seafarers already onboard. 
A further factor which was not always apparent to the seafarers already onboard was 
the time that a new-joining seafarer had spent travelling to the vessel. Many seafarers 
travelled vast distances to join a vessel and even when the flight to join a vessel was 
relatively short, the travel either side of the flight was sometimes extensive and 
resulted in many hours spent travelling, as a Chief Engineer explained: 
“We usually take the [Swedish term] flight in the morning, 6 o’clock in the 
morning from the airport [Stockholm], you arrive at the ship, if you go to 
Pembroke you arrive at the ship 3 o’clock in the afternoon and then you have 
your reliever standing there and he want to go also” Chief Engineer, ship 4.  
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The seafarers perceived the shipping company to make little – if any – effort to 
arrange convenient and time efficient journeys. In describing his experiences 
regarding joining a ship one Deck Cadet said: 
“It took 2 hours to get there [home airport] and then flew to Barcelona and then 
to Malaga. Flying time I think it took like an hour and a half to Barcelona then I 
had to wait I think it was about 8, 10 hours in the airport, it was a ridiculous 
length of time in the airport, I was just like ahhh and then from there to Malaga 
and then from Malaga put up in a hotel, that was about [it]. Well think I left it 
was about midday the flight, to Barcelona, like the first flight I got on and then I 
arrived in Malaga in the airport about 3 in the morning and just waited. It was a 
long day, I think got picked up from there [hotel] about 10 or 11 to join the ship” 
Deck Cadet 1, ship 2. 
Despite the excessive time spent travelling, the distance between the UK and Spain 
is unlikely to have resulted in the Deck Cadet experiencing jet lag. However, for a 
Filipino AB joining a vessel in the UK, jet lag was an issue. As he put it:  
“You are adjusting your time because in the Philippines it’s different, for 
example for this time in the Philippines it’s time for sleep” AB, ship 3. 
Thus, the responses from seafarers indicated that their experiences immediately prior 
to joining a vessel meant they were unlikely to arrive at a vessel feeling fresh and 
rested and this issue is of significance when considering risk and seafarers’ 
perceptions of risk at an early stage of a tour of duty. These findings also have 
implications for seafarers’ well-being outcomes as many of the issues considered 
here – such as jet lag and excessive time spent travelling to a vessel – are likely to 
result in fatigue, which in turn adversely impacts on an individual’s well-being. 
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6.1.2 Newcomer adjustment 
Regardless of their use of time immediately prior to joining a vessel and whether they 
arrive at the ship in a direct or indirect manner all seafarers joining a vessel for the 
first time (as well as individuals who have not sailed onboard the vessel in the 
previous six months) are required to undertake familiarisation training. In accordance 
with the ISM Code, the MLC and STCW – as seen in the review of the literature in 
chapter 2.2.3 – familiarisation training is to be completed prior to any work duties 
being assigned. During the interviews it emerged, however, that this was rarely the 
case. As one Third Officer – an individual new to the shipping company as well as the 
vessel – explained: 
“I haven’t even done any bridge equipment familiarisation yet. I mean cos 
tomorrow morning I’m going to get a pilotage on the way out, you know I might 
have to set up the bridge and of course I can’t do the AIS or any of that shit yet 
because I haven’t even been shown it, different radar systems, different 
ECDIS systems.” Third Officer, ship 2.  
It was seen in chapter 4.1.1 that the familiarity of a seafarer with both the vessel and 
their colleagues was dependent upon the manner in which the seafarer was 
employed. For some seafarers joining an unfamiliar ship with unfamiliar people was 
perceived as being particularly difficult.  
A Deck Cadet – who was at an early stage of his career at sea – identified the 
beginning of a tour of duty as a time of unhappiness and discontent. He explained 
how: 
“The first week I don’t know my way around, I don’t know the people, I’m jet 
lagged, I’m tired, I hate it, I want to go home, I want to cry, it’s just the worst 
experience ever” Deck Cadet 3, ship 2.  
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From these comments it is apparent that new joining seafarers who were unfamiliar 
with the vessel and their colleagues experienced considerable stress and 
apprehension – which was further exacerbated by inadequate familiarisation training. 
Consequently, these findings imply that there was a heightened risk to seafarers’ 
well-being when they first arrived onboard an unfamiliar vessel. This resonates with 
literature (see for example Axtell et al. 2002) which indicates that changes to work 
practices can negatively impact upon an individual’s well-being. A seafarer arriving at 
an unfamiliar vessel with unfamiliar colleagues can be considered as an extreme 
example of changes to working practices and it is unsurprising that many of the 
seafarers interviewed perceived the beginning of a tour of duty as a period which was 
related to adverse well-being outcomes. 
The accounts of seafarers also indicated that unfamiliarity with a ship was one reason 
for a perceived increase in risk in terms of personal safety at the start of a tour of duty 
and the following example provides a strong illustration: 
“I think you're at more risk when you've just joined and you don't know things 
like even though I’ve done other ships before, coming here was a big shock I 
mean everything is completely different, starting on a completely new ship and 
I think that’s the same even going between the same class of ships, so 2 ships 
that are exactly the same and you'll go to another ship and things will be done 
completely differently, things will be in different places.” Deck Cadet 2, ship 2. 
This association between an increase in risk and unfamiliarity has been identified by 
others (see for example Underhill 2007) in relation to occupational health and safety.  
An unfamiliar new-joiner may also be unsettling for the seafarers already onboard. 
For example, many senior officers suggested that working with junior officers who 
were already familiar with the vessel minimised disruption to the routine onboard, as a 
Chief Officer explained: 
“All officers more or less, 80% of them maybe is fixed back-to-back so that also 
mean a lot so I don’t have a new guy even if it’s a new third officer I cannot let 
him or her be alone in CCR [Cargo Control Room]... so that means a lot also, 
all stations have back-to-back” Chief Officer, ship 4. 
A Storekeeper elaborated on the situation, describing how: 
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“This ship have a lot of changing [crew] the last year, lot of changing people 
every time. I believe that’s not a good thing [for the] company, much better to 
keep people who will stay for a long long time so you can work as a team. You 
know them, you don’t need to start from scratch again” Storekeeper, ship 1.  
The accounts of seafarers who had returned to the same vessel for subsequent tours 
over a period of many years, suggested that for these individuals the start of a tour of 
duty resulted in little – if any – anxiety or worry. Among such seafarers the following 
account was not untypical: 
“Once I unpack and that takes around an hour and once I’ve done the 
handover, after 8 years you just click back in. If it was joining a new ship 
different answer” Captain, ship 2. 
The ability to simply ‘click back in’ and easily settle in and adjust to the routine of life 
onboard resulted in substantial differences in perceptions of risk – both in terms of 
safety and well-being – at the start of a tour of duty depending on the seafarer’s 
familiarity with the vessel. It emerged that those seafarers with vast amounts of 
sea-going experience onboard a familiar ship found it much easier in comparison to 
those who were unfamiliar, as one Captain explained: 
“I’ve been home and I come onboard the first day it feels like I have been here 
so it is not so much difference no, not for me. For other people they are new 
onboard, they’ve not been on the ship before of course the beginning if you’re 
new on a ship in the beginning it takes time to adopt everything that you need 
to for safety Captain, ship 4. 
Moreover, all seafarers, regardless of their familiarity, needed to adjust to the routine 
of life onboard which – as it was seen in chapter 4.1.2 – included shift work and night 
work. One Bosun explained: 
“It’s just about getting back into a routine, getting your body clock used to it.” 
Bosun, ship 1. 
While a First Officer elaborated on the situation, describing how: 
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“[The] first two days are quite tough, later on you change your body, the body 
just adjusts for this time, change watches and times of work.” First Officer, ship 
1. 
This combination of adjusting to the routine of life onboard and tiredness from 
travelling to the vessel resulted in increased levels of perceived fatigue at an early 
stage of a tour of duty and the following account was not untypical: 
“For me the first week I’m always really tired and like I always ache and stuff 
and then after that I’m alright” Fourth Engineer, ship 2. 
This is akin to Wadsworth et al.’s (2006) observations in which seafarers were found 
to become increasingly fatigued over their first week onboard before reaching a 
ceiling and remaining at this level of fatigue for the remainder of the tour of duty. 
Moreover, whilst some of the seafarers stated that their working routine remained 
consistent throughout their tour of duty, others reported that their routine altered 
monthly. The altering of seafarers’ working routine is a concern as in a study of 
offshore oil installation workers Parkes (2007) revealed that individuals were at an 
increased risk of personal injury when switching shift patterns during a tour of duty. 
Despite this increase in risk, altering their shift patterns during a tour of duty was 
preferred by offshore oil installation workers (Parkes 2007). Similarly, throughout the 
interviews it became apparent that there were several reasons why some seafarers 
preferred to change their working routine during a tour of duty and many of these 
were dependent upon the individual seafarer’s personal preferences as well as the 
vessel’s trading pattern.  
Although some individuals altered their working routine at various points throughout a 
tour of duty, the adjustment at the start of a tour of duty was considered by the 
seafarers to be the most substantial. When joining a ship the seafarers transitioned 
from an extended period at home to a demanding physical and psychosocial 
environment. This led a Second Engineer to describe being onboard a ship as a 
situation requiring more mental and physical strength. As he put it: 
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“At the beginning of your trip the first few days you’re just wandering around 
scratching your head. I was saying to [seafarer’s name] actually when he 
joined he was trying to undo a bolt and he was just messing around with it and 
I was like just give it here and he was yeah sorry and he was saying he forgets 
you need ship’s strength. It means that when you go home you go a bit soft 
and you forget how hard things have to be beasted whereas so in the first few 
days I’d say you’re a bit soft and then you get into it” Second Engineer, ship 2. 
The transition into life onboard required the seafarers to subscribe to the rules and 
regulations of the vessel – regardless of how they carry out similar tasks whilst at 
home. The following example provides a strong illustration: 
“The start of the trip … its getting yourself into work mode whereas you might 
do something at home – I’ll give you a prime example, going up a ladder to put 
lights up at Christmas, whereas at home you’ll just get the ladder out, get the 
lights up and get down again – when you get back onboard here, you’ve got to 
start thinking about safety harnesses, are the ladders in date, about this, about 
that, you’ve got to switch back into your safety mode as such” Bosun, ship 1. 
The notion that seafarers’ transition from home mode to work mode is important – 
particularly as seafarers perceived that the switch was not instant and a period of time 
to readjust is required. The Bosun again explained: 
“You’re just getting back into it, you’ve had 5 weeks off of possibly doing 
nothing, playing golf, getting drunk and then you’re back to no alcohol, no free 
time as such and that’s it so you’re well, I would liken it to prison but it’s not, 
you’ve gone from being able to do anything you want to this is what you’ve got 
to do so yeah probably say 3 or 4 days to a week to sort of get into it” Bosun, 
ship 1. 
Perhaps due to the accepted notion that the switch from home mode to work mode 
was not instant, it was notable that some of the seafarers interviewed reported 
utilising unofficial working routines in order to ease the burden on new joining 
seafarers. For example, when asked about procedures regarding new joining 
members of the engine department, a Chief Engineer explained:  
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“If you have bad luck when you join the ship you can be on duty but unofficially 
we do this that this one who’s joining he’s never on duty so let’s say the 
Second [Engineer] will take his first night yeah, or let’s say on this night I was 
not on duty because it was the duty of the Second Engineer but we had a crew 
change and they just arrived in the evening so I said, well this has become 
normal practice, take a rest, I will take the duty until 0800” Chief Engineer, ship 
3.  
Thus, it emerged that instead of the official procedure regarding on call engineering 
officers – as detailed in chapter 4.1.2 – which required individuals to take turns to be 
on call during periods when the engine room was unattended an unofficial system, 
which was considered normal practice, was in place. 
New joining seafarers from other work departments faced similar issues and during 
an interview a Chief Officer commented that: 
“The Captain used to plan that quite good so sometimes if I join the ship direct 
then I can sleep to the morning or something so he will arrange that, so far he 
have handled it really good, if I have been awake from early morning because 
of the flight and I arrive in the evening then more or less he would have started 
up everything and I can rest and start in the morning” Chief Officer, ship 4. 
The importance of such unofficial procedures is made even more evident when 
remembering that the transition to life onboard must occur alongside carrying out 
work duties in a safety critical environment. As a Chief Engineer put it: 
 “[It’s] full ahead from day one” Chief Engineer, ship 4. 
Undoubtedly, some of these work duties which must be carried out regardless of 
when an individual joined the ship carry immense responsibility and – particularly for 
senior officers – not being ready for such responsibility was simply not an option. 
From these comments it is apparent that for the participants the need to transition and 
adjust to life onboard is a process which requires the understanding and cooperation 
of those seafarers already onboard. If such cooperation is not forthcoming the safety 
and well-being of seafarers is likely to be negatively affected. 
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6.2 The end of a tour of duty 
When considering the health, safety and well-being experiences of seafarers in 
relation to the organisation of work at sea the end of tour of duty is a particularly 
important period of time as, just like the start of a tour, the end of a tour is also a 
period in which seafarers’ change, transition and adjust. During the interviews it was 
apparent that throughout a tour of duty the seafarers were thinking of home and the 
family and friends awaiting their return. Towards the end of a tour of duty many 
seafarers eagerly anticipated the day they would leave the vessel and return home to 
the life they had, in effect, left ‘on hold’. 
6.2.1 Time preceding the end of a tour of duty 
Just like the time preceding the start of a tour of duty it is also important to consider 
seafarers use of time immediately preceding the end of a tour of duty. Whilst 
seafarers must work every day they are at sea – regardless of how close they are to 
the end of their tour of duty – the accounts of some seafarers suggested that there 
was a change in the nature of the work undertaken at a late stage of a deployment. 
As one Chief Engineer explained: 
“Towards the end I’m doing more paperwork, trying to catch up with stuff rather 
than physical stuff in the engine room. I’m down in the engine room walking 
around looking at things, towards the end I ease off a wee bit as far as the 
physical works concerned….my last week of my trip is a quieter time for me 
but it’s still work but its different work for me” Chief Engineer, ship 2. 
The increase in paperwork and decrease in manual work experienced by seafarers 
towards the end of a tour of duty was particularly apparent among officers. Whilst this 
may be the result of officers’ autonomy in terms of controlling work routines what 
emerges on careful consideration of the data is that officers likely felt obliged to catch 
up on paperwork prior to leaving the vessel. Consequently, this change in working 
practices may simply be the result of different requirements for officers, for example, 
compiling handover documents at the end of a tour.18  
                                            
18 Unlike officers, ratings are generally not responsible for any paperwork or records and do not write 
handover notes. 
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During the interviews it was suggested this change in working practices may also be 
due to the fact that the initial energy and enthusiasm to solve problems and make 
improvements wanes as time onboard progresses. One Chief Officer explained: 
“[When I] come onboard I have a lot of energy I have been at home for long 
time you know then you start up different kind of maintenance work, solve 
problems. In the end you put everything on paper” Chief Officer, ship 4. 
Moreover, seafarers reported that the intensity of work differed towards the end of a 
tour of duty. For some seafarers, this difference was a reduction in work undertaken – 
in comparison to other periods of time within a tour of duty, as one First Officer 
explained: 
“I did everything ahead, looking ahead to be prepared to not leave too much 
work on my last days, to get proper rest before home” First Officer, ship 1. 
Conversely for others the time preceding the end of a tour of duty was a period in 
which they worked harder than usual, as the following account illustrates: 
“[I] try to clear off everything I’ve postponed for the last 6 weeks. More and 
more work at the end, last week is horrible, then you read your handover notes 
from the previous guy and oh shit I didn’t do that, oh that I forgot, oh shit, oh 
my god yeah and then you have to settle your account, clear out what you 
have started and so on so there’s always more to do at the end. The closer you 
get to signing off, the more you have to do, the more you have to wrap up and 
so on” Chief Engineer, ship 4. 
Similarly, another seafarer explained that: 
“[The] last few days I’m normally busy trying to tie every job up if you know 
what I mean, last 2 weeks I’m trying to make everything, I’m writing my 
handover notes and making sure all the jobs are finished so if anything the last 
2 weeks I do more work to make sure everything’s finished” Fourth Engineer, 
ship 2. 
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As previously stated, whilst officers reported a change in working practices towards 
the end of a deployment and ratings did not, the same findings emerged with regards 
to work intensity. For example, when asked about his own working practices and work 
intensity in relation to temporal factors, one rating responded:  
“For me it doesn’t matter if it’s the first, second or third week cos the same job. 
We know what we have to do” AB 2, ship 1. 
The accounts of officers, however, suggested that they perceived a difference in the 
work intensity of ratings as they were approaching the end of their tours of duty. One 
Chief Engineer explained: 
“You see in the way they [the ratings] work, it’s more slowly and more slowly, 
you can see that. They get more and more tired. You can see if you go down in 
the crew day room 8 o’clock in the evening is usually empty because they’re all 
gone to sleep. The longer they’ve been onboard the more time they spend in 
their cabin” Chief Engineer, ship 4. 
Similarly, a Chief Officer stated: 
“They don’t violate the rest hour or something but it’s a big difference from 
when they come onboard of course” Chief Officer, ship 4. 
The Chief Engineer perceived the ratings’ work intensity to decrease as they 
approached the end of their tour of duty as a result of cumulative fatigue and there is 
a tacit understanding of the same in the comment made by the Chief Officer. The 
Chief Officer went on to explain how he perceived this cumulative fatigue related to 
risk in terms of both personal safety and well-being: 
“The longer you stay onboard of course the risk will increase, you will get 
tireder and tireder. Normally work 60 hours a week, mixed night a day time it’s 
a lot, sometimes 70 hours a week and then you work day and night time that’s 
quite much in my opinion if you work day and night mixed you should not work 
more than 60 hours a week and in this busy trading area I think 4 or 5 weeks 
then it’s going down. The last week you are a little bit tired you get rested and 
you don’t violate your rest hours but it’s about to keep the ambition up and 
everything” Chief Officer, ship 4. 
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The idea that prolonged working routines can cause an increase in risk with regards 
to occupational safety has been identified by others in relation to consecutive shift 
patterns for night-shift workers (see for example Folkard 2000). 
Among the seafarers a perceived increase in risk in terms of safety towards the end 
of a deployment was not untypical: 
“Probably the when you look for the statistic probably the likelihood will 
increase close to the end of the contract” First Officer, ship 1. 
Moreover, the accounts of some seafarers suggested that this perception of an 
increase in risk to both well-being and safety was – as well as the result of cumulative 
fatigue – also a consequence of individuals experiencing the ‘channels19’. As one 
Captain explained: 
“You have to be careful when they [ratings] start to get in the end of 6 months, 
then they are already home some of them in the head. I mean when they are in 
the end of the contract they are maybe not so concentrated anymore because 
they are their mind they’re thinking about home all the time, planning 
everything so when crew are in the last part of the contract supervisors have to 
be little bit aware of that situation” Captain, ship 4.  
Similarly, another Captain suggested that he was able to notice when seafarers were 
experiencing this mind-set as they neared the end of their tours of duty: 
“You can tell when people have the channels but I don’t consider it hugely 
necessary to be supervising them more because I don’t think that it makes a 
huge amount of difference again in their attitude to safety. I’m sure it has some 
effect but not enough to worry me” Captain, ship 2. 
Seafarers’ experiences regarding the end of a tour of duty also included uncertainty 
and frustration due to not knowing the date when they would leave the ship. One 
Chief Engineer illustrated the effect this uncertainty has on individuals: 
  
                                            
19 The ‘channels’ – as explained in chapter 2.2.3 is a phrase used among British seafarers to describe 
the time period at the end of a tour. The name refers to the fact that historically British seafarers left the 
ship when the vessel returned to the UK and as such sailing in the Dover channel signalled the 
impending end of a tour. 
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“They will go to the captain ‘any news on my reliever?’ ‘ah no not yet’. Then 
they’ll start thinking about that, sometimes they, I can see they’re standing on 
deck watch, they’ve been onboard for 5 months, he’s just standing on the 
manifold and staring at something, dreaming of his home in Manila or 
something” Chief Engineer, ship 4. 
Likewise, when asked about when he would be going home one Deck Cadet 
responded: 
“Another month I think, fingers crossed mid-December I’m signing off” Deck 
Cadet 2, ship 2. 
The Deck Cadet went on to explain how he had estimated when he would be leaving 
the ship: 
“We're meant to be, I think Gibraltar for bunkers is meant to be about the 14th 
16th December and that’s when they're going to be doing a big crew change 
so I’m just going to say that they don’t need me on so I’m just going to go with 
that one so that’s not too bad” Deck Cadet 2, ship 2. 
As an individual who was not required onboard as part of safe manning regulations 
the Deck Cadet felt he had a good chance of leaving the ship during a pre-planned 
crew change. Whilst some seafarers considered such uncertainty as ‘part of the job’ it 
raises an interesting issue with regards to seafarers’ perceptions of job control and 
the impact this has on their well-being. It could be argued that uncertainty regarding 
when they will leave the vessel is an example of a substantial lack of job control and 
viewed in light of Karasek’s (1979) findings it is unsurprising that such uncertainty 
was not perceived by all as ‘part of the job’ and for many seafarers it adversely 
impacted on their well-being. 
The uncertainty was further compounded by the issue that, like the notice seafarers 
received when joining a vessel as outlined in section 6.1.1, information regarding a 
seafarer leaving a vessel was often given at short notice. During one interview it 
emerged that the Chief Cook was expecting to go home imminently and when asked 
if he would be leaving in the next port he responded:  
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“No information, maybe yes, maybe no, maybe I’m coming home from 
Pembroke [tomorrow], change from Pembroke but I don’t know” Chief Cook, 
ship 3.  
Irrespective of when they received details regarding departing a vessel, a change in 
circumstances could result in a seafarer remaining onboard – regardless of the 
seafarer’s plans and expectations and during the interviews one First Officer 
remembered the last-minute postponement of his departure from a vessel: 
“I got the situation on the helideck with my bag on the back and my reliever 
haven’t been in there, in the chopper so I had to come back and spent 5 days 
longer on the vessel, to wait for my reliever and I couldn’t focus on the job, 
what I’m doing you know. I was thinking only about to go to home, I don’t care 
about the job, I didn’t care about my watch. Okay only my body been on the 
watch but I say I didn’t think clearly, of course you are trying to do it safely but 
this is quite dangerous” First Officer, ship 1. 
It is easy to see why in these circumstances the First Officer had lost interest in his 
work. Having worked every day for a prolonged period he had packed his suitcase 
and then had to watch a helicopter depart that he had fully expected to be on. Another 
seafarer put it succinctly when – during an informal conversation at dinner – he 
referred to a similar experience as the ‘postponement of Christmas’.  
From such comments it is apparent that the uncertainty regarding leaving a vessel 
caused considerable amounts of frustration and dissatisfaction amongst seafarers 
and the unsettling effect of such uncertainty adversely affected their well-being. 
Worryingly, such uncertainty and the postponing of leaving a vessel was seen to be 
commonplace and the following section presents findings regarding the experiences 
of seafarers who remained onboard for longer than expected. 
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6.2.2 Tour of duty extensions 
First, it is important to note that not all tour extensions were viewed negatively. For 
some seafarers, particularly those from less economically developed countries who 
were employed on an ad hoc basis – as explained in chapter 4.1.2 – the opportunity 
to remain onboard a vessel was welcomed. Whilst they may not have relished staying 
onboard for longer than originally anticipated, for such seafarers the prospect of the 
additional salary earned by working a tour extension is too good to turn down. As one 
Chief Engineer explained: 
“Some people don’t want to go home, they come when they have 4 months left 
of the contract they come and they say ‘extension’. They want to extend 1 to 2 
months or something” Chief Engineer, ship 4. 
Clearly, these requested tour extensions are very different to mandatory tour 
extensions and in this section tour extensions will be considered to be events in which 
seafarers were mandatorily required to remain onboard longer than they had 
expected and there are a number of reasons why such circumstances may arise.  
As outlined in chapter 2.2.3, if a vessel is deep sea it may be several weeks before a 
port is reached where a seafarer can disembark. In some circumstances the port 
might not be suitable for a seafarer to travel home from. This might be because the 
port is in an area which lacks infrastructure or it may be in a country which is deemed 
unsafe. In some countries the debarkation of seafarers is not permitted and in others 
a seafarer may require a visa which they may be unable to obtain. The accounts of 
the seafarers suggested that in situations such as these – whereby the circumstances 
were beyond the control of the shipping company – remaining onboard a vessel for 
longer than expected was ‘part of the job’. As one Third Officer explained: 
“Most of the time you’re over but you can’t blame it on the company because 
you know like this Ukraine Russia [war in Crimea peninsula] thing that was 
beyond their control and there’s other things like to do with the trading route of 
the ship you know if you’ve got a 3 week voyage out somewhere obviously if 
you’ve only got 1 week left you’re going to be 2 weeks late, you’re not going to 
be relieved on time” Third Officer, ship 2. 
  
165 
 
However, the experiences of seafarers suggested that mandatory tour extensions 
were often used by shipping companies as a cost saving measure. Seafarers 
conveyed a strong message that – particularly in circumstances which could have 
been controlled by the shipping company – mandatory tour extensions were a great 
source of frustration and annoyance and something which negatively affected their 
well-being. One AB stated: 
“I think getting relieved on time is very very important, I think it’s probably the 
top thing. That’s what really cheeses people off when they’re not being 
relieved on time and you’re in the vicinity, say in the Med or round Europe you 
know where they’ve got the time and the chance to do it, it’s still really really 
poor” AB 2, ship 2. 
In some instances, seafarers worked mandatory tour extensions simply because the 
shipping company had not provided a relief on time. As one Chief Engineer 
explained: 
“The Manila office where the Filipino crew are not the fastest processors in the 
world so sometimes it take time for them to process the new crew members 
from out there, then they’re delayed and they have to stay 2 weeks more or 1 
week more and so on” Chief Engineer, ship 4. 
In a study of the global seafaring labour market Leong (2012) suggested that shipping 
companies extended seafarers tours of duty to overcome labour shortages. 
Moreover, mandatory tour extensions also serve to reduce costs for those who 
employ seafarers. On one of the ships discussed here, the shipping company had 
recently implemented a policy which limited the number of crew changes which 
occurred each month. This policy resulted in joining and leaving the vessel in groups 
rather than individually and thereby costs – such as agents’ fees – were reduced. 
Consequently, the leaving of a seafarer who was scheduled to leave the vessel was 
postponed until a number of others onboard were also scheduled to leave the vessel 
– thereby resulting in a group debarkation being undertaken. This policy was seen to 
be particularly unpopular and one Chief Engineer explained how – in practice – he 
paid little attention to the policy.  
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“We have a policy from [company name] that we’re only allowed to make 2 
crew changes per month but they are coming to [realise] that it doesn’t work. 
Yeah they’re trying to relax it, officially they say we don’t relax anything but 
unofficially okay they try to relax a little bit as long as they are so cost focused 
that’s the only thing they’re bothered about” Chief Engineer, ship 4. 
Thus, the nuances in the responses from the seafarers indicate that they perceived 
those who controlled their labour to view them as a commodity. The shipping 
company was viewed as being interested only in operating the vessel as cheaply as 
possible with little – if any – regard for the well-being of the seafarers. A First Officer 
put it succinctly when he stated: 
“They [the shipping company] don’t care they need only the head to cover the 
position, that’s all it not depends if I’m here and I work for almost one and a half 
years in here or someone new will come and cover the position, they don’t 
care” First Officer, ship 1. 
Whilst to the seafarer this expected date to leave the vessel became a fixed focal 
point – to the shipping company it was merely a guideline. During the analysis of the 
quantitative data it emerged that mandatory tour extensions were considered 
differently by the three shipping companies. For example, the tanker company – 
whose injury dataset was analysed in chapter five – considered a seafarer to be ‘over 
tour’ only once the expected end of tour date was exceeded by more than one month. 
Similarly, the offshore vessels injury dataset – again, which was analysed in chapter 
five – was as follows: 
•  “[Over tour] payment would be triggered once a relief had been 
delayed by more than 4 days over the normal tour rotation which is: - 
North Sea 35 days 
• Counting of days will commence from the hour/date signed on vessel’s 
agreement. 
• Once 4 days are exceeded the person’s leave rate will be increased to 
1.5 days per day backdated to the original relief date. 
• This payment would not be triggered if the delay in the relief is due to 
any of the following circumstances: 
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1. Prior previous personal arrangements 
2. Periods outside vessel’s normal operations i.e. transit 
voyages and refit periods. 
• Assuming the delay is not excessive i.e. more than 14 days the staff 
member will be expected to re-join on their normal crew change day.” 
This policy provides several details which are important to highlight. First – in the 
eyes of the shipping company – a seafarer is not considered to be over-tour unless 
they have been delayed by more than four days, a time period which is greater than 
ten percent of their expected tour of duty duration.  
Second, periods of time not considered to be part of normal vessel operations are not 
recognised as over-tour. Consequently, seafarers who must remain onboard, for 
example when the vessel sails from one oil field to another, may not go home on the 
date they expected yet in the shipping company’s eyes they are not over-tour.  
Finally – and perhaps most worryingly – only delays in excess of two weeks will alter 
the date on which the seafarer is required to re-join the vessel. For example, if a 
seafarer with a thirty-five-day tour of duty remained onboard for forty-eight days, 
instead of thirty-five days leave they would receive only twenty-two days. This 
scenario would result in a two weeks’ reduction in the time the seafarer spent at home 
resting and recovering from the intense period of work they had undertaken – as well 
as substantially decreasing the time they were able to spend with their family and 
friends. 
Throughout this chapter – and chapter four – findings regarding the adverse impact a 
lack of job control has on the well-being of seafarers have been presented and 
mandatory tour extensions are yet another example of seafarers’ lack of job control 
which was seen to negatively affect well-being outcomes. For example, as one 
Second Engineer stated: 
“I think some of the boys do get a bit shanghaied, the crew all the time they are 
doing longer trips. If you can get any of them to speak to you you'll find out, but 
they're all miserable as fuck because of it” Second Engineer, ship 2. 
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The impact of mandatory tour extensions on a seafarer’s morale has been identified 
by others and in her book George (2013, p.6) stated: “The grump is Igor, second 
officer, deck, and misery is his default setting because he had been meant to go 
home weeks earlier so exudes his frustration in his face”.  
From the accounts of seafarers it was also apparent that the impact upon a seafarer’s 
morale adversely affected the individual whose responsibility it was to inform the 
seafarer that they must remain onboard for longer than they expected. As one Admin 
Officer explained: 
“The people expecting to go home after a few days but then there’s no 
back-to-back or they cannot go home then they’re going to get mad. Of course 
they get furious ‘I got holidays booked’ and blah blah blah, but what can we 
do?” Admin Officer, ship 1. 
Whilst this study has not included the experiences of the families and friends awaiting 
the seafarer’s arrival home, the accounts of seafarers suggested that such individuals 
were also negatively affected in instances when a seafarer was required to remain 
onboard. One Third Officer remembered that: 
“There was another guy on there, Second Mate, his wife was going to give 
birth or whatever, I mean he was saying ‘I want to go home, my wife’s about to 
give birth’ and what not and he missed the birth and he was pissed off about 
that” Third Officer, ship 2. 
The negative impact upon a seafarer’s family in such circumstances was perceived to 
place further burden on the seafarer, as one Storekeeper explained: 
“My kids are grown up, my wife is home and she has no problem to be alone 
she said she like to be alone sometimes so that’s not a problem but I can see 
the young people here they are crazy if they have to stay 2 days extra because 
wives start and they have small kids and they’re expecting them home” 
Storekeeper, ship 1. 
The mandatory tour extensions experienced by seafarers were also perceived to 
adversely impact upon safety. As one Chief Engineer stated: 
169 
 
“I would say if you felt that your time was dragging, say for example, well the 
crew for example they have a 3-month trip and then sometimes they can't get a 
relief for another month, then that’s a bit much you know that’s a quarter of 
your trip again. If they were asking me after my 10 weeks to do an extra month 
I wouldn’t be happy about it, I can see the point of them kind of pulling back on 
the throttle a little where work and stuff like that is concerned maybe for them 
there might be a bit of carelessness comes in, or apathy if you like about 
having to do some extra time that they didn’t plan on doing you know I would 
say that there’s a possibility there [of increased risk]” Chief Engineer, ship 2. 
A perceived increase in risk to safety during mandatory tour extensions has been 
identified by others. A Captain cited in Knudsen (2009, p.300) stated: “If I have an 
able seaman whose wife is about to divorce; if he has just recovered from a flu, or 
maybe he has been aboard one month longer than he should, then you can feel he is 
tired; and it may be more dangerous than if he was well”. 
Similarly, one Second Officer remembered an incident which occurred whilst she was 
undertaking a mandatory tour extension. She explained: 
“Instead of printing out information regarding river Tyne, I have printed out 
information regarding river Tees. I have noticed that the VHF channels which 
we were supposed to use on approach and which I listed on the passage plan 
did not coincide with the VHF channels given in Volume 6. I assumed I have 
got the channels wrong in the first instance and corrected them. I did not 
realise that at that point I was using pages regarding river Tees. A few days 
after the Captain took the printed pages from the ALRS publication and used 
them to get the phone number to book the pilots. He called the port authorities 
but they advised him that the berth he is trying to get to does not exist on the 
river Tees and that also his agent never been in touch with Port Authorities. 
The Captain then realised then that the information given on the printed pages 
were for River Tees. At the time when I made the mistake I must have spent 
onboard more than 5 weeks. I was feeling tired and ready to go home. I was 
finding it difficult to concentrate and the fact that I was unsure of when exactly I 
will be signing off was making me very anxious” Second Officer, ship 1. 
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From these comments it is apparent that mandatory tour extensions were perceived 
to negatively impact on occupational safety outcomes as well as seafarers’ 
well-being. It is important to note, however, that there is no heuristic available to 
translate, for example a seafarer staying an extra month more than expected 
onboard, into an occupational safety consequence.  
The perceived increase in risk in terms of both safety and well-being appeared to be a 
consequence of the seafarer remaining onboard for longer than expected – rather 
than because the duration of the tour of duty was greater. As one First Officer 
explained:  
“When you came and you know you need to do 6 weeks it’s you know you 
prepare yourself looking for the calendar that okay end of the month you will be 
at home yeah but other things you are coming and middle of the month you will 
be at home and then someone is telling you you need to stay longer. Then you 
are not thinking about the job you are thinking only to finish your trip and not 
that the job needs to be done. Of course you are doing everything but the way 
of the thinking has changed rapidly” First Officer, ship 1. 
It also emerged that remaining onboard for longer than expected resulted in the 
individual being unable to pace their work effort. The effect of work effort pacing has 
been identified by others (see for example Duchon et al. 1997) in relation to 
moderation of work efforts across extended work shifts. Duchon et al. (1997) 
suggested that individuals are able to offset the impact of additional fatigue resulting 
from extended work shifts by pacing their work effort across the expected shift length. 
Such work effort pacing is not possible for seafarers who do not know how long their 
tour of duty, and therefore their work effort, will last. 
Finally, when considering these findings regarding mandatory tour extensions it 
should be noted that during the interviews it emerged that many seafarers considered 
talking about their experiences regarding mandatory tour extensions as speaking 
negatively of the shipping company. Consequently, among ratings there was much 
reluctance in saying that they had remained onboard for longer than they expected 
and when an inquiry was made as to why the officers onboard one of the ships visited 
had not always gone home on time but the ratings said they had, the Chief Engineer 
replied: 
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“I never heard about a rating coming home on time. When you interview them 
they will say yes of course, they will be shit scared” Chief Engineer, ship 4. 
This finding likely relates to the issue that the ratings were precariously employed (as 
seen in chapter 4.1.1) and consequently were reluctant to express any opinions 
which they perceived might jeopardise their ability to secure future employment. It is 
also worth remembering that these findings represent the better end of the seafaring 
industry and it is possible that the prevalence of mandatory tour extensions is even 
greater among other shipping companies. 
6.3 Summary 
The findings presented in this chapter indicate how both the early and late stages of a 
tour of duty were experienced by seafarers. In doing so this chapter identifies a 
number of factors – such as mandatory tour extensions – as being related to job 
control and variations in power held by seafarers in different work and employment 
situations, as well as variations in the balance of power held by seafarers and the 
companies employing them. Importantly, those with more power were seen to be able 
to mitigate some of the adverse features of the organisation of work and employment 
at sea.  
At the beginning of a tour of duty seafarers commenced working immediately upon 
joining the vessel, regardless of the time they spent travelling to the vessel and 
irrespective of whether they were experiencing jet lag. Findings regarding rest upon 
joining a vessel corroborate those of Wadsworth et al. (2008) in which 66% of 
questionnaire respondents reported that they did not have the opportunity to sleep 
between travelling to a ship and beginning work onboard. Viewed in light of findings 
which indicate that many seafarers were unfamiliar with the vessel, their colleagues, 
or even both, the start of a tour of duty is a particular concern in terms of health, 
safety and well-being outcomes. Unsurprisingly, the seafarers themselves perceived 
an increase in risk – particularly in terms of personal safety – at the start of a 
deployment. The study, however, found that as they were unable to delay 
commencing work when joining a vessel some of the seafarers who experienced 
more power had devised various informal and unofficial procedures to try and 
alleviate the problems experienced as a result of these employment and work 
organisational practices of the companies employing them.  
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When exploring the end stages of a tour of duty the findings in this chapter also 
indicated that some seafarers – particularly officers – altered their working practices 
at a late stage of a tour of duty. In particular, changes from manual work to 
paperwork, as well as differences in work intensity were reported and such findings 
indicate that some seafarers experienced a degree of job control. Given that 
paperwork is inherently safer than manual work, this finding may also help to explain 
why the analysis of the shipping companies’ injury data in chapter five revealed that 
among seafarers onboard offshore vessels the last week of a five-week tour was the 
safest.  
Some seafarers, however, especially those lower in the onboard hierarchy, 
experienced less control and had little – if any – scope to alter their working practices. 
Thus the overarching findings indicate that the degree to which seafarers perceived 
they could control where, when and how they worked varied substantially with both 
employment arrangements and rank. These variations impacted on seafarers’ 
well-being outcomes and those seafarers who experienced more power and job 
control – such as those senior officers who were permanently employed – 
experienced greater levels of well-being.  
In the following discussion chapter the findings identified in this and the previous two 
chapters will be developed further.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN: DISCUSSION 
7.0 Introduction 
This chapter discusses key findings of the research that were presented in previous 
chapters and examines their contribution to addressing the research questions posed 
in the study. It therefore presents a sociological understanding of particular aspects of 
the effects of the organisation and relations of work and employment experienced by 
seafarers and shows how they impact upon the health, safety and well-being of 
individuals working at sea. To achieve this, the chapter is arranged into five main 
themes.  
The first section of this chapter discusses the exploitation of the seafaring labour 
force. One of the ways in which the seafarers in this study were exploited was through 
the use of precarious employment methods and such methods are intrinsic to the 
ways in which employment at sea is organised. The organising of employment in this 
way served to increase seafarers’ vulnerability – for example, with seafarers joining 
vessels irrespective of the rest and restoration period they had experienced 
beforehand, which previous chapters argued had implications for their health, safety 
and well-being. 
In the second section the heterogeneity of the seafaring labour force is discussed. In 
chapter five it was seen that – in terms of the recording of occupational injuries – the 
three shipping companies treated seafarers as a homogenous labour force. It was 
apparent from the analysis in chapters four and six however, that some seafarers had 
more power to protect themselves from some of the adverse features of the 
organisation of work at sea than others, and that this had very significant implications 
for their occupational health, safety and wellbeing.  
Relatedly, the third section considers seafarers’ control over deployment scheduling. 
In doing so it identifies a further aspect of the organisation of work and employment at 
sea which was revealed to result in substantial variations in power – and ensuing 
inequalities – among the seafaring labour force.  
  
174 
 
The theme of job control continues in the fourth section, where issues regarding 
seafarers’ job control whilst at sea are discussed. Job control was revealed to be an 
important aspect of the organisation of work at sea, not least because seafarers live 
as well as work in the workplace and consequently can be called upon at any time to 
under-take work. Levels of job control were found to vary considerably among with 
seafarers’ work and employment situations, and substantial inequalities were 
apparent among the seafaring labour force. Such inequalities are important when 
exploring the impact that the organisation of work and employment at sea has on the 
health, safety and well-being of seafarers, as those who were afforded greater levels 
of power were found to be able to mitigate some of the adverse features of the 
organisation of work and employment at sea. 
In the final section the flexibility of the seafaring labour force is discussed. During the 
analysis it was apparent that the organisation of employment at sea resulted in a 
flexible labour force with some seafarers being deployed on unfamiliar ships and 
even on unfamiliar types of ships. Again, the organising of the seafaring labour force 
in this way was seen to impact on the health, safety and well-being of those who work 
at sea. 
In discussing the health, safety and well-being consequences of features of the 
organisation of work and employment at sea, this chapter also shows how they are 
manifestations of underlying issues of labour market power in a deregulated global 
industry. Such deregulation – combined with the relatively limited influence of trade 
unions – has substantially weakened the position of labour in the seafaring industry. 
Exploring seafarers’ health, safety and well-being in relation to the organisation of 
work and employment at sea, this chapter helps to provide a better understanding of 
the lived consequences of these features of employment in a global industry. 
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7.1 Exploitation of the seafaring labour force 
There were a number of underlying issues regarding the organisation of work and 
employment at sea which appear to relate to the exploitation of the seafaring labour 
force, which emerged in the qualitative findings. For example, throughout the analysis 
issues surrounding the use of precarious employment practices and the associated 
vulnerability of seafarers who were precariously employed were identified. Research 
(see for example Quinlan 1999) has shown that such employment practices have 
implications for workers’ health, safety and well-being. Thus, precarious employment 
and the vulnerability of seafarers are the themes that begin the discussion in this 
section. The section goes on to consider fatigue as a consequence of the exploitation 
of labour in the seafaring industry. 
7.1.1 Precarious employment 
The employment of many seafarers falls within the definition of precarious 
employment, as presented in the review of the literature in chapter one, and 
categorised by: “the limited duration of the contract (fixed-term, short-term, 
temporary, seasonal, day-labour and casual labour) and the nature of the 
employment relationship (triangular and disguised employment relationships, bogus 
self-employment, subcontracting and agency contracts) (ILO 2011[online]).” These 
working arrangements are often characterised by four working conditions: “low wage, 
poor protection from termination of employment, lack of access to social protection 
and benefits usually associated with full-time standard employment and lack of or 
limited access of workers to exercise their rights at work” (ILO 2011 [online]). 
The findings from this study showed the majority of the seafarers were employed on 
single voyage contracts and, in recent years, research has consistently shown 
seafarers to be predominantly precariously employed in this way (see for example 
Kahveci and Nichols 2006). 
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The prevalence of precarious employment has been shown – by studies in a number 
of shore-based industries – to adversely impact on the health, safety and well-being 
of workers. Quinlan (1999) suggested that precarious employment exacerbates 
disorganisation in the workplace and as a consequence workers are subjected to 
market forces that are unfiltered and occupational health and safety issues are 
subordinated to these. He showed through a review of previous studies that changes 
in the employment structure from permanent employment to various forms of 
precarious employment resulted in individuals experiencing uncertainty regarding 
their future employment. Thus, in such conditions whereby individuals prioritise ways 
to secure future employment, their working conditions are likely to deteriorate.  
Precarious employment adversely impacted on the health, safety and well-being of 
seafarers in this study in a number of ways. First, shipping companies operate with 
very little involvement or commitment towards any particular group of seafarers – as 
from a regulatory perspective a shipping company simply needs to ensure the correct 
number of seafarers with the correct certification is onboard. Therefore, as Walters 
and Bailey (2013, p.92) state: “the need to ensure the supply of the required number 
of certificated individuals can conveniently be outsourced to a third party.” This has 
taken place on an enormous scale in the seafaring industry, especially since the 
flagging out of vessels. Its effects on the social relations of work at sea are extensive 
and really have no comparable parallels in land-based industry — but, as far as can 
be judged from the (almost entirely land-based) literature on precarious work, the 
precarity of employment for seafarers that results from this mimics many of the 
negative effects discussed in the land-based literature. For example, chapter 4.1.2 
showed seafarers were routinely deployed by manning agencies to different shipping 
companies and different types of vessels. Implications of the resulting specific 
workplace unfamiliarity in relation to health, safety and well-being will be discussed in 
section 7.5.1 of this chapter. It also emerged that those seafarers who were 
precariously employed experienced earnings uncertainty and, as will become clear as 
this chapter progresses, for many seafarers earnings uncertainty resulted in less than 
ideal employment being accepted.  
177 
 
Moreover, in their land-based study, Lewchuk et al. (2003) considered earnings 
uncertainty, such as that experienced by the seafarers in this study, as one 
component of employment strain. The employment strain model – as presented in 
chapter one – suggests that workers engaged in precarious employment face risks 
that are a product of the insecurity of their employment (Lewchuk et al. 2003). Thus, 
employment strain captures a dimension of an individual’s work experience that is 
independent from their experience with any one workplace.  
Furthermore, literature regarding shore-based workers who are precariously 
employed and are engaged in work at multiple workplaces (see for example 
Fitzpatrick and Neis 2015) has revealed that these workers experience a number of 
work-related health, safety and well-being issues which are associated with working 
in transient and multiple workplaces. This has salience in relation to seafarers who – 
as will be discussed further in section 7.5.1 – tend to be deployed to different vessels 
for subsequent tours of duty, and thus experience multiple workplaces. 
7.1.2 Seafarers vulnerability 
One particularly interesting way in which precarious employment – and the ensuing 
earnings uncertainty – was seen in this study to adversely impact on seafarers was 
that seafarers joined vessels irrespective of the rest and restoration period they had 
experienced beforehand. One seafarer interviewed had spent at least ten months, out 
of the preceding twelve months, at sea. This study likely accessed the better end of 
the seafaring industry and consequently it is perhaps unsurprising that this scenario is 
by no means exclusive to the seafarers interviewed in this study. Walters and Bailey 
(2013, p. 95) stated: “it is also well recognised within the industry, that due to 
pressure from crewing agencies, after completing a nine-month contract, it is not 
uncommon for seafarers to return to work after just a month of leave, thus 
contributing to fatigue.” This pressure from crewing agencies is especially prevalent in 
new labour supply countries and in such countries where seafarers are acutely aware 
of the ease with which they can be blacklisted by manning agencies and denied 
future employment (Sampson 2013). It is particularly concerning that seafarers are 
not protected from these pressures. 
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To understand why this is so, it is necessary to consider the regulating capacity – and 
perhaps more significantly, the regulating appetite – of the seafaring industry. Prior to 
the 1980’s domestic seafaring labour markets were, in part, protected by national 
regulations. However, the widespread use of open registries in the 1980’s and 
onwards, deregulated these national seafaring labour markets, and this global 
deregulation resulted in ship owners acquiring considerable influence – influence that 
had previously been kerbed by national regulations. 
Such deregulation was the consequence of the widespread uptake of ship owners 
registering their tonnage to open registers. These open registers enabled ship owners 
to recruit from a global labour pool and as such internationally recruited seafarers 
from low-cost developing countries were recruited on single voyage contracts, with 
reduced wages and poor employment terms and conditions. The exploitation of 
labour in this manner is perhaps unsurprising given that the industry is particularly 
vulnerable to wide fluctuations in freight rates and with many of the operating costs 
fixed, a cost efficiency logic has been to seek ways in which to reduce labour costs. 
Moreover, a consequence of open registers – and the resulting lack of overlap 
between the ship registry, the nationalities of the owners and the seafarers working 
onboard – has been the weakening of the influence of trade unions. In the context of 
the physical separation brought about by open registers, national trade unions are 
inadequately equipped to defend their members’ interests (Kahveci and Nichols 
2006). Thus, as Bhattacharya and Tang (2013, p.64) state: “the local trade unions, 
which in theory could support the ‘local’ seafarers through collective bargaining with 
the ship-owners within the national jurisdiction, find it difficult to have a similar level of 
influence in an international setting.” Consequently, even if seafarers are members of 
national trade unions it is clear that these unions do not have the resources and 
capital to counter ship owners, least of all those trade unions from less economically 
developed countries. Thus the influence these local trade unions hold is inadequate 
in protecting seafarers from the pressures of ship operators and manning agencies. 
The implication of this is that the mechanisms to give seafarers a voice are 
inadequate. 
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Whilst some national governments – see for example the USA’s Merchant Marine Act 
(Jones 1921) – have sought to maintain protection of the domestic seafaring labour 
market, such national protectionist regulation is no longer commonplace and the 
number of seafarers who benefit from it is much reduced. Thus, without this 
regulation and the strong influence of trade unions, ship owners and operators have a 
free hand in the exploitation of labour. 
The impact national regulations can have on the protection of labour, in relation to the 
organisation of work, can be seen in other industries such as the UK offshore energy 
industry – whereby workers are protected from excessively long deployments and 
from returning to a workplace when they have not experienced a suitable restoration 
period by national regulations. These regulations require the durations of 
deployments and leave periods for workers on offshore UK North Sea installations to 
be recorded and a system flags up when a worker appears likely to exceed – in a 
given time period – the maximum permitted days offshore (Parkes 2010). If such 
protection – like that seen in the UK offshore industry – was in place the power of 
shipping companies and manning agencies to deploy seafarers who have not 
experienced an adequate rest and restoration period would be significantly curtailed. 
However, given the dearth of such regulations to protect labour in the seafaring 
industry and the weak influence of trade unions, it is unsurprising that the seafarers in 
this study were not protected from excessively long deployments or returning to a 
ship when they had not experienced a suitable restoration period. This problem is 
exacerbated by the fact that there is currently no way of measuring its extent given 
that the shipping companies who provided the injury data did not record details such 
as the duration of the seafarer’s leave period prior to joining the vessel. The worrying 
dearth in the information regarding features related to the organisation of work and 
employment at sea recorded by the shipping companies will be discussed as this 
chapter progresses. 
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7.1.3 Fatigue as a consequence of exploitation 
One of the consequences of a lack of protection was that seafarers frequently 
experienced fatigue and this fatigue was attributed to a number of features, some of 
which related to the organisation of work, such as insufficient rest hours – which, 
arguably, shipping companies could mitigate for – and others which related to the 
work environment, such as poor weather conditions – which were beyond the control 
of the shipping companies. It is unsurprising that fatigue which could be attributed to 
the work environment impacted on all individuals concurrently, however, it also 
emerged that fatigue which could be attributed to the organisation of work 
predominantly impacted on colleagues synchronously. For example, whilst the vessel 
was in port, many of the seafarers onboard increased their hours of work and were 
disturbed during their rest periods to carry out tasks such as mooring the vessel. 
Thus, during these time periods seafarers perceived that levels of fatigue were 
increased for most – if not all – individuals onboard. 
Cumulative fatigue, however, was perceived to effect individuals independently and 
was considered to be a particular risk as the length of time the seafarer was onboard 
for progressed. The idea that prolonged working routines can cause an increase in 
risk with regards to occupational safety has been identified by others in relation to 
consecutive shift patterns for night-shift workers (see for example Folkard 2000). 
The adverse effects of fatigue on health, safety and well-being are well known. For 
example, Carotenuto et al. (2012) stated that sleep of sufficient quality and duration is 
necessary for well-being. Moreover, the effect of fatigue on personal safety and 
operational safety is worrying – the MCA (2013) estimated that fatigue was a 
contributory factor in approximately one third of incidents at sea. The analysis seen in 
chapter 4.3.2 showed that the seafarers perceived fatigue – irrespective of the cause 
– to adversely impact on their health, safety and well-being. 
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Thus it is particularly concerning that the findings presented in chapter 6.2.2 showed 
that seafarers who were employed on single voyage contracts requested for their 
deployment to be extended – even when they were already scheduled to be onboard 
for a prolonged period of time. With their future employment uncertain some of the 
seafarers endeavoured to prolong their current temporary employment and the 
potential to earn a salary for an additional period of time was prioritised over leaving 
the vessel at the end of a scheduled deployment. Requests for tour extensions were 
made to the shipping company (via the Captain) and the shipping company approved 
the requests unless the Captain asked for the requests to be denied. Onboard ship 4 
the Chief Engineer stated that such requests for tour extensions were routine and 
they were – without exception – denied by the Captain due to concerns for the 
seafarers’ health, safety and well-being. Thus, whilst the ratings onboard ship 4 
prioritised employment it was left to the Captain onboard to protect these individuals 
from excessively long deployments – even at what is likely to be the better end of the 
industry. 
7.2 Heterogeneous labour force 
This issue suggests that there is another party who – given the absence of 
protectionist regulations (and arguably strong trade union influences) – has the power 
to protect seafarers from adverse features of work patterns, such as excessively long 
deployments. This party – the vessel’s Captain – holds significant amounts of power, 
which in this study, was seen to be used to protect the seafarers onboard. For 
example, as well as refusing requested tour extensions, Captains in this study 
reported taking measures such as refusing to sail from dry-dock or anchoring the 
vessel when they deemed the crew onboard to be particularly fatigued.  
This power, however, was held solely by the vessel’s Captain and the substantial 
variations in the power and control among those onboard was one of the most 
apparent themes, and it is a discussion on the heterogeneity of the seafaring labour 
force that begins this section. This section then discusses the unequal employment 
terms and conditions afforded to different seafarers and in doing so considers the 
implications of such inequality. 
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7.2.1 Inequality among seafarers  
To understand the power held by the Captain it is first necessary to consider that the 
seafaring industry is unusual in that there is a physical separation between the 
shore-based management and the shipboard workplace. Although the Captain is 
supervised by shore-based management, the Captain has the authority and 
responsibility to make decisions with respect to safety. Whilst in theory ships are 
bound by the laws of the states in which they are registered, such regulation is often 
of little consequence as the enforcement of some flag states is negligible. Moreover, 
even when safety standards are rigorously enforced the interference into the 
organisation of life onboard by flag states and shipping companies is minimal. Thus, 
the power held by ships’ Captains can be attributed to a number of features such as: 
the geographical location of vessels, a vacuum in regulations onboard and the 
hierarchical traditions of seafaring. 
Consequently, the control of the organisation of life onboard – and thus many 
features of the organisation of work – was largely left to the Captain, and there were 
numerous ways in which this was evident in this study. For example, the Captains 
onboard all of the vessels organised – in conjunction with shore-side personnel – 
when each seafarer would leave the vessel, an issue which will be discussed in 
greater detail in section 7.3.1. Sampson (2013) suggested that Captains could 
choose to do a great deal to control the organisation of life onboard, from 
encouraging social activities to altering the vessels course during poor weather so as 
to reduce motion and thus enable individuals to sleep. 
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In this study Captains – and other senior officers – reported holding power in a 
different capacity in relation to work patterns: they were predominantly permanently 
employed. Additionally, the small group of junior officers and ratings interviewed who 
came from Western Europe were also employed on permanent contracts and herein 
lies perhaps the most significant source of the diversity and inequality which emerged 
from the analysis. Seafarers from more economically developed countries were found 
to be far more likely to be engaged in permanent employment than those from less 
economically developed countries and this situation is by no means exclusive to the 
seafarers interviewed in this study. It was outlined in the review of the literature in 
chapter two that seafarers from more economically developed countries were 
significantly more likely to be able to access secure employment (Sampson 2013).  
The analysis of the shipping companies’ health and safety data presented in chapter 
five, however, contains no information regarding the employment terms and 
conditions of the injured seafarers. Such an omission is important as without such 
data it was not possible to compare incidents sustained by seafarers who were 
precariously employed with incidents sustained by seafarers who experienced 
permanent employment. The omission, however, was not surprising given that in 
shore-based studies injury data often fail to record key variables such as the manner 
in which the individual was employed (see for example Quinlan 1999). 
It is also of interest to know whether seafarers willingly choose to engage in 
precarious employment or if they simply have no option due to the lack of secure 
employment available. Literature (see for example Connelly and Gallagher 2004) 
argues that workers who voluntarily chose precarious employment contracts had less 
adverse perceptions and experiences than those who performed contingent work 
because they were unable to obtain permanent employment. This issue is of 
pertinence to the seafaring industry as seafarers from the Philippines, which is one of 
the largest sources of seafarers in the global labour market, are unable to secure 
permanent employment due to the terms of the POEA which – as explained in 
chapter one – prohibits Philippine nationals from obtaining permanent international 
employment.  
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Moreover, in many less economically developed countries the market rate of 
seafaring wages is much higher than the wages of alternative shore-side 
employment. For example, Lillie (2004) reported the average monthly wage for an 
industrial worker ashore in the Philippines to be $140. In comparison, the median 
monthly wage for a Filipino able seaman was found to be $1025 (Lillie 2004). 
Thus, for many seafarers despite suffering from a lack of protection due to 
non-standard employment, employment at sea is preferable to the alternatives which 
are substantially lower wages ashore or unemployment. Ship operators utilise a 
range of nationalities when crewing their vessels and thus those seafarers from 
poorer countries who had little choice but to accept precarious employment were 
seen to be working alongside seafarers from richer nations who enjoyed permanent 
employment.  
In determining the nationalities of seafarers employed onboard their vessels, Lane 
(2002) suggests that the racial preferences of ship owners have little to do with the 
patterns of multi-national crewing. Rather, the preferences are deliberate decisions 
made on other grounds and often the decisions vary for different sections of the ships’ 
crew. For example, ship owners have tended to employ Europeans as senior officers 
for a number of reasons. First, newer and cheaper labour supply countries, such as 
the Philippines, have been unable to implement the high quality educational and 
training regimes needed to produce an acceptable calibre of skilled and experienced 
senior officers (Lane 2002). Also, ship owners – who are predominantly from the 
richer traditional maritime nations in Europe – have tended to favour European senior 
officers as they share similar cultural characteristics and thus are perceived to be 
better able to establish effective ship-shore communication (Lane 2002). Thus, to 
some ship owners the employing of senior officers from more economically 
developed countries has been deemed cost effective due to their particular skills and 
experience. 
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By picking and choosing different sections of crews from different nations, ship 
owners are able to optimise the balance of skills and cost (Lane 2002), and the most 
significant consequence of this approach has been – as seen in this study – the 
assembling of multi-national crews. This approach by ship operators also serves to 
inhibit the dominance of the labour market by a small number of nations (Kahveci and 
Nichols 2006). Moreover, the use of seafarers of different nationalities also prevents a 
common trade union identity for seafarers, who are multi-national and drawn from a 
global labour market (Walters and Bailey 2013). Without a common trade union 
identity seafarers’ national trade unions have little bargaining strength and do not 
have the reach to affect open register shipping, as discussed previously in section 
7.1.2. 
7.2.2 Unequal terms and conditions 
Variations in the precarity of employment were not the only inequality in employment 
terms and conditions evident in this study, and a further important example, is the 
vast differences in the durations of tours of duty between seafarers of different 
nationalities. For example, onboard ship 3 deployment lengths ranged from six weeks 
to six months. Moreover, onboard ship 4 whilst the Swedish Second Officer worked 
two month tours his colleague, a Second Officer from Eastern Europe worked six 
month tours. The seafarers from less economically developed countries, who 
experienced limited control over access to future employment, were willing to accept 
longer tour lengths and had limited scope for negotiating tour length. These findings 
corroborate Drewry (2009) in which a comparison of deployment and leave rates of 
junior officers sailing onboard tankers found Burmese officers were onboard for 
between six and nine months with between five and ten days leave per month worked 
onboard and British officers were onboard for between three and four months with 
between twenty and thirty days leave for each month worked onboard.  
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The seafarers in this study who were from more economically developed countries 
also experienced considerably longer leave periods than their colleagues from less 
economically developed countries, again corroborating Drewry’s (2009) findings. 
Thus, whilst seafaring labour is able to compete on a wage basis, the organisation of 
work also serves as a competing factor with those who hold the least power working 
considerably longer tours of duty with far shorter leave periods, thereby reducing the 
costs of crew changes for ship operators. As such, it is the ship owners – who are 
seeking to reduce costs wherever possible – who benefit from this competition and it 
is the seafarers who bear the consequences. 
These findings are a concern for occupational health, safety and well-being for a 
number of reasons. Long tours of duty are a worry due to fatigue and performance 
decrement, issues which are associated with extended work periods and long 
working hours. Moreover, a lack of harmonised terms and conditions between 
employees has been seen in other industries to adversely impact upon well-being 
outcomes (see for example Kabeer’s 1996 discussion on gender pay inequality and 
well-being). Among the seafarers interviewed the vastly different terms and 
conditions – particularly tour of duty duration – were a source of great frustration and 
stress for those individuals who wanted to work shorter tours (which their colleagues 
onboard were working) but were not permitted to do so. 
The vastly different tour of duty durations sailed by different seafarers also suggests 
that the manner in which the analysis of injuries in relation to days onboard was 
conducted by Hansen et al. (2002) and Jensen et al. (2004) does not paint an 
accurate picture. This is because – as discussed in chapter 2.3.1 – neither study 
considered the deployment lengths of individual seafarers. Hansen et al. (2002) 
identified time phases of how long a seafarer had been onboard when an accident 
took place and Jensen et al. (2004) utilised the average tour length from respondents. 
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In the analyses of the shipping companies’ data – seen in chapter five – all of the 
seafarers employed onboard the offshore vessels were scheduled to be onboard for 
five weeks and thus the issues present in the two studies discussed above (Hansen 
et al. 2002 and Jensen et al. 2004) were not applicable. However, the analyses of the 
injuries sustained onboard tankers and container ships (as seen in chapter five) were 
limited by the fact that the injured seafarers were sailing very different tour of duty 
durations. Thus, the analysis of these two data sets focussed on specific time periods 
within a deployment as opposed to using average deployment durations, since such 
averages would not take into account the unequal tour of duty durations which were 
evident. 
Moreover, the inequality which emerged from the analysis suggests that, despite 
being treated as so in terms of incident investigation, the seafaring labour force is not 
homogeneous. The three shipping companies’ safety records present the injured 
seafarers as a universal workforce whilst this study clearly indicates that the seafaring 
labour force is heterogeneous, with different seafarers experiencing vastly different 
employment terms and conditions, even when employed onboard vessels operated 
by the same shipping company. This suggests that in the recording (and 
investigating) of seafarers’ injuries the shipping companies are quite simply glossing 
over features of their workforce which may help to explain aspects of occupational 
health, safety and well-being outcomes – despite the fact that it is the shipping 
companies themselves who have chosen how to control these employment features 
of their workforce.  
Taken together the findings from this first section suggest that there is both an 
absence of mechanisms to protect seafarers in relation to features of the organisation 
of their employment and their work patterns, and an absence of mechanisms to give 
seafarers a voice. Regulations – like those evident in the offshore installation industry 
– which protect labour from issues such as insufficient leave periods quite simply do 
not exist in the seafaring industry. Instead, it has been left to ships’ Captains, and 
other senior officers, to safeguard their colleagues from many of the adverse impacts 
which can be attributed to the organisation of work and employment at sea.  
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Moreover, with little in the way of collective bargaining power – combined with their 
physical separation and the Flags of Convenience regimes – those who work at sea 
are left without a voice (an issue which will become more apparent as this discussion 
progresses). Thus, these findings reflect an industry whereby the workers are made 
vulnerable by the organisation of their employment, the inadequacy of the regulatory 
mechanisms in protecting them and their collective weakness in relation to those who 
control their labour. And the consequences of this vulnerability are seen in the lived 
experiences of seafarers. 
7.3 Deployment scheduling control 
Moving on, there were numerous issues relating to job control which emerged in the 
qualitative findings. For example, throughout the analysis issues surrounding 
deployment scheduling uncertainty were identified and some seafarers had little 
control over when they were deployed. In a land based study Lewchuck et al. (2008) 
revealed that the well-being experiences of individuals were improved when they 
perceived they were able to control aspects – such as work scheduling – of their 
employment. Thus, deployment scheduling uncertainty is the theme that begins the 
discussion in this section. It then moves on to discuss the other end of the spectrum – 
cases of deployment scheduling certainty. 
7.3.1 Deployment scheduling uncertainty 
The deployment scheduling of many of the seafarers was uncertain and one 
significant consequence of this was seafarers received little notice regarding the date 
on which they would join the vessel. Thus, seafarers left home for prolonged periods 
of time with little notice and this scenario has no similar comparisons with other 
occupations. Workers on offshore oil and gas installations generally experience fixed 
rotations with pre-determined deployment dates (Parkes 2007) and military personnel 
tend to receive substantial pre-deployment notification (Fitzsimons and 
Krause-Parello 2009).  
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A further problem also arose when replacement seafarers were unable to meet the 
shipping companies’ requirement to join a vessel at short notice. The consequence of 
this scenario was that the seafarer who did not join the vessel was unable to relieve 
the seafarer already onboard who had been scheduled to return home. Unless an 
alternative seafarer who could join the vessel at short notice could be found, the 
seafarer who was already in post had to remain onboard for longer than they had 
anticipated, regardless of how long they had already been onboard.  
There were also many other reasons – as presented in chapter 2.2.3 – as to why 
mandatory tour extensions occurred. However, in the analysis presented in chapter 
6.2.2 it was seen that the seafarers who remained onboard after the date on which 
they had anticipated going home experienced considerable stress and frustration.  
Nevertheless, as reported in chapter 6.2.2 there was a considerable gap between the 
contracted obligations of the shipping company and the seafarer’s expectations 
regarding leaving the vessel on a specific date. Whilst to the seafarer the expected 
leave date became a fixed focal point, to the shipping company it was merely a 
guideline – owing to the plus or minus clause in the contact, as presented in chapter 
2.2.3. It is noteworthy that very little is known regarding the frequency of injuries 
which occurred in the time periods which the seafarers considered to be over-tour as 
it is not known how many seafarers who considered themselves to be over-tour did 
not experience an injury in comparison to the number of seafarers who considered 
themselves to be over-tour who did experience an injury. However, in the analysis 
nearly 7% of injuries recorded onboard offshore vessels and 3% of injuries recorded 
onboard tankers occurred during the time period considered to be over-tour20.  
                                            
20 Data were not available regarding over-tour injuries sustained onboard container vessels (as 
explained in chapter six). 
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Previous research into seafarers’ injuries has utilised the number of elapsed days into 
tour at the time the incident occurred (see for example Hansen et al. 2002 and 
Jensen et al. 2004) and as such very little is known regarding the implications of 
mandatory tour extensions on seafarers’ safety. Similarly, literature regarding the 
effect of mandatory tour lengths on the well-being of seafarers is sparse, however in a 
review of literature regarding the impact of deployment length on the health and 
well-being of military personnel, Buckman et al. (2010, p.69) concluded “a mismatch 
between actual and expected deployment lengths can increase the likelihood that 
military personnel and employees of other organisations that deploy to war zones will 
suffer from mental health problems.” 
The use of mandatory tour extensions was perhaps the most obvious power 
imbalance between shipping companies and seafarers which emerged – quite literally 
shipping companies were able to control seafarers to the extent that they retained 
seafarers onboard beyond the completion of a pre-determined period of employment. 
The labour process perspective on the ordering of work (as presented in chapter one) 
argues that managerial action is motivated by employers desire to control and 
stabilise labour, which is considered to be the unruly factor of production (ILPC 2008). 
As the unruly factor of production, seafarers gave their services in a time period which 
was controlled by the shipping companies – and this control extended to time periods 
in which seafarers had not agreed to give their services but the control of the shipping 
companies, and the nature of the workplace, meant they had no realistic option but to 
comply. This control – and the associated uncertainty – had a number of detrimental 
effects on seafarers. 
First, seafarers were unable to pace their work effort throughout a tour of duty since 
the duration of the deployment was often uncertain. Research has shown that 
uncertainty regarding the duration of a work period to be a cause for concern. In a 
land-based study Duchon et al. (1997) found that individuals were able to offset the 
impact of additional fatigue which resulted from extended work shifts by pacing their 
work effort across the expected shift length.  
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As discussed in section 7.1.3, fatigue is known to adversely impact on the well-being 
of individuals (see for example Smith et al. 2006) and furthermore, the classic studies 
such as those of Robert Karasek (1979) have shown that individuals experience 
lower levels of well-being when they perceive lower levels of job control. Thus it is 
unsurprising that many of the seafarers reported responses such as frustration, 
distress and dissatisfaction, which are recognised risk factors for psychosocial harm, 
resulting from scheduling uncertainty.  
Moreover, owing to the nature of seafaring – in that seafarers live as well as work at 
sea – the experiencing of such psychosocial issues are likely to be significant 
contributors to both health and performance and the constraints at sea may influence 
the ability of seafarers to adopt coping skills which reduce the impact on their 
well-being (Carter 2005). It is also worrying that, as Carter (2005, p.61) argues 
“almost all jobs at sea are to a greater or lesser extent safety-critical and so 
decrements in performance from whatever cause, including psychological ones, may 
put other seafarers, passengers or the vessel at risk.” 
7.3.2 Cases of deployment scheduling certainty 
Nevertheless, not all of the seafarers experienced scheduling uncertainty. Some were 
permanently assigned a vessel which they returned to for subsequent deployments. 
These seafarers experienced far lower levels of uncertainty and exhibited greater 
degrees of control regarding their deployment schedule. Such control was possible 
due to the fact that they were replaced at the end of their deployment by the same 
individual each time and thus together they were (generally) able to make scheduling 
arrangements between themselves.  
These seafarers knew the date on which they would be joining the vessel in advance, 
and the date on which they anticipated leaving the vessel was adhered to, with such 
individuals rarely (if ever) experiencing mandatory tour extensions in the same way 
as their colleagues. Consequently, these seafarers did not experience the frustration 
and annoyance associated with deployment scheduling uncertainty, that their 
colleagues experienced. It is therefore hardly surprising that seafarers expressed 
preference for control over their work pattern in this manner, especially given that it 
was not only their work schedule they were controlling but also when they would be 
away from the life they had effectively left on hold when they joined the ship.
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Such seafarers – who were predominantly officers from richer countries – formed a 
sector of the ships’ crew that provided continuity and stability. No doubt many ship 
owners prefer such stability and continuity in terms of the seafarers working onboard 
their vessels, however as Lane (2002, p. 98) states: “they have become so 
accustomed to shopping for crews that they are reluctant to make any substantial 
long-term investment in labour from any one source.” By permitting these seafarers a 
free hand to arrange their own upcoming deployment patterns they were, in many 
respects, making a long term investment. And the seafarers who experienced this 
situation recognised the investment made in them and understood their experiences 
were at the best end of the industry – ultimately the situation was recognised by the 
seafarers as being outside of the norm. Consequently, they perceived their future 
employment to be particularly secure. The implication was that these individuals were 
undoubtedly among those who reported a more favourable work-life balance and a 
happier work experience. This itself may have contributed to support for some of the 
negative impacts on well-being such as fatigue and stress – as discussed in section 
7.2.1 – and therefore aided working more safely. 
7.4 Job control whilst onboard 
Scheduling uncertainty also extended to the seafarers’ work schedule once they were 
onboard the vessel. Since seafarers live as well as work in the workplace, the 
implications of such control are likely to take on even greater significance. In 
considering job control this section discusses variations in the extent to which 
seafarers were able to alter their working practices in response to their domestic 
needs. 
7.4.1 Work scheduling onboard 
Depending upon their position onboard and the ship’s activities some of the seafarers 
were able to, unofficially, control the hours they worked. Officers, particularly senior 
officers experienced – albeit limited – autonomy in determining their work schedule 
and the temporal ordering of tasks. Kossek et al. (2006) argue that the use of 
flexibility in working hours can increase well-being. Moreover, as discussed in section 
7.3.1 research (see for example Karasek 1979) has revealed a link between job 
control and well-being, with perceived lower levels of job control being associated 
with poorer well-being outcomes. 
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Whilst a table of shipboard working arrangements is required in accordance with ILO 
180 (as seen in chapter 1.1.2), the seafarers deviated from these pre-determined 
working arrangements and consequently, the Captains – and the senior officers who 
assisted them – exercised control over determining how and when things were done. 
Thus, whilst on paper there were pre-determined working hours, in practice the senior 
officers were able to operate in accordance with their own preferences.  
Those seafarers who were able to control their own working routine indicated that the 
autonomy to implement working hours in a manner they themselves deemed fit had 
positive implications for their health, safety and well-being. For example, some 
seafarers were able to delay tasks they perceived as arduous or difficult when they 
were feeling particularly tired and instead carry out tasks they considered to be 
easier. Given that fatigue is a well-known contributor to accidents in the seafaring 
industry (see for example MCA 2013) an individual’s ability to postpone certain tasks 
when they are tired is likely to have a positive impact on their own health and safety, 
as well as on the safety of other seafarers onboard and the operational safety of the 
vessel. 
Similarly, some seafarers were also able to postpone tasks to enable them to leave 
the ship and go ashore whilst the vessel was in port. This is important as literature 
(see for example Bauer 2007) has shown that shore leave is an important factor in 
improving the well-being experiences of seafarers.  
Thus, by and large these findings suggest that the experiences of the seafarers in this 
study did not always match the requirements determined by shore-side. And this 
mismatch was perceived by the minority of seafarers who experienced autonomy in 
determining their own work schedule onboard to positively impact on their well-being 
– as well as their safety. 
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7.4.2 Work scheduling controlled by others 
Seafarers lower in the onboard hierarchy, however, had little autonomy and control 
regarding their work schedule and the temporal ordering of tasks and they worked the 
hours dictated to them by the senior officers onboard. A lack of autonomy was seen to 
have a number of negative effects. For example, some seafarers – in particular 
ratings – conducted arduous tasks when they were fatigued. Some seafarers were 
also not able to adjust their working hours to enable them to go ashore and thus were 
unable to take shore leave. 
Significantly, the power held by senior officers did not just refer to seafarers’ 
autonomy in terms of carrying out work related tasks, but also when they rested, 
when they ate and even if they were allowed to leave the ship when it was in port.  
The implication of this was a seafarer’s ability – or inability – to make decisions as 
part of their work extended to many other aspects of their life onboard. Such control 
has been noted by others. For example, in discussing the power and authority held by 
some seafarers over other seafarers Sampson (2013, p.79) stated: “onboard the 
Captain is still king and controls not only the work aboard the vessel but the living 
arrangements, and to a great extent, the out of work activities of all the crew.” 
Moreover, life at sea is highly institutionalised and the workforce are under the 
constant surveillance of their superiors – generally the senior officers onboard. As 
previously discussed, whilst remote from the land the jurisdiction of entities such as 
the flag state and ship owner are irrelevant to the seafarers onboard and instead it is 
the onboard occupational hierarchy which influences the organisation of life at sea. 
The hierarchy among seafarers is unusually strong and Sampson and Thomas (2002) 
noted that the hierarchy among seafarers was so important that it was common 
practice for individuals to refer to themselves and others by rank, rather than by 
name. 
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As a consequence of shore-side’s lack of effective monitoring of the organisation of 
life onboard, tradition combined with an unusually strong hierarchy has resulted in 
hierarchies of power and control in which the onboard lives of those lowest in the 
hierarchy are organised subject to the whims of those above. During the analysis it 
emerged that unofficial amendments to working hours were not always implemented 
in a manner that assisted individuals onboard equally and some senior officers 
abused their power by imposing additional working hours and tasks onto their 
subordinates so as to lessen their own burden. For example, as presented in chapter 
4.3.1 a Third Officer described how, on a previous vessel, a Chief Officer had 
imposed additional working hours on the Third Officer, so as to decrease his own 
working hours. This resonates with literature regarding relational power in the 
workplace (see for example Hodson et al. 2006) which suggests that whilst power for 
some provides a protection, it increases the vulnerability of those with less power.  
Importantly, the examples of abuses of power which emerged during the analysis, 
such as that of the Third Officer covering the watch of the Chief Officer, indicate that 
such abuses were tacitly accepted. In a study of the National Guard in the US, Zellars 
et al. (2002) found that those who had witnessed or experienced abuses of power, 
which were tacitly accepted, went on to mimic these abuses. Consequently, the 
mimicking of such abuses of power is likely the result of the socialisation of accepted 
behaviour in the workplace. Given that seafarers move between work teams (as 
discussed in section 7.3.2 below) it is likely that an abuse of power can be mimicked 
on an exponential level and consequently becomes accepted behaviour.  
The lack of desire from shore-side to interfere in the organisation of life onboard also 
enables such abuses to go unchecked. Since other parties – such as HR managers 
and trade unions – are physically separated from seafarers, the ability of these 
entities to protect seafarers is severely limited. However, even with available avenues 
to report abuses of power seafarers have been seen as reluctant to report such 
incidents (see for example Dutt 2015). Such reluctance may be owing to the 
acceptance of some of the behaviours as normal. In the same vein that abuses of 
power may be committed as a consequence of the socialisation of accepted 
behaviour at sea, those who are subjected to such abuses may normalise these 
occurrences through socialisation. 
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It is also likely – at least in part – that the reluctance to report abuses of power is due 
to the fear of reprisals. One reprisal feared by seafarers is blacklisting. Dutt (2015) 
found that seafarers did not report instances of ill-treatment as they took blacklisting 
very seriously and felt such an occurrence would have negative consequences for 
their ability to secure further employment and also would inhibit their career 
advancement. 
Furthermore, it is general practice that a seafarer receives a written appraisal report, 
completed by a senior officer onboard, at the end of each deployment. For those 
seafarers who are precariously employed a positive appraisal report may help to 
secure further employment, whereas a negative report would likely have the opposite 
effect and thus inhibit the seafarer in securing further work. Thus seafarers are likely 
to be reluctant to report abuses of power committed by the individuals who are 
responsible for writing their appraisals. These concerns echo those presented in 
land-based literature (see for example Fevre et al. 2012). 
It is also worth remembering that – as discussed in section 7.1 – senior officers were 
(predominantly) permanently employed, whilst those seafarers lower in the onboard 
hierarchy tended to be precariously employed. It is likely that seafarers lower in the 
hierarchy (who are precariously employed) perceive their supervisors onboard (who 
are permanently employed) as considerably more valuable to the shipping company 
than they are. In shore-based studies (see for example Hearn and Parkin 2001) 
differences in job security have been seen to result in an environment prone to 
abuses of power. Einarsen et al. (2003) also argued that the presence of structurally 
weak targets, such as low-status employees, in the workplace increased the 
likelihood that abuses of authority would occur. As a shipboard hierarchy results in 
seafarers being slotted into predetermined superior and inferior positions this issue is 
likely to be applicable to the seafaring industry. Thus whilst autonomy was a positive 
aspect for some seafarers, the impact that this autonomy had on other individuals 
onboard was not necessarily a positive aspect for those without autonomy.  
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7.4.3 Working practices in relation to personal calendars 
It is of particular importance to this study that the analysis presented in chapter 6.2.1 
showed that those seafarers who were able to exert some control over their own 
working routine reported changes in their routine and working practices at a late stage 
of a deployment. Whilst for some seafarers the time approaching the end of a tour of 
duty was particularly busy, due to their endeavours to complete all of their tasks 
before leaving the vessel, for others it was a time when work efforts decreased and 
less work than usual was undertaken. A decrease in work towards the end of a 
deployment is unsurprising given that seafarers perceived cumulative fatigue to 
increase as time onboard progressed. In a study of seafarers’ fatigue Wadsworth et 
al. (2006) found fatigue on waking to have increased between the beginning and end 
of a tour. Furthermore, in a land-based study Winwood et al. (2005) stated that 
recovery from work-related fatigue mostly occurred between shifts. Thus as seafarers 
work and live in the same environment they are likely to accrue sleep debt. This is 
particularly likely given that the experiences of the seafarers suggested that the rest 
hour legislation does not provide a sufficient amount of rest and that non-compliance 
with rest hour legislation was commonplace and widespread. These experiences are 
unsurprising given that seafarers are permitted to work ninety-eight hours a week, 
almost double the forty-eighty hours suggested by the European Working Time 
Directive (ITF 2017). 
From the analysis it also emerged that seafarers perceived that they experienced ‘the 
channels’ – a time period in which concentration levels decreased – as they 
approached the end of their deployment. It is possible that the perceived change in 
concentration levels can be attributed to cumulative fatigue. The concept of the 
‘channels’ has no real comparable parallels with land-based employment – but as far 
as can be judged from the literature regarding concentration and occupational injuries 
(see for example Swaen et al. 2003) it would be reasonable to conclude that injury 
risk may increase during the time in which a seafarer is experiencing the ‘channels’. 
Viewed in light of cumulative fatigue and the channels it is not surprising that 
seafarers perceived the very end of a deployment to be a particularly risky period of 
time.  
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The analysis in chapter 5.2 showed that for injuries sustained onboard tankers the 
penultimate week of a seafarer’s tour was riskier than the two preceding weeks and 
the last week of a tour. A possible explanation for this spike in incidents in the 
penultimate week is that seafarers’ concentration decreased as they approached the 
end of their anticipated time onboard. The decrease in injuries during the last week 
may simply be a consequence of seafarers altering the type of work they undertake 
during their last few days onboard. For example, some of the seafarers reported 
doing more paperwork and less manual tasks at a late stage of their deployment, and 
the decrease in injuries may be the result of inherently safer tasks (such as 
paperwork) being conducted. This idea may also explain why the analysis identified 
that incidents were less likely during the last week of a tour than during the rest of a 
tour onboard offshore vessels. Nevertheless, as has been discussed, the power to 
control and alter their own individual work patterns did not extend to all seafarers. As 
a consequence of little, if any, interference from shore-side management in the 
organisation of life onboard, senior officers were free to control the work patterns 
onboard but this control was not extended to those lower in the onboard hierarchy.  
In controlling their work patterns in this manner the seafarers did not attract the 
attention of shore-side. Throughout the findings it is apparent that the senior officers – 
and the Captain in particular – could choose to do a great deal which impacted on the 
organisation of life onboard but remained ‘invisible’ to shore-side. Only rarely, for 
example when delaying the vessels sailing from dry-dock, were shore-side interested 
in the decisions the Captain had taken. Thus it was only when the actions of the 
Captain – in relation to the organisation of life onboard – had commercial implications 
that these actions became ‘visible’ to shore-side.  
Consequently, shore-side were seen to be more interfering when there were financial 
ramifications – such as an increase in berth fees if the vessel did not sail – and less 
interfering when the implications impacted solely on the labour force. This would 
suggest that the relationship between shore-side and the seafarers was based 
predominantly on profit, with little interference with regards to life onboard as long as 
additional costs were not being incurred. Such a situation was recognised by one 
Chief Engineer who, as presented in chapter 6.2.2, suggested that the shipping 
company turned a blind eye to the seafarers amending company policies, as long as 
such amendments did not involve an increase in cost. 
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Throughout this section numerous examples of how shore-side have given autonomy 
to the Captain – and other senior officers onboard – have been presented. This is a 
consequence of the management techniques utilised by shore-side. In shifting the 
responsibility from shore-side to the Captain of the ship, the Captain – in conjunction 
with the other senior officers onboard – exercise control over the rest of the crew. This 
autonomy was seen to have positive implications for those who were fortunate 
enough to experience it, but importantly there were negative ramifications for those 
individuals who did not experience such autonomy and were subjected to the 
unchecked control of others.  
Thus, by and large the findings suggest that the experiences of the seafarers did not 
match the requirements determined by shore-side. This mismatch however was not 
recorded by the seafarers. In addition, a lack of interference from shore-side 
regarding this mismatch enabled abuses of power to occur, as seen in the event 
whereby the Chief Officer instructed the Third Officer to work extra hours so as to 
reduce his own work schedule. This reflects seafarers’ reluctance to accurately 
record any information which they perceived would jeopardise their ability to secure 
future employment – a situation caused predominantly by the use of precarious 
employment methods. It also reflects shore-side’s lack of desire to know what exactly 
is going on onboard the vessels they operate. This is most likely due to the fact that 
an increase in crew numbers is the only realistic way in which many of the 
mismatches in seafarers’ experiences and the requirements of shore-side could be 
reconciled.  
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7.5 Flexible labour force 
In this final section, issues relating to the flexibility of the seafaring labour force are 
discussed. From the analysis it emerged that seafarers were considered as a 
homogeneous labour force and consequently were readily employed across the 
various sectors of the seafaring industry. Research (see for example Breslin and 
Smith 2006), however, has shown that a lack of workplace specific experience 
contributes to occupational injury risk, thus suggesting that current practices whereby 
seafarers are deployed to unfamiliar vessels for subsequent tours is a cause for 
concern. In considering this issue this section also identifies and discusses the impact 
that deploying to unfamiliar vessels has on seafarers’ work team stability, given that 
unstable work teams have been seen in shore-based literature (see for example 
Lewchuk et al. 2003) to adversely impact on health, safety and well-being.  
7.5.1 Lack of workplace specific familiarity 
In the analysis presented in chapter 4.1.2 it was evident that some seafarers were 
deployed to familiar ship types and others were deployed to a type of vessel of which 
they had no prior experience. It was also seen that some of the seafarers had little, or 
no, knowledge of the ship or even the shipping company prior to arriving onboard. For 
example, there were seafarers onboard ship 2 (a tanker) who had sailed onboard 
tankers previously, but were new to the shipping company (and that specific vessel). 
There was also a seafarer onboard ship 2 who had never sailed on a tanker, and was 
also new to the shipping company but had previously sailed on offshore vessels. 
This scenario is by no means exclusive to the seafarers in this study. Walters and 
Bailey (2013) stated that whilst some seafarers may be fortunate and be deployed 
with the same shipping company for a period of years and in some instances they 
may even return to the same ship, it is more likely that for each subsequent tour they 
will be deployed on a different ship or even with a different shipping company. 
Seafarers tend to be considered as flexible employees and the general approach to 
the seafarer labour market considers seafaring labour to be of a homogeneous nature 
(Leong 2012). This is in part due to the fact that – as seen in chapter one – STCW 
enables certified trained seafarers to be employed onboard the entire spectrum of 
vessels without the requirement of further qualifications. 
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In recognition of the well-known implications for the safety of the vessel and its crew 
of seafarers’ unfamiliarity with their ship and its equipment, there are, however, 
requirements for arrangements intended to mitigate for such unfamiliarity. 
Familiarisation training – as required by the ISM Code – provides information 
regarding the actions to be taken in an emergency, and the use of mandatory safety 
equipment, and seafarers are required to receive basic training prior to commencing 
shipboard duties. Alongside such familiarisation training, new joining seafarers are 
required to receive ship-specific familiarisation which provides them with instructions 
and information for the shipboard equipment they will be using. The familiarisation is 
intended to benefit the seafarer and also the vessel and the operational standards 
onboard. 
The findings presented in chapters four and six, however, suggest seafarers’ 
experiences in practice do not always match this theory. First, the findings in chapter 
6.1.2 showed that despite regulations, familiarisation training for new-joining 
seafarers was sometimes poor or even non-existent – and further that the 
familiarisation training paperwork was completed, even when familiarisation training 
was not conducted. Thus, similar to Bhattacharya’s (2009) findings regarding the 
implementation of the ISM Code, the situation would appear to shore-side as being in 
accordance with the requirements, even when this was not the case.  
There are a number of possible explanations for familiarisation training not taking 
place. Seafarers commenced work immediately upon joining a vessel thus leaving 
little – if any – time period in which adequate familiarisation training could take place. 
Moreover, those who were responsible for ensuring that the familiarisation training 
was conducted to an adequate standard – the Captain and other senior officers – 
experienced substantial additional work during port visits, the time period when 
familiarisation training is often required and, of course, would be of particular use. 
202 
 
Inadequate familiarisation training is particularly concerning as the findings presented 
in chapter 6.1.2 indicate that new joining seafarers were unfamiliar with specific 
pieces of mandatory equipment onboard. The implication was that seafarers utilised 
mandatory equipment that they were unacquainted with. Sampson et al. (2016) 
stated that the mandatory equipment onboard different ships varied and that it was 
imperative that such mandatory equipment was understood and that it was used 
appropriately and maintained properly as otherwise it posed a threat to both human 
life and the environment. Whilst SOLAS determines the mandatory equipment 
onboard ships, and the specifications of this equipment, the equipment can be 
generic and not a specific make or model. Thus the specific make and model of the 
mandatory equipment depends on the decisions made by the shipping company and 
whilst newer models might be used on newly built ships a cost efficiency logic has 
been to continue to use older equipment on older vessels, rather than retrospectively 
fit newer models. Consequently, even between ships owned by the same shipping 
company makes and models of mandatory equipment onboard are likely to be 
different. 
Second, and likely related to these issues, the analysis presented in chapter 4.1.2 
indicated that the seafarers perceived a lack of workplace specific familiarity 
adversely impacted on personal safety (despite their qualification to work onboard 
any vessel). In particular, there was a clear perception among the seafarers that took 
part in this study of an increase in risk at the start of a tour of duty owing to a lack of 
workspace specific familiarity. Furthermore, when seafarers lacked specific vessel 
familiarity, they perceived this to be not only a concern for the individual deployed, but 
also to be an issue which adversely effected other colleagues onboard and the 
operational safety of the vessel. For example, seafarers who were more familiar with 
the vessel carried out tasks for their newly arrived colleagues in a conscious attempt 
to minimise risk.  
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A reasonable supposition, therefore, would be that seafarers’ injuries which occurred 
as a consequence of vessel specific unfamiliarity would generally occur at a very 
early stage of a deployment – for example within the first week onboard – perhaps 
particularly when considered in combination with the fact that seafarers commenced 
work immediately upon joining a vessel, so in many cases were dealing with the 
effects of fatigue in addition to their unfamiliarity. However, in the three shipping 
company datasets analyses this was not found to be the case. It was seen in chapter 
five that onboard tankers the fourth week of a tour was riskier than the first three 
weeks of a tour. Thus the patterns of injuries sustained onboard tankers provide no 
clear evidence for an increase in injuries at an early stage of a deployment. 
The distribution of incidences across the first four weeks of a tour did not differ 
significantly for offshore vessels or container vessels and would indicate that injuries 
sustained during the first four weeks of a seafarer’s deployment were randomly 
distributed and not significantly related to the start of the seafarer’s deployments.  
However, shipping companies do not collect any information regarding injured 
seafarers’ familiarity with the vessels on which they were injured. It was, therefore, 
not possible to control for familiarity in any of these analyses. This is of concern as it 
suggests that even among the three shipping companies that provided these data, 
which, arguably, represent the better end of the spectrum, familiarity – a factor known 
to relate to occupational health and safety – was not deemed relevant enough to 
record and consider. Were they to do so, other patterns may emerge. For example, 
Hansen et al. (2002) showed that the likelihood of a seafarer experiencing an injury 
decreased when the seafarer returned to a familiar vessel for subsequent tours. 
Parallels can also be drawn between seafarers who arrive at an unfamiliar vessel and 
agency workers from shore-based industries who are also placed in unfamiliar 
workplaces, of which they have no specific experience or knowledge. Breslin and 
Smith (2006) identified that workplace specific inexperience contributed to 
occupational injury risk, irrespective of the age of the worker, in various shore-based 
industries. Similarly, Underhill (2007) found that agency workers were particularly 
vulnerable to injury early in their placement, when the effects of unfamiliarity were 
most apparent. 
204 
 
Taken together, these findings suggest a scenario in which not only do seafarers’ 
experiences not match the intentions of the ISM code, but the mechanisms intended 
to record that mismatch are inadequate and those with the potential to effectively 
measure its consequences are not in place. This again reflects shipping companies’ 
averseness to acknowledging a mismatch exists. Such unwillingness is very likely the 
result of the current widespread cost efficiency logic whereby manning levels of ships 
meet safe manning requirements but are not sufficient in enabling seafarers to meet 
other requirements, such as having the time to carry out adequate familiarisation 
training. 
7.5.2 Unstable work teams 
The analysis in chapter 4.1.2 showed that the crew onboard a vessel can consist of a 
mixture of seafarers: some who are permanently assigned to a specific vessel and 
some who are not. The implication of this is that whilst some seafarers return to a 
familiar vessel for subsequent deployments they may still be part of an unstable work 
team as their colleagues are regularly deployed to different vessels. For example, the 
Captain and Chief Engineers interviewed on ships 3 and 4 returned to the vessel for 
subsequent deployments but their other colleagues onboard did not. 
Moreover, crew change staggering was also seen to result in unstable work teams. 
On a regular basis a number of the ship’s crew departed (those who had reached the 
end of their deployment) and were replaced by an influx of new team members. This 
echoes Hansen et al. (1995) in which a study regarding the crew turnover onboard 
two ships found that onboard one of the ships a new crew member joined the ship, on 
average, every eight days and onboard the second ship it was every twenty-two days.  
The qualitative findings suggest that the staggering of crew changes had both 
positive and negative implications. First, the findings in chapter 4.1.2 showed that 
newer members of the team – who were unfamiliar with the vessel and equipment 
onboard – were able to learn from more established team members who had more 
familiarity. Thus similar to Mikkelsen et al’s. (2004) findings regarding offshore 
installation workers in the North Sea, there was the potential for increased knowledge 
transfer between individuals. 
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In recognition of the increase in the transfer of information if crew changes are 
staggered, there are requirements in place in some sectors of the seafaring industry 
to prevent certain individuals – who are deemed particularly crucial to the operational 
safety of the vessel – from leaving the vessel concurrently. In the tanker sector a 
SIRE rule requires the crew change of the senior officers onboard SIRE inspected 
tankers to be staggered (OCIMF 2014). This SIRE rule is an example of private 
regulation of health and safety in the seafaring industry. The findings presented in 
chapter 4.2.2, however, suggest seafarers’ experiences did not necessarily match the 
requirements. The analysis revealed that on some occasions a number of senior 
officers left the vessel concurrently. There are a number of possible explanations as 
to why this occurred. Whilst the stagger required by SIRE is of a short duration, the 
trading patterns of many ships mean this simply is not possible. Take for example 
ship 2, which sailed for approximately six weeks between two consecutive ports. If the 
Captain was to leave the vessel in the first port, the Chief Officer must remain 
onboard (according to SIRE regulations) until the next port which would be reached in 
six-weeks time – irrespective of when the Chief Officer had been expecting to leave 
the vessel. Thus such requirements were likely to result in mandatory tour 
extensions, a scenario which as discussed in section 7.3.1, caused seafarers 
substantial levels of frustration and stress. Many senior officers were able to avoid 
mandatory tour extensions if SIRE requirements were not enforced.  
The enforcing of such crew change requirements primarily rested with the Captain, as 
the analysis in chapter 4.1.1 revealed. The Captain was seen to hold the onboard 
responsibility for arranging crew changes – even when a scheduling arrangement 
was in place, and the two seafarers involved communicated via email, it was 
ultimately up to the Captain to permit their suggested crew change. Since the 
Captains themselves also wished to leave the vessel at the end of their scheduled 
tour (irrespective of crew change staggering requirements), it was in their own 
interest not to stringently enforce the rules.  
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The Captain’s power to avoid enforcing such rules was again the result of a lack of 
effective monitoring from shore-side (as also discussed in section 7.4.2). Even when 
shore-side expressed concern over requirements not being met, the genuineness of 
such concern was questioned by the seafarers, since it was after all shore-side who 
had made the travel arrangements for the leaving and joining seafarers. The 
seafarers suggested that any genuine concerns from shore-side would likely have 
resulted in travel arrangements not being made and the crew change being vetoed 
and thus in effect shore-side chose to leave the Captain – and other senior officers – 
to do as they wished. 
Furthermore, the necessity of crew change staggering was questioned by some of 
the seafarers in this study. In chapter 6.1.2 it was seen that many of those senior 
officers returning to a vessel for subsequent tours perceived that they immediately 
clicked back into life onboard and thus they felt they had enough experience that such 
a stagger was, in their case, unnecessary. Thus, overall the seafarers reported that 
they perceived such requirements as a hindrance rather than as a mechanism to 
protect them. 
Second, the analysis presented in chapter 4.2.2 indicated that the staggering of crew 
changes meant the entire ship’s crew were not adjusting to life onboard concurrently. 
It was seen that seafarers experienced significant adjustment when transitioning from 
life at home to life onboard and the seafarers in this study reported commencing work 
immediately upon joining the vessel despite the need to adjust.  
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They also commenced work when they joined irrespective of the length of time they 
had spent travelling to the vessel. This echoes Wadsworth et al. (2008) who found 
that many seafarers had no opportunity to sleep between travelling to the vessel and 
commencing work onboard. It was also seen in chapter 6.1.2 that seafarers 
commenced work whilst experiencing jet lag. This finding is a concern as jet lag is 
known to cause sleep disturbances and other adverse symptoms such as difficulty 
concentrating and clumsiness (NHS 2016). Ideally, seafarers would join a vessel and 
spend time adjusting to life onboard prior to commencing work. However, as the 
accommodation space onboard vessels is limited, on most vessels it would not be 
possible to accommodate new joining seafarers and leaving seafarers concurrently – 
especially if crew changes were conducted with a substantial number of individuals. 
These issues would thus suggest that an entire crew, who had not rested following 
prolonged travel and were experiencing jet lag, would be a safety concern and thus 
the staggering of crew changes does offer some potential benefits. Arguably, 
however, if seafarers had the opportunity to rest prior to commencing work upon 
joining a vessel, and handovers of adequate duration were conducted, these 
perceived benefits of crew change staggering would be obsolete. 
Irrespective of the possible benefits that crew change staggering posed, the seafarers 
in this study expressed a strong preference for working with familiar individuals as 
part of a stable work team. They perceived working as part of a stable work team, 
alongside familiar individuals, to be safer for the seafarers onboard and also better for 
the operational safety of the vessel, in comparison to working with unfamiliar 
colleagues.  
208 
 
Unstable work teams were also perceived as a concern as they were felt to promote 
feelings of isolation and inhibit social support. Relationships built between seafarers 
became transitory, with seafarers leaving the vessel and new colleagues arriving 
onboard. The relationships between those onboard are especially important given 
that seafarers are physically removed from the interactions and support of individuals 
ashore. These findings resonate with findings from the offshore industry, in which a 
study of the working arrangements for offshore workers in the North Sea found a 
strong preference for stable crews among offshore workers (Mikkelsen et al. 2004). In 
explaining this preference Mikkelsen et al. (2004, p. 175) stated “the more stable the 
offshore crews were, the easier the interviewees expected to be able to relate and 
adapt to their team colleagues and to improve the psychosocial work environment.” 
Similarly, unstable work teams have been shown in other industries to adversely 
affect employees’ well-being (see for example Sparks et al. 2001). In their study of 
land-based industries, Lewchuk et al. (2003) considered the number of different 
supervisors and groups of co-employees an individual had to be a function of task 
uncertainty. Task uncertainty was seen to be a component of employment strain, an 
issue which – as discussed in section 7.1.1 – has a negative impact on the health and 
well-being outcomes of individuals. 
Furthermore, besides the well-known adverse impact that social isolation has on 
well-being (see for example Chappell and Badger 1989), isolation has been shown to 
be an important factor in the ‘Job Demand Control Support’ (JDCS) model (Johnson 
et al. 1988). The JDCS model – expanded from Karasek’s Job Demand Control 
Model (1979) – hypothesis predicts that low social support (isolation) combined with 
high demand and low control has negative health outcomes among workers (see for 
example Van Der Doef and Maes 1998), as well as an adverse impact on 
psychological well-being (see for example Hausser et al. 2010). 
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By and large these findings suggest a scenario in which there is a mismatch between 
the advantages in terms of the social support and togetherness provided by stable 
work teams and the disadvantages of entire crews of seafarers commencing work 
immediately and adjusting to life onboard concurrently, and the related issue of the 
potential reduction in the transference of information. However, the advantages 
posed by stable work teams are such that, arguably, it is the disadvantages of the 
situation that need to be resolved. Such resolutions would require investment – not 
only in terms of money – but also in the commitment shown to workers by shipping 
companies. The deployment lengths of seafarers onboard the same vessel would 
need to be aligned – and this would not match the cost efficiency logic which is 
currently being followed by shipping companies worldwide. It would also require 
seafarers to be adequately rested prior to commencing work and the reduction in the 
information transferred could be substantially minimised if extended handovers 
occurred, scenarios again which are unlikely to occur given the seafaring industry’s 
prioritisation of profit. Thus, the presence of unstable work teams in the seafaring 
industry reflects a lack of commitment to the seafarer labour force which is driven by 
the prioritisation of profit over safety. Arguably, this lack of commitment to seafarers’ 
safety – as well as their well-being – is unchecked because of the absence of 
mechanisms which give seafarers a voice. 
7.6 Conclusions 
By considering seafarers’ health, safety and well-being in relation to the organisation 
of work and employment at sea this study has shown how the mechanisms to protect 
those who work at sea are, at best inadequate, and at worst absent.  
The findings presented in chapters four, five and six indicate that the experiences of 
seafarers in this study do not match the requirements and regulations determined by 
shore-side. For example, familiarisation training (as discussed in section 7.5.1) was 
reported to be non-existent or poor, despite the requirements of the ISM Code.  
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The differences in seafarers’ experiences and the requirements determined by 
shore-side were, undoubtedly, possible owing to shore-side’s lack of interference in 
the organisation of life onboard. Shore-side were reported to turn a blind eye to many 
of the features of the organisation of work – such as hours of work and rest and when 
each individual would leave the vessel – and the decisions regarding such were 
ultimately deferred by shore-side to the Captain. This served to give shore-side the 
potential to distance itself. Only when aspects of the organisation of life onboard 
impacted on profit did they become ‘visible’ to shore-side – if there were no 
implications for profit, the seafarers suggested that shore-side treated such aspects 
as though they were ‘invisible’. In her work Sampson (2012) suggested that onboard 
a ship many of the actions of seafarers were unlikely to attract the attention of 
shore-side.  
Furthermore, the mismatch between seafarers’ experiences and the requirements 
determined by shore-side were not recorded as much of the recording conducted 
onboard was reported to be inaccurate and false. Familiarisation training paperwork 
was falsely completed and hours of rest records were wrongly filled in to ensure 
compliance was, on paper, evident. Thus, the seafarers presented themselves to 
shore-side as rule abiding individuals even when this was not the case. These 
findings corroborate Bhattacharya’s conclusions regarding the implementation of the 
ISM Code and seafarers appearance to shore-side as being in accordance with 
requirements even when this was not the case. Similarly, Bloor’s (2003) study 
regarding seafarers’ falsification of rest hours records provides further support for the 
argument that seafarers’ experiences as reported to shore-side may not be accurate. 
This inaccuracy between seafarers’ actual experiences and the experiences they 
report to shore-side has a number of implications for their health, safety and 
well-being. First, unless an accurate picture is presented the true scale of the impact 
that features of the organisation of work and employment at sea have on seafarers’ 
experiences are not known. Moreover, it is not possible to accurately consider the 
appropriateness of the methods of safeguarding seafarers if seafarers do not record 
their experiences in a truthful manner. For example, if onboard a ship rest hours 
violations are not recorded then on the face of it the manning arrangements for the 
vessel are adequate – even if the experiences of the seafarers onboard suggest 
otherwise. 
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The reasons for seafarers presenting themselves to shore-side as rule abiding even 
when this was not the case were found to be closely related to the organisation of 
employment in the seafaring industry. Precarious employment was seen to be 
widespread and seafarers – many of whom were from less economically developed 
countries – were unwilling to do anything which could potentially jeopardise their 
ability to secure future employment. In effect, therefore, the mechanisms intended to 
record any mismatch between seafarers’ experiences and the requirements 
determined by shore-side, were ineffective – because seafarers were unwilling to risk 
their continued employment and shore-side were only too willing to accept the fully 
compliant picture presented. Arguably, seafarers were coerced into accepting unsafe 
working practices – such as signing paperwork stating they had received 
familiarisation training when this was not the case. Consequently, these findings 
indicate how the organisation of employment at sea may result in seafarers 
experiencing unsafe working conditions. 
The findings from this study also showed that when an incident occurred (and was 
reported) the three shipping companies only recorded superficial factors – about, for 
example, the location of the incident and the injuries sustained. They did not record 
details such as the seafarer’s familiarity with the ship and his/her colleagues, the 
manner in which they were employed or, with any accuracy, when in their deployment 
the incident occurred – all of which the wider literature suggest are associated with 
work-related incidents and injuries. The implication of this is, of course, that shipping 
companies are unaware of how factors relating to the organisation of work and 
employment at sea impact on the safety outcomes of their workforce. 
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Underlying these mismatches and failures seemed to be the shipping companies’ 
regard for seafarers as a homogeneous workforce. Yet the various seafarers in this 
study were afforded substantially different employment terms and conditions and thus 
there was wide-spread inequality among the seafaring labour force. Such inequality 
resulted in some seafarers being more vulnerable than others. Those seafarers who 
were less vulnerable were able to mitigate some of the adverse features of the 
organisation of work and employment at sea. Issues relating to this ability – such as a 
seafarers’ ability to arrange their own relief schedule and the facility to exert some 
control over their working routine onboard – are related to those concerning job 
control and the question of power both onboard ships and in the seafaring labour 
market more generally. 
When considering the power held – and utilised – by those who control the seafaring 
labour market this study indicates that there is a drive to use the workforce in the 
most cost effective way possible. This resonates with the labour process perspective 
on the ordering of work which argues that labour is a factor of production and the 
workforce is objectified in use values (ILPC 2008). 
The absence of a mechanism to give seafarers a voice served to reinforce this 
potential. As discussed in section 7.1.2, local trade unions do not have the resources 
and capital to counter ship owners and, owing to multi-national crews, there is no 
common identity among seafarers, a factor which substantially reduces their 
bargaining power. This lack of voice is a particular concern given the dearth of 
regulation – resulting from the prevalence of Flags of Convenience – to protect labour 
in the seafaring industry. 
Taken together, the mismatch between seafarers’ experiences and the requirements 
determined by shore-side, the absence of an appropriate mechanism to record this 
mismatch, and the absence of an effective measure of any consequences, were seen 
to exacerbate the adverse health, safety and well-being experiences of those who 
work at sea. Moreover, it is particularly concerning that these findings are from what 
is likely to be the better end of the industry and it is possible that seafarers not 
employed at the better end of the industry may be facing additional challenges. In the 
following chapter the conclusions from this study will be considered. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSIONS 
 
8.0 Introduction 
This concluding chapter identifies the key findings of the research. It demonstrates 
how the thesis has addressed the research question, through the use of both 
qualitative and quantitative research methods. In doing so it also acknowledges the 
limitations of the study, for example, the difficulties experienced in accessing shipping 
companies’ safety data. The final section of this chapter provides reflections on the 
findings of this study and highlights possible approaches to addressing the problems 
identified. These reflections include the need for shipping companies to improve their 
incident reporting procedures, among others. 
Against the background of enormous change in the structure of employment and 
labour markets in the shipping industry since the 1970s, this study set out to consider 
the impact that the work patterns prevalent throughout today’s seafaring industry 
have on the safety, health and well-being of those who work at sea. Thus this thesis 
has sought to address the following research question: What are the health, safety 
and well-being experiences of seafarers in relation to the organisation of work and 
employment at sea? In particular, this thesis explores an important aspect of the 
organisation of work at sea – seafarers’ work patterns – and considers when and 
where within an entire tour of duty the adverse health, safety and well-being 
experiences of seafarers were most apparent and the underlying reasons, 
implications and consequences. 
The literature review – drawing predominantly on research regarding health, safety 
and well-being in shore-based industries, owing to the dearth of pertinent literature 
from the seafaring industry – revealed that adverse health, safety and well-being 
outcomes could be attributed to features of the structure and organisation of 
employment, as well as ways in which work at sea is organised.  
214 
 
The literature highlighted that within all industries occupational accidents are more 
likely to occur at an early stage of a worker’s employment – especially if workers 
lacked specific workplace familiarity (see for example Underhill 2007). This issue is 
particularly salient to the seafaring industry whereby current employment practices 
mean that following one tour of duty, seafarers are rarely deployed to the same 
vessel for subsequent tours. At the same time, however, research regarding 
consecutive work shifts in shore based occupations found relative risk to increase 
over successive workdays (Folkard and Lombardi 2006). The literature also showed 
that between the start and end of a seafarer’s tour of duty fatigue on waking 
increased (Wadsworth et al. 2006). Such literature would suggest an increase in risk 
as a seafarer’s time onboard progressed. Thus the arguments in the literature steered 
this study to explore the organisation of work and employment in the context of the 
seafaring industry. 
In order to address the research question a mixed methods approach was utilised. 
The quantitative component comprised safety data which were obtained from three 
multi-national shipping companies. This data comprised 650 incidences which 
resulted in injuries – ranging from those incidents which resulted in a fatality to those 
which required basic first aid – to seafarers employed onboard the ships operated by 
the three shipping companies. Alongside this quantitative component a total of 37 
semi-structured interviews were conducted onboard four ships. Consequently, I was 
able to gain an in-depth and broad understanding of seafarers’ health, safety and 
well-being outcomes in relation to the organisation of work and employment at sea. 
8.1 Summary of key findings  
The findings of this study are based on the testimonies of the seafarers interviewed – 
in conjunction with the analysis of three shipping companies’ injury records. The 
seafarers discussed their recollections of their experiences and there are both 
strengths and weaknesses in this methodological approach.  
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First, there is a weakness in that the findings I describe in this study were not 
observed by myself, they are the recalled experiences of those individuals who I 
interviewed. It is important to acknowledge that the recalling of experiences may not 
necessarily be accurate as memories of experiences may have changed over time. 
These recollections of the seafarers were also a phenomenological interpretation of 
experiences, an issue which intrinsically ties in with subjectivity.  
Nevertheless, in asking seafarers to recall their experiences I was able to shed light 
on the lived experiences of the impact of the organisation of work and employment at 
sea on the health, safety and well-being of those seafarers who were interviewed. 
And in doing so a number of key findings emerged and these key findings are 
presented in this section. The section begins by highlighting the fluctuations in the 
health, safety and well-being experiences of seafarers in relation to their work 
patterns. The mismatch between seafarers’ experiences and the requirements 
determined by shore-side is then considered and the inadequacy of the mechanisms 
intended to record the mismatch highlighted.  
8.1.1 Fluctuations in health, safety and well-being experiences in relation to 
work patterns 
On the whole the impact on seafarers’ well-being resulting from their work patterns 
featured many of the issues – such as employment uncertainty, task uncertainty and 
scheduling uncertainty – that Lewchuk et al. (2003) identified as components of 
employment strain. But the impact of employment related geographical mobility –  
which is an intrinsic part of the work-life of seafarers – may serve to increase their 
vulnerabilities in this respect as it is often overlooked by both protective regulation 
and occupational health and safety management (Fitzpatrick and Neis 2015). 
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The impact these components of employment strain had on seafarers varied in 
relation to work patterns. The impact of location uncertainty – which was considerable 
during an early stage of a seafarer’s tour of duty – decreased as they became familiar 
with the vessel. Similarly, the impact of task uncertainty was substantial at an early 
stage of a tour when seafarers were unfamiliar with their colleagues and supervisors 
onboard. Task uncertainty decreased when, as time progressed, the seafarer 
became familiar with the vessel. However, the regular influx and departure of 
colleagues and supervisors at crew changes meant that familiarity with those onboard 
– something which can be considered as an aspect of task uncertainty – fluctuated 
throughout an individual’s tour. 
Scheduling uncertainty impacted on seafarers predominantly towards the end of their 
expected tour of duty. The uncertainty seafarers experienced regarding when they 
would go home was a clear source of stress and anxiety for many in this study. The 
impact of scheduling uncertainty was also felt in the period immediately preceding a 
deployment, with seafarers unsure of when they would be instructed to leave home 
and commence work on a vessel.  
Moreover, seafarers – predominantly those from less economically developed 
countries – requested tour extensions towards the end of their deployment and this 
can also be considered as a consequence of employment uncertainty. Despite having 
been onboard for a prolonged period of time seafarers asked to stay longer as the 
alternative was to return home without any certainty of when they would next receive 
a wage. 
Thus the impact of employment strain – something which has been seen in research 
regarding shore-based industries to be adversely related to stress and job satisfaction 
(see for example Lewchuk et al. 2008) – fluctuated in relation to seafarers’ work 
patterns. 
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Other factors which are not attributed to employment strain but are associated with 
the way in which employment and work at sea is organised were also seen to impact 
on seafarers’ well-being. The analysis revealed that as well as during times of 
increased operational activity onboard and poor weather conditions, fatigue was also 
a concern at a very early stage of a tour when seafarers had recently arrived onboard. 
Such fatigue can – at least in part – be attributed to the time spent travelling, jet lag 
and inadequate rest before the tour of duty commences. Seafarers further perceived 
fatigue to increase as a tour progressed, a finding also supported by at least one 
previous study where between the start and end of a tour fatigue on waking increased 
(Wadsworth et al. 2006). 
The findings from the analysis of the shipping companies’ injury records were mixed, 
suggesting that whilst several patterns regarding time within a tour of duty and injury 
risk could be identified, a mismatch in terms of recording outcomes was evident in the 
limited – and superficial – factors recorded when a seafarer sustained an injury. The 
factors recorded by the shipping companies focused on the injured seafarers’ basic 
details – for example rank and working department, and included no information 
pertinent to the organisation of work and employment. Thus, the shipping companies 
were unable to assess how features of the organisation of work and employment at 
sea related to the safety of their labour force. 
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When seen in the context of the qualitative findings the inherent problems of relying 
exclusively on the data the shipping companies were collecting become apparent. For 
example, it emerged during the analysis that seafarers were reluctant to report 
injuries and this reluctance was greater at certain time periods within a tour of duty – 
in particular at both an early and late stage of a tour of duty. It was evident that many 
seafarers – particularly those from less economically developed countries – were 
reluctant to say or do anything which might jeopardise their future employment. Thus 
seafarers were disinclined to report injuries as they perceived doing so would draw 
negative attention to themselves and such attention could potentially adversely affect 
their career. For many seafarers the salary earned at sea was significantly greater 
than the salary they would earn in occupations ashore. And in many countries there is 
an abundance of surplus seafarers ready to snap up any opportunity afforded to 
them. These findings regarding seafarers’ reluctance to draw attention to themselves 
mirror those of other studies (see for example Sampson 2013).  
Moreover, some seafarers suggested they had failed to report injuries, particularly 
injuries they felt could be deal with onboard which would not need the input of any 
services ashore. Consequently, the patterns which emerged – or indeed did not 
emerge – from the shipping companies’ data may simply be the consequence of 
seafarers’ incident reporting patterns, as opposed to accurate reflections of incidents. 
8.1.2 Mismatch in seafarers’ experiences and shore-side’s requirements and 
the inadequacy of mechanisms to record this mismatch 
In exploring the impact of the organisation of work and employment at sea on 
seafarers’ health, safety and well-being outcomes several ways in which seafarers 
attempted to circumvent requirements that had been determined by shore-side were 
revealed, indicating that there are short-comings in the ways in which seafarers are 
safeguarded.  
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It was particularly concerning that the seafarers reported needing to circumvent 
instruments of global governance, as the requirements of the shipping companies 
meant compliance with such regulations was unfeasible. During the discussion on 
hours of rest (chapter 7.2.3), for instance, it was apparent that seafarers were not 
experiencing the hours of rest determined by the Maritime Labour Convention. The 
seafarers reported ‘playing’ with their hours of work records, so that where possible, 
they were able to avoid recording hours of rest violations. Similar findings were 
identified by Allen et al. (2006) who found that 40% of a sample of officers reported 
under recording the hours they worked, so as to comply with legislation. 
Requirements of the ISM Code were also circumvented. For example, in section 8.1.1 
above it was seen that some seafarers failed to report injuries – yet the reporting of 
injuries is an important requirement of the ISM Code. The findings regarding the 
under-reporting of injuries mirror those from previous studies (see for example 
Bhattacharya 2009) that found a considerable mismatch between the purpose of the 
ISM Code and what it actually achieved in practice. 
Another requirement of the ISM Code is that suitable familiarisation training must be 
carried out, however, the findings revealed that familiarisation was poor or even 
non-existent. 
The mismatches between seafarers’ experiences and the requirements determined 
by shore-side were not evident on paper, however, as despite circumventing 
shore-side’s requirements seafarers completed paperwork – as required by 
shore-side – in a manner which failed to show the mismatch. For example, seafarers 
falsely reported familiarisation training to have been carried out and inaccurately 
recorded their hours of rest.  
220 
 
As individuals who were precariously employed, the seafarers likely presented 
themselves as rule abiding individuals even when this was not the case in order to 
avoid potentially inhibiting their ability to secure future employment. It was apparent 
that unless they were willing to draw attention to themselves, seafarers were left with 
little option other than falsifying records as the requirements determined by 
shore-side were not feasible. For instance, seafarers falsified their hours of rest as 
they needed to work more hours than permitted owing to the fact that crewing levels 
were aligned with the minimum safe manning requirements rather than the actual 
number of seafarers needed for the crew to operate without working excessive hours.  
Similarly, the analysis revealed that those who were responsible for ensuring that the 
familiarisation training was conducted experienced substantial additional work during 
port visits, the time period when familiarisation training was required. Again, this 
indicates that crewing levels were not adequate and that conducting familiarisation in 
the manner determined by shore-side was not feasible. 
There were also short-comings in the use of private regulators in the safeguarding of 
seafarers. For example, the analysis showed that senior officers departed the vessel 
even when SIRE crew staggering requirements were not met. SIRE requirements 
stipulate that senior officers – such as the Captain and Chief Officer – should not 
leave the vessel at the same time and thus the relieving of these individuals is to be 
staggered. 
Thus irrespective of whether they were requirements of private regulators or 
instruments of global governance, the findings from this study suggest that the 
mismatch between seafarers’ experiences and shore-side’s requirements was – at 
least in part – the consequence of the infeasibility of shore-side’s requirements. They 
also indicate seafarers’ reluctance to truthfully record the mismatch, which was likely 
the result of their fears on the impact this might have on their ability to obtain future 
employment. 
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By employing seafarers on single voyage contracts, providing them with short-notice 
prior to joining, deploying them to unfamiliar vessels and relieving them at a time that 
suited them, the shipping companies indicated to seafarers that they perceived them 
as commodities. Thus it was unsurprising that many of the seafarers perceived 
themselves as easily replaceable by shore-side and this perception was particularly 
evident in the discussion regarding mandatory tour extensions (chapter 7.2.1). 
The perception of being replaceable also reduced the seafarers’ perceptions of the 
power they held in relation to shore-side. Furthermore, the deregulating of the 
seafaring industry – which has given rise to the precarious employment methods 
experienced by today’s seafarers – has further served to tilt the balance of power in 
the favour of shipping companies. 
Moreover – and a further consequence of the deregulating of the seafaring industry – 
the use of multi-national crews has inhibited a common identity among seafarers and 
in the context of the physical separation brought about by open registers, national 
trade unions are inadequately equipped to defend their members’ interests. 
Consequently, the mechanisms to give seafarers a voice are inadequate and without 
these mechanisms, those who work at sea are reliant on the Captain – and other 
senior officers – to ensure that the organisation of life onboard results in a safe and 
positive work experience. This reliance is a consequence of the power the Captain – 
and other senior officers – were seen to hold in relation to the organisation of life 
onboard (as discussed in chapter 7.1.5). The danger of such a scenario is that 
without interference from shore-side abuses of power are able to go unchecked – 
especially given seafarers reluctance to draw attention to themselves. 
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Onboard the ships visited the Captains, and other senior officers, reported using this 
power in ways which benefited those onboard – and the other individuals suggested 
this was also the case. These individuals, however, likely represent the better end of 
the industry, particularly given that they themselves gave me permission to conduct 
research onboard their ships regarding the health, safety and well-being of their crew. 
Those Captains and senior officers who are not so benevolent would likely not have 
indulged my request and it was apparent that seafarers’ experiences on previous 
vessels had not always been so positive. For example, a Third Officer reported 
working extra hours during a previous tour of duty as a consequence of the Chief 
Officer’s abuse of power. 
Nevertheless, throughout the discussion shore-side appeared only too willing for 
many of the features of the organisation of life onboard to remain invisible to them. 
The inadequacy of mechanisms to record the mismatch between seafarers’ 
experiences and the requirements enables companies to potentially distance 
themselves from any negative outcomes. In simply accepting the reports of seafarers 
at face value the shipping company is able to present itself as committed, yet they are 
able to avoid any remedies – such as increasing crewing levels – which would 
adversely impact on their profit. This indicates a lack of desire to regulate, with 
shipping companies appearing to regulate seafarers, when in actual fact they are only 
too willing to turn a blind eye when seafarers’ experiences do not match the 
regulations. This lack of interference by shore-side and the related inadequacy of 
mechanisms to record the mismatch between seafarers’ experiences and the 
requirements is, undoubtedly, possible due to the inadequacy of mechanisms to give 
seafarers a voice. Moreover, these findings are likely related to changes in the 
structure of the seafaring industry whereby ship owners have flagged out their 
vessels to Flags of Convenience and the national link between the ship owner and 
the flag of the ship no longer exists. In turn, these structural changes to the industry 
have impacted on the ways in which seafarers are now employed – and also 
deployed – by shipping companies. 
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8.2 Limitations of study  
This research was not free from limitations, as noted in chapter 3.1. It was conducted 
by a lone researcher and there were a number of constraints including limited time 
and financial resources. In this section the ways in which the study may be improved 
will be highlighted. 
In total, four ships were visited and I arrived onboard each of them as soon as they 
were cleared for visitors and I left each ship once the final preparations for departure 
had begun. Consequently, I had around two days onboard each ship during which I 
conducted interviews. The data these interviews produced was rich, however, had I 
been onboard for longer time periods it is likely that I would have generated more 
data. The limited time onboard meant that I had little opportunity to gain familiarity 
with the participants and this may have adversely impacted on the depth of the 
responses obtained in some instances. If I had sailed onboard the vessels I would 
have been able to make “observations in the context of people doing their jobs and 
interacting with others at work” (Whitfield and Strauss 1998, p.115). Clearly, there are 
differences between researcher observations and the recollections and experiences 
of interview participants. As discussed in section 8.1 the recalled experiences of 
seafarers are dependent on seafarers’ memories and the reliability of memory. 
Retention may also be dependent on personal significance (Whitfield and Strauss 
1998). Conversely, researcher observations of events would have been recorded as 
and when they occurred. Nevertheless, the recalling of experiences of seafarers 
provided areas of insight that my observation of events would not have provided.  
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From the outset I have been aware of my position as a researcher, in so much that I 
identify myself as a seafarer owing to my previous employment. Literature regarding 
practitioner research (see for example Costley et al. 2010) warns against insider bias. 
Such literature argues the importance of using a research informed knowledge base 
as opposed to using previous knowledge. Thus throughout this study I have 
endeavoured to keep an open mind and separate my own prior knowledge and 
experience from the data I collected and analysed. My position as a practitioner 
researcher also brought with it substantial advantages, such as my ability to gain 
interviewees’ trust and build rapport in a short space of time. These issues regarding 
my position as a researcher – both the positives and negatives – were considered in 
greater detail in chapter 3.1.1 and I am confident that the rigorous manner in which 
the data were collected and analysed has prevented my position as an insider 
researcher from compromising the authenticity of this study. 
It was also seen in chapter 3.2.1 that the analysis of seafarers’ injury data is fraught 
with difficulties, in the most part due to difficulties in accessing such data. Thus 
obtaining injury data from three large multi-national shipping companies was a 
significant strength of this study, however such an approach was not without 
limitations. Many of the limitations associated with the data obtained were presented 
in chapter 6.4.  
There were also limitations regarding obtaining secondary data, the main one being 
that I was limited to whatever data the gatekeepers – who in each instance were the 
shipping company’s health and safety superintendent – granted me access to. The 
implication of this was that I was reliant on these gatekeepers to provide me with 
accurate data and any data which these individuals did not wish to divulge could 
simply be withheld from me. In fact, as presented in chapter three, the Superintendent 
at one of the shipping companies was unwilling to provide data regarding when the 
injured seafarers had been expected to leave the vessel. Nevertheless, such 
limitations were somewhat mitigated by analysing data obtained by a number of 
shipping companies (and thus from a number of gatekeepers) and also through the 
use of qualitative research methods in conjunction with the analysis of the 
quantitative data. 
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Also, despite obtaining injury data covering a number of years for large fleets more 
incidences of injuries would have permitted further analyses to be conducted. 
Similarly, without knowing the denominator population of the seafarers the ability to 
conduct relevant and worthwhile analyses was restricted. The denominator 
population would have identified the total number of individuals at risk and thus 
enabled an analysis of the frequency of reported incidences in relation to the total 
population at risk. 
The fact that the three shipping companies granted me – albeit limited – access to 
their safety records indicated that they operated in a relatively transparent manner, at 
the better end of the seafaring industry. Thus whilst the findings from this study have 
demonstrated patterns of injuries for three shipping companies, it is possible that they 
have not captured any additional issues faced by seafarers employed at the poorer 
end of the industry. It is likely that an analysis of a wider sample of the overall 
seafaring industry would reveal problems of an even greater magnitude. 
8.3 Reflections 
In light of some of the issues which emerged in this thesis regarding the impact of the 
organisation of work and employment at sea on seafarers’ health, safety and 
well-being outcomes this section highlights possible approaches to ways in which 
these problems can be addressed.  
An obvious possible approach to the problem regarding the adverse effects on 
well-being resulting from unfamiliarity would be for seafarers to return to familiar 
vessels for subsequent deployments. Research (see for example Hansen et al. 2002) 
has drawn attention to the improved safety outcomes that result from such an 
approach and this study has extended such research and highlighted the improved 
well-being resulting from returning to a familiar vessel. Ultimately, this approach is not 
feasible in all situations. However, in instances whereby a seafarer is deployed to an 
unfamiliar vessel an extended handover would alleviate many of the problems 
associated with a lack of specific workplace familiarity. Importantly, such extended 
handovers would enable seafarers to become suitably familiarised with both the 
vessel and the equipment onboard prior to commencing work, as well as aiding the 
transferring of information. 
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With regards to the problems associated with seafarers experiencing inadequate rest 
between travelling to a vessel and commencing work, one possible approach would 
be that in determining the rest required a range of issues, such as the total amount of 
time spent travelling from door-to-door and time zones crossed, are considered. 
Adequate rest immediately prior to joining a vessel would likely result in seafarers 
commencing work in a less fatigued state and by taking this approach seafarers’ 
safety outcomes may be improved and the negative effects on their well-being may 
be reduced. 
One approach to addressing the problems associated with mandatory tour extensions 
and scheduling uncertainty would be for shipping companies to share their plans 
regarding scheduling with seafarers in a clear and timely manner. Whilst the imposing 
of mandatory tour extensions is undesirable, the issues related to such extensions 
may be lessened if shipping companies communicated more openly with seafarers – 
something that is also clearly related to the ways in which seafarers are employed. 
A substantial issue which emerged in this thesis is the inadequacy of the incident 
reporting procedures of shipping companies and a way in which this problem could be 
addressed would be through the implementation of a universal standard for incident 
reporting within the seafaring industry. Given the current regulating climate within the 
global seafaring industry a universal standard appears unlikely and as such greater 
emphasis placed on the information individual shipping companies record when an 
incident occurs would go some way to addressing the issue. This recorded 
information should include aspects such as the manner in which the seafarer is 
employed, their length of time working as a seafarer, their length of time working 
onboard different vessel types, their hours of rest and when and where within a tour of 
duty the incident occurred – among many others factors. This approach may enable 
shipping companies to identify trends regarding health, safety and well-being risks in 
the labour force and the identification of such trends and risks would likely enable 
shipping companies to actively target areas which require improvement.  
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A further problem regarding incident reporting relates to seafarers’ reluctance to 
report injuries, with the under-reporting of injuries seen in this study confirming 
well-established understandings in this area (see for example Bhattacharya 2009). 
Approaches to addressing this problem are complex and could include shipping 
companies allaying – both on paper and in practice – seafarers’ fears of 
repercussions should they report an injury. Unless the current conditions within the 
industry which inhibit seafarers’ willingness to report injuries are addressed, accurate 
information will simply not be recorded by shipping companies. 
Overall, this study indicates that further research regarding seafarers’ occupational 
health, safety and well-being is required. Whilst my study has shed light on seafarers’ 
health, safety and well-being experiences in relation to the organisation of work and 
employment at sea, it is by no means exhaustive. It would be of interest to explore 
seafarers’ health, safety and well-being experiences in relation to the organisation of 
work and employment in other sectors of the industry – for example, within the cruise 
sector, where due to the nature of the organisation of employment, scheduling 
uncertainty is unheard of. Given the substantial impact that scheduling uncertainty 
was seen to have on seafarers’ well-being experiences in this study, further research 
into the prevalence of mandatory tour extensions would also be of particular interest.  
In light of the substantial variation in the duration of seafarers’ tours of duty – as well 
as differences in the ways in which various seafarers are employed – this study has 
challenged the appropriateness of analysing the frequency of seafarers’ injuries in 
relation to days into tour of duty lapsed. Rather, the findings from this study indicate 
the importance of exploring injury frequency in the context of an entire tour of duty 
and further research in this area could build on this approach to achieving a more 
in-depth understanding of occupational injuries among those working at sea.  
In addition, whilst previous studies (see for example Hansen et al. 2002) have 
explored seafarers’ injury rates in relation to returning to the same vessel for 
subsequent tours of duty, further research regarding seafarers’ health, safety and 
well-being in relation to workplace specific familiarity is undoubtedly required. Such 
research is of particular importance given that mandatory safety equipment varies 
from ship to ship.   
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Similarly, studies (see for example Mikkelsen et al. 2004) have explored stable work 
teams in the offshore oil and gas installation industry but little is known about the 
impact of stable crews on seafarers’ health, safety and well-being outcomes. Thus an 
exploration of stable crews onboard vessels is required.  
The scope of future research could also be expanded and the views of other 
stake-holders, such as, trade unions, shipping companies and manning agencies, 
explored in order to appreciate their perceptions on the underlying issues regarding 
the organisation of work and employment at sea.  
A key feature of the present research concerns the way in which it has tried to 
understand the effects upon the health of workers of the ways in which work and 
employment are organised. For this reason it has taken into account the possible 
consequences of long distance travel between home and worksite and vice versa, 
along with the consequences of the overrun of contracts and repatriation delays, 
which in turn raise issues concerning the contractual basis of employment in the 
seafaring industry. Throughout it has acknowledged the considerable challenges 
involved in collecting and analysing meaningful data to measure the effects of these 
issues. While it has been concluded that there are no easy solutions to this problem, 
this is no reason for not accepting the challenge they present for seeking appropriate 
ways to further explore associations between these issues and work-related health.  
8.4 Final words 
This research set out to explore the impact of the organisation of work and 
employment at sea on the occupational health, safety and well-being of seafarers. 
Through the use of a mixed-methods approach this study has generated several 
important findings. It has largely indicated the presence of hierarchies of vulnerability 
among seafarers which were strongly associated with the ways in which their work 
and employment were organised. These appear to reflect a shift in the balance of 
power between seafarers and their employers, which has been a consequence of 
fundamental changes in the structure and organisation of the seafaring industry and 
its labour market. 
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Through an in-depth analysis it has further been revealed that there are features of 
the associations between poor occupational health, safety and well-being outcomes 
and the way that work and employment at sea is organised that are not (and cannot 
be) captured by the arrangements in place which are intended to safeguard 
seafarers, nor are the outcomes of these presently monitored. 
By highlighting the associations between occupational health, safety and well-being 
outcomes and the organisation of work and employment at sea, this study has 
extended the boundaries of a relatively sparse body of literature regarding 
occupational health and safety in the seafaring industry. It has also shown the need 
for the health, safety and well-being of those who work at sea to be understood in the 
context of broader factors concerning the sociology of work and employment. In doing 
so, this study has contributed to academic knowledge and has importance for those 
who control the seafaring labour force, as well as for those who work at sea. 
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APPENDIX I: RESEARCH PARTICIPANT DISCLAIMER (SHIPPING COMPANY 
SUPERINTENDENT) 
Helen Douglass         
SIRC/Nippon PhD Research Fellow 
SREC Application for Ethical Approval 
 
ACCIDENT BLACK TIMES AMONG SEAFARERS 
RESEARCH PARTICIPANT DISCLAIMER 
 
Research conducted by: HELEN DOUGLASS 
Seafarer International Research Centre, Cardiff University, 52 Park Place, Cardiff, United Kingdom, CF10 3ATE 
mail: douglassh1@cf.ac.uk 
 
Supervisors: Prof David Walters & Dr Emma Wadsworth 
Cardiff Work Environment Research Centre, Cardiff University, 59 Park Place, Cardiff, CF10 3AT 
Email: waltersd@cf.ac.uk / wadsworthej@cf.ac.ukTel: 029 2087 0013 / 5123 
 
DISCLAIMER FOR COLLECTION OF COMPANY ACCIDENT DATA 
 
• I am willing to provide data to be used for this research as follows: 
• For seafarers who experienced an occupational accident: 
• date the seafarer joined the ship, date the seafarer experienced the accident, 
• type of occupational accident (restricted work accident/lost time incident/medical treatment 
case), 
• date the seafarer expected to leave the ship (end of planned contract), 
• date the seafarer left the ship, 
• ship name (to be used to ascertain ship type) 
• For each ship on which a seafarer experienced an occupational accident: 
• total number of seafarers onboard at the time 
• total number of seafarers from this group that over-stayed their planned contract end 
• I have been informed that all information I give will remain confidential and all participants will remain 
anonymous. Any details which may compromise this anonymity will be removed or masked as 
appropriate. No company identifiable data will be used at all during the work. 
• I understand that the data will be stored securely throughout the period of research and also for a period 
of five years following the completion of the research as per the Cardiff University guidelines. I 
understand that access to the data will be restricted to Helen Douglass and two PhD supervisors. 
• I have been informed that the data I give will be used for PhD research.  The data will appear in a PhD 
thesis and may be published in the form of journal articles, books or used as training material. 
• I understand that I have the right to withdraw my consent for the use of any data provided at any time and 
that the partaking in this research is voluntary. 
Signature of participant 
Name        Date 
Signature of researcher 
Name        Date 
Copies: participant 
Research file 
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APPENDIX II: INTERVIEW PARTICIPANTS 
 
Position onboard Department Nationality Age 
 Ship 1 
Bosun Deck British 37 
Third Engineer Engine British 29 
Chief Steward Other Polish 46 
AB 1 Deck Romanian 44 
AB 2 Deck Romanian 51 
Second Officer Deck Polish 27 
First Officer Deck Polish 28 
Storekeeper Other Norwegian 62 
Administrator Other Filipino 42 
Steward Other Filipino 41 
 Ship 2 
Second Engineer Engine British 27 
Chief Engineer Engine British 55 
Captain Deck British 53 
Deck Cadet 1 Deck British 20 
Deck Cadet 2 Deck British 21 
Fourth Engineer Engine British 23 
Third Engineer Engine British 29 
Deck Cadet 3 Deck British 20 
Third Officer Deck British 29 
AB 1 Deck British 52 
Second Officer Deck British 23 
AB 2 Deck British 51 
 Ship 3 
Third Engineer Engine Filipino 43 
Chief Engineer Engine Swedish 39 
Second Officer Deck Swedish 54 
Chief Officer Deck Swedish 39 
Captain Deck Swedish 54 
OS Deck Filipino 31 
Wiper Engine Filipino 34 
 Ship 4 
Captain Deck Dutch 57 
Chief Officer Deck Filipino 52 
Chief Engineer Engine Polish 45 
Cook Other Polish 49 
Third Officer Deck Russian 25 
AB Deck Filipino 42 
Second Engineer Engine Filipino 43 
Second Officer Deck Russian 30 
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APPENDIX III: ETHICAL APPROVAL LETTER 
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APPENDIX IV: INTERVIEW GUIDE 
 
Three main areas: 
1. Risks at sea 
2. Time 
3. Injuries at sea 
Background 
1. Can you start by telling me a bit about your background as a seafarer? 
- What ticket do you hold? 
- What is your role in your current rank? 
- How long have you worked at sea? 
- What other ship types have you worked on? 
- How long have you worked for your current employer? 
- How long have you worked onboard a [ship type]? 
- How long have you worked onboard this vessel? 
 
2. Can you tell me about the manner in which you’re currently employed, such as your 
contract type, trip length and so on? 
- Do you have a permanent or a voyage contract? 
- How long is your trip? 
- How long is your leave? 
- Do you do any employment during your leave? 
 
3. Can you tell me about crew change-over such as the size of crew-change over and 
frequency of crew change-overs? 
- How many crew change-over at once? 
- How often do crew changes occur? 
- How often does on time relief occur? 
- How do you feel about not getting relieved on time? 
- Do you work back-to-back / do you return to the same vessel? 
 
4. Can you tell me about your normal hours of work onboard? 
- Which watch pattern are you working? 
- How do the hours you work change within an entire trip? 
- When during a trip do you work more hours? 
- When during a trip do you work less hours? 
 
5. Can you tell me about fatigue during a trip? 
- When are you particularly tired? 
- Why are you particularly tired then? 
- How do you identify periods when you’re particularly tired? 
- How does fatigue relate to your working practices? 
- Can you give me an example of how your working practices are affected by 
fatigue? 
 
6. Can you tell me about the process from leaving home until joining this vessel? 
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- How much notice did you get? Is this standard? 
- How long did it take to get to the airport? 
- How long was your flight? 
- What happened when you arrived at the destination airport? 
- What was the time zone difference? 
- How long did you spend in a hotel? 
- How long did you travel to the ship from the airport? 
 
7. Next can you tell me about the process you experienced once you joined the vessel? 
- Can you tell me about your familiarisation tour? 
- Can you tell me about the handover you experienced? 
- Were you already familiar with the other seafarers onboard? 
- When did you begin work? 
 
8. Finally, thinking back can you describe the process you experienced when you signed 
off your last vessel? 
- Can you tell me about the handover? 
- Can you tell me about your final few days of work? 
- How soon after finishing work did you leave the ship? 
Risks 
9. What do you think are the greatest risks faced by yourself onboard? 
- Why do you think these are the most significant risks? 
- Can you give me an example of how you experience these risks? 
 
10. How do you think risks vary depending on your position onboard? 
- Why do you think this? 
- What do you think is the riskiest part of your particular job onboard? 
- Can you give me an example of why you think this is particularly risky? 
 
11. What do you think are the greatest barriers to addressing the risks you’ve mentioned? 
- What makes you think of these issues as barriers? 
- How do you try to overcome these barriers? 
 
12. Can you tell me how you think these risks vary might vary? 
- How do you think these risks vary with time of the day? 
- How do you think these risks vary with experience? 
 
13. How do you think the SMS addresses these risks? 
- What do you particularly like about the SMS? 
- What do you dislike about the SMS? 
- How confident do you feel using the SMS? 
- What would you change about the SMS? 
 
14. How do the ways the SMS address the risks work in practice? 
- Can you give me an example of when you haven’t followed the SMS procedures?  
(If no: can you give an example of when a colleague hasn’t followed the SMS 
procedure?) 
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- Can you explain why you didn’t follow the SMS procedure? 
Time  
15. What is your favourite watch to work? 
- Why do you particularly like the X to Y watch? 
 
16. What is your least favourite watch to work? 
- Why do you particularly dislike the A to B watch? 
 
17. How do you think risk differs between the different watches? 
- What do you think is the riskiest watch? 
- What do you think is the safest watch? 
- Why do you think this? 
 
18. How do you think risk differs between different watch patterns? 
- What do you think is the riskiest watch pattern? 
- What do you think is the safest watch pattern? 
- Could you tell me more about your thinking on this? 
 
19. When within your X weeks/months trip are you today? 
- It’s interesting that you say you’re X days/ weeks in rather than X days/ weeks 
from the end, when within a trip would you say that you were X days/ weeks from 
the end of your trip? (or vice versa) 
- What makes you choose this particular period of time? 
- How do you think this would vary depending on the length of trip you’re working? 
- Why do you think this? 
 
20. Do you think risks vary within the X weeks/months you are onboard? 
- Can you explain why you think this? 
 
21. When do you think the riskier times within the X weeks/months you are onboard? 
- Why do you think these times are more risky? 
- Can you give me an example? 
 
22. Do you think the SMS takes account of these times? 
- If so, how? 
- If not, what could be done differently? 
- How are these issues taken into account unofficially onboard? 
 
23. Do your working practices differ at different times during your trip?  
- Can you tell me more about how your working practices might differ? 
- How do these times of working practice differences relate to periods of time you 
view as particularly risky? 
 
23. What period of time would you consider to be the start of your trip? 
- Why do you view this particular period as the start? 
- How does this vary with the length of your trip? 
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24. What period of time would you consider to be the end of your trip? 
- Why do you view this particular period as the end? 
- How does this vary with the length of your trip? 
 
Injuries at sea 
25. What factors would affect whether or not you reported an injury? 
- What are your reasons for identifying these particular factors? 
- How would the period of time into your trip affect whether or not you reported an 
injury? 
- What makes you say this? 
 
26. Can you tell me about the most recent injury have you experienced onboard? 
(If no: what about an injury that you didn’t report/ can you tell me about an occasion 
when you hurt yourself but didn’t feel it warranted reporting?) 
- What were the events leading up to the injury? 
- Can you tell me more about why you think the incident happened? 
- What particularly stands out in your mind about the incident? 
- Can you recall how you felt after the incident? 
 
27. Can you tell me what happened when you reported the injury? (If didn’t report it: why 
did you choose not to report the injury? Did anyone else witness the event? How did 
you feel about not reporting the injury?) 
- How did the Captain react when you reported the injury? 
- How do you feel the injury report was handled by shoreside? 
- What makes you say that? 
- If you experienced a similar incident in the future would you do anything 
differently? 
- Can you tell me more about your thinking on that? 
 
28. How does when this incident occurred within your trip relate to your ideas regarding 
risky times? 
 
29. What else do you think is relevant that we haven’t discussed? 
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APPENDIX V: INFORMATION SHEET FOR SEAFARERS 
Helen Devereux        
SIRC/Nippon PhD Research Fellow 
SREC Application for Ethical Approval 
 
Research project: Exploring the relationship between occupational injuries and time 
into tour in the seafaring industry. 
 
Dear prospective participant, 
 
You are being invited to participate in the above-stated project and before you decide 
if you wish to participate it is important you understand what the project will involve and 
why it is being carried out. 
 
What is this project about? 
The overall aim of this project is to contribute to the understanding of the ways in which 
different time periods within a voyage affect seafarers from different sectors of the 
seafaring industry. 
 
Who is doing the project? 
This research is being carried out by Helen Devereux a 3/O who is completing a PhD 
at the Seafarers International Research Centre, part of Cardiff University. Helen is 
being supervised by Professor David Walters and Dr. Emma Wadsworth. 
 
Why have I been chosen? 
Helen is looking to speak to seafarers who sail onboard either deep-sea tankers or 
offshore vessels in order to explore how these seafarers experience and perceive risk 
at different periods of time within a voyage. 
 
What will I have to do? 
You will be invited to participate in a conversation with Helen which will take around 
one hour and with your permission this conversation will be digitally recorded so that 
all the things that are said in the discussion will be remembered. 
 
What kind of things will be discussed? 
During the conversation you will be asked about how you perceive risk at different 
periods of time within a voyage and your experiences of personal injuries at sea. You 
are free to say as much or as little as you want and of course you can withdraw from 
the conversation at any time without having to give a reason. 
 
What will be done with the information I give? 
Following the conversation Helen will play back the audio recording and type the 
discussion exactly as it happened. This information will then be analysed and used as 
part of a PhD thesis. Some of the information may also be used in journals and books, 
however, it will not be used for any other reason. 
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Will the information I give be kept confidential? 
When typing up the conversation all identifying details will be removed and these 
identifying details will only be accessible by Helen and her two supervisors. Your 
name will not feature on either the digital recording or the typed version and you will 
remain anonymous. The recording and typed version of the conversation will be stored 
in a secure location at Cardiff University. 
 
What if I am concerned about the conduct of the research? 
This project is being conducted with the approval of the Cardiff University School of 
Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee. If at any point you are concerned about 
any aspect of this project please contact the chair of the committee at the following 
address: 
Cardiff University School of Social Sciences 
Glamorgan Building 
King Edward VII Avenue 
Cardiff CF10 3WT 
Wales UK 
 
How can I contact you? 
If you would like any further information about this project please contact Helen at 
either the following postal address or email address: 
 
Helen Devereux 
Seafarers International Research Centre 
Cardiff University 
Cardiff CF10 3AT 
Wales UK 
Email: douglassh1@cardiff.ac.uk 
 
Thank you for taking the time to read this information and it would be a pleasure to 
have you participate in this project. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copies: participant 
Research file 
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APPENDIX VI: INTERVIEW PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM 
Helen Devereux         
SIRC/Nippon PhD Research Fellow 
SREC Application for Ethical Approval 
 
ACCIDENT BLACK TIMES AMONG SEAFARERS 
RESEARCH CONSENT FORM 
 
Research conducted by: HELEN DEVEREUX 
Seafarer International Research Centre, Cardiff University, 52 Park Place, Cardiff, 
United Kingdom, CF10 3AT 
douglassh1@cf.ac.uk 
 
Supervisors: Prof David Walters & Dr Emma Wadsworth 
Cardiff Work Environment Research Centre, Cardiff University, 59 Park Place, Cardiff, CF10 3AT 
Email: waltersd@cf.ac.uk / wadsworthej@cf.ac.ukTel: 029 2087 0013 / 5123 
 
CONSENT FOR PARTICIPATION IN INTERVIEW 
 
1. I am confirm they I have read the attached participant information document and that I 
understand the contents of it.   
 
2. I have been informed that all information I give will remain confidential and my 
participation will remain anonymous. Any details which may compromise this 
anonymity will be removed or masked as appropriate.  
 
3. I understand that the data will be stored securely throughout the period of research 
and also for a period of five years following the completion of the research as per the 
Cardiff University guidelines. I understand that access to the data will be restricted to 
Helen Devereux and two PhD supervisors. 
 
4. I have been informed that the data I give will be used for PhD research.  The data will 
appear in a PhD thesis and may be published in the form of journal articles, books or 
used as training material. 
 
5. I understand that I have the right to withdraw my consent for the use of any data 
provided at any time and that the partaking in this research is voluntary. 
 
 
Signature of participant 
Name 
Date 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copies: participant 
Research file
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APPENDIX VII: RECODING OF FACTORS 
 
Nature of injury: 
Recoding category Original category 
Break/ fracture Cracked/ broken bone 
Bruise contusion/ bruising 
Sprain/ strain sprain/strain 
Laceration/ open wound 
cuts/ abrasions 
abrasions/ graze 
cut/ laceration 
open wound 
Burns (scalds/ chemical) 
chemical/ electrical burn 
burn/ scald 
Other 
dislocation 
crush 
foreign bodies 
amputation 
strike/ blow 
other 
swelling 
respiratory/ asphyxiation 
Concussion 
head injuries 
 
262 
 
Rank: 
Recoding category Original category 
Officer 
Captain 
Chief engineer 
First engineer 
First officer 
Chief officer 
Second engineer 
Second officer 
Third engineer 
Third officer 
Fourth engineer 
Electrician 
Senior officer deck 
Junior officer engine 
Junior officer deck 
Engine cadet 
Deck cadet 
Dual cadet 
Rating 
Deck rating 
Pump man 
Oiler 
SHN 
Chief cook 
Second cook 
Mess man 
SHS 
MO3 
Other 
Other 
Repair man 
Supernumerary 
Shore representative 
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Part of body injured: 
Recoding category Original category 
Arm 
Arm 
Hands/ fingers 
Elbow 
Leg 
Legs 
Knees 
Feet/ toes 
Torso 
Torso (front) 
Torso (back) 
Shoulder 
Internal 
Head 
Head 
Face 
Eye 
Teeth 
Other 
Other 
Groin 
 
Seafarers working department: 
Recoding category Original category 
Deck Captain 
Chief officer 
First officer 
Second officer 
Third officer 
Deck cadet 
Deck rating 
Pump man 
Senior officer deck 
Junior officer deck 
Engine 
Other 
Chief engineer 
First engineer 
Second engineer 
Third engineer 
Fourth engineer 
Engine cadet 
Junior officer engine 
Oiler 
Electrician 
Chief cook 
Dual cadet 
Second cook 
Mess man 
Other 
264 
 
Repair man 
Supernumerary 
Shore representative 
SHS 
SHN 
MO3 
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APPENDIX VIII: INJURY CLASSIFICATIONS 
 
Fatality 
A death directly resulting from a work injury 
regardless of the length of time between the injury 
and death. 
Lost workday case 
This is an injury which results in an individual 
being unable to carry out any of his duties or to 
return to work on a scheduled work shift on the 
day following the injury unless caused by delays 
in getting medical treatment ashore. Note: An 
injury is classified as an LWC if the individual is 
discharged from the ship for medical treatment. 
Restricted work case 
This is an injury which results in an individual 
being unable to perform all normally assigned 
work functions during a scheduled work shift or 
being assigned to another job on a temporary or 
permanent basis on the day following the injury. 
Medical treatment case 
This is any work-related loss of consciousness, 
injury or illness requiring more than first aid 
treatment by a physician, dentist, surgeon or 
registered medical personnel, e.g. nurse or 
paramedic under the standing orders of a 
physician, or under the specific orders of a 
physician or if at sea with no physician onboard 
could be considered as being in the province of a 
physician.  
First aid case 
This is any one-time treatment and subsequent 
observation or minor injuries such as bruises, 
scratches, cuts, burns, splinters etc. The first aid 
may or may not be administered by a physician or 
registered professional. 
Incident classification adapted from OCIMF 1997 [online]. 
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APPENDIX IX: INDEPENDENT VARIABLES ANALYSIS 
 
Rank Company A Company B 
Officer 52 (39.1%) 120 (34.7%) 
Rating 76 (57.1%) 208 (60.1%) 
Other 5 (3.8%) 18 (5.2%) 
 
Injury type Company A Company B 
Break/fracture 14 (10.6%) 22 (6.2%) 
Sprain/strain 22 (16.7%) 52 (14.6%) 
Laceration/open wound 52 (39.4%) 103 (29.0%) 
Burn/scald 9 (6.8%) 15 (4.2%) 
Bruise 20 (15.2%) 56 (15.8%) 
Other 15 (11.4%) 107 (30.1%) 
 
Location where injury 
occurred Company A Company B 
Deck 58 (43.6%) 156 (40.0%) 
Engine room 39 (29.3%) 125 (32.1%) 
Accommodation block 32 (24.1%) 88 (22.6%) 
Other 4 (3.0%) 21 (5.4%) 
 
Part of body injured Company A Company B 
Arm 55 (41.4%) 144 (38.6%) 
Leg 29 (21.8%) 77 (20.6%) 
Torso 11 (8.3%) 65 (17.4%) 
Head 35 (26.3%) 84 (22.5%) 
Other 3 (2.3%) 3 (0.8%) 
 
Department Company A Company B 
Engine 37 (32.2%) 82 (24.6%) 
Deck 58 (50.4%) 97 (29.1%) 
Other 20 (17.4%) 154 (46.2%) 
 
